Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

886A.2553/11–1250: Telegram

The Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Hare) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Jidda, November 12, 1950—1 p. m.

296. ReDeptel 161, November 7.¹

1. Reftel received here November 10 crossed Embtel 284, November 8² reporting my comments Salha along same line.

2. In reviewing proposed message reftel we consulted with Owen who informed us of further delay Davies departure until November 17 in order permit discussion with Department November 13.

3. In view this unexpected development we intend withholding action until learning outcome Department’s conversation with Davies proposed message.

4. Owen raises question whether our proposed intervention is advisable prior initiation negotiations because (a) it might give impression of exerting undue pressure on Saudi’s (b) might give Saudi’s idea Aramco seeking USG support in maintaining inflexible position (which he gathers may not be case) and (c) might exhaust ammunition which we might want to use later. He suggests this question of timing be specifically discussed with Davies. We have no particularly strong view on subject and can see that there might be certain utility in atmosphere—creating representations to SAG along lines proposed memo prior negotiations. However, we do not feel argument for doing so is so strong as to justify over-riding such judgment as Aramco may reach.

5. Believe if approach made it should be direct to Prince Feisal not only as Foreign Minister but as probable head SAG negotiators, although unconfirmed report from Mecca source has it Feisal endeavoring retire from leadership SAG negotiators.

Understand Feisal now in Riyadh and no information re expected arrival here.

6. Withholding any action pending further information and instructions from Department.

Hare

1. Supra.
2. Not printed. It read, in part: “Najib also expressed impatience at delay of Aramco negotiations and said SA Ambassador Washington denied having been cause. Added he hoped I would be able help in reconciling difficulties which might arise. I said wanted, of course, give any appropriate assistance but would not want success judged by ability to persuade Aramco accept fantastic bill of particulars presented by SAG. Only reasonable proposals can serve as basis for satisfactory negotiation.… Najib admitted list contained some items which would be pressed and some which could be modified or dropped but did not say which.” (611.86A/11–850)