Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

357.AC/8–1750

Memorandum by Mr. James M. Ludlow of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs to the Director of That Office (Bancroft)

secret

[Washington,] August 17, 1950.

Subject: Future Policy on Palestine

1. Present Situation

The Palestine Conciliation Commission is now established in Jerusalem and is in the process of conferring at the various capitals in the area with the governments concerned. Following these conferences and an assessment of the possibilities of further effective negotiation in the area, the PCC will prepare its report for submission to the General Assembly. So far as I know, no specific date has been set for the preparation of such report but it will probably be done about the middle of September or shortly thereafter. Jim Barco is of the opinion that the PCC will return to Geneva for the purpose of writing the conclusions and recommendations to the report. By Palun 377 of August 14¹ and by our circular telegram to the area of August 11² it appears reasonably clear that the general subject of Palestine and the future of the PCC will come up in the General Assembly. In view of the fact that Korea and the subject of Aggression will be the most significant items for the General Assembly to consider, the timing of General Assembly considerations of the Palestine problem and the extent to which we are prepared to go in committing ourselves to any future action with regard to Palestine are important.

2. Possible Courses of Action

While these courses of action obviously are not mutually exclusive they do indicate different directions which this Government’s policy on Palestine may take.

a. As outlined in Jim Barco’s memorandum,³ the PCC could initiate discussions immediately with the Arab nations and Israel with the idea of advancing a system of direct negotiations between the parties as envisaged, for example, by the Shukairy proposals. As you may recall they suggest that direct negotiations be conducted through the establishment of three committees under the general guidance of the PCC. One committee would consider refugee problems taking as the basis of its considerations the General Assembly’s December 11, 1948 resolution. The second committee would consider territorial adjustments using the partition plan map as the basis for negotiation. The third committee would consider any special problems which the parties themselves or the PCC might suggest as necessary to a general settlement. Should all states approached by the PCC indicate a general willingness to agree to some system of direct negotiation the PCC would report to the General Assembly that it had obtained or expected to obtain agreement from the parties to negotiate, thereby presumably obviating any lengthy discussion of the Palestine problem in the General Assembly. Should the PCC fail to get the acceptance of the Arab states and Israel to such a proposal it would so report to the General Assembly with the recommendation that the parties should be called upon to enter into direct negotiations. Presumably any General Assembly resolution would endorse the PCC recommendations thus adding weight to the requirement that the Arabs and the Israelis start direct negotiations. Coupled with the PCC efforts to start direct negotiations of the sort envisaged by the Shukairy proposal, this Government should reassess, if possible, its Palestine policy toward the end that we might bring pressure to bear upon the Israelis to the effect that it would be advantageous for them to agree to the suggested plan for direct negotiation. The advantages to be obtained by the Israelis for entering into negotiation along the line suggested would be: that since the plan was of Arab origin, presumably it would have to be endorsed by the Arabs; that it is of the utmost importance to Israel that it achieve peace treaties with the various Arab states, particularly in view of the unsettled world conditions which might prevent the United States and other powers from coming to the assistance of Israel if set upon by its Arab neighbors; and that, in order to assure a satisfactory compensation plan as part of the settlement of the refugee problem, the United States would undertake to make a very substantial loan available to the state of Israel in order that it might release some of its own funds for compensation settlement. A proposal of this scope of necessity would have to have the President’s approval, particularly since our bringing diplomatic pressure to bear upon Israel to accept such a plan of direct negotiation would quite possibly soon cause possible political repercussions in this country.

b. If the PCC should determine that it had been unsuccessful in getting the Arabs and Israelis to agree to some form of direct negotiation this Government could take the position with the respective governments that it was in effect “washing its hands” of any further efforts to get the parties to arrange for a peaceful and permanent settlement. This Government would take the position that it would be willing to assist, individually or in concert with other nations, the parties at any such time as there was any satisfactory indication that they desired to arrange for a permanent and peaceful settlement of their problems. This position of the Government in the General Assembly could take the form of advocating the abolition of the PCC or “putting it up in mothballs” until such time as it might be of some positive use. Concurrent with such a move this Government would indicate that continued United States financial support of PRA might be stopped, in view of our heavy commitments elsewhere in the world and of the unlikelihood that its continued operation would effectively resolve the refugee problem. We would, of course, have to reiterate our intention to support the three power statement of May 25 as the most effective means of assuring our continued interest in the maintenance of peace in the area.

c. If the PCC reports no agreement to direct negotiation this Government might take the position in the General Assembly that a fresh directive should be given to the PCC and the parties. This directive might take the form of a resolution calling upon the parties to enter into direct negotiations and stating that the first item for negotiation should be the assessment of claims and damages and the establishment of a system of compensation. The second order of business might be the settlement of frontiers. The PCC might be charged with making specific recommendations on both these matters in supervising the negotiations.

d. Assuming that the PCC report stated that it had failed to achieve any degree of success in fulfilling its functions this Government might urge that the PCC continue in existence, consider any possible means of negotiation and attempt to bring the parties together at such time in the future as might be propitious.

1. Identified also as telegram 42 from Amman, not printed.
2. Not printed; it reported that the Syrian Foreign Office had approached the French Minister in Damascus regarding whether Syria should support a move to place the Palestine question on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. The Department of State had asked the views of the PCC on the matter. (357.AC/8–1150)
3. Not further identified.