690D.91/5–550: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
priority
629. V. P. Menon, Secretary of States Ministry, sent for Parsons1 this afternoon and gave him following message which he said Patel would have given directly to me had it been practicable. Menon asked [Page 1409] Patel’s name and his not be used in connection and discussion this matter. Message was as follows:
GOI was loyally trying to implement truce represented by Nehru–Liaquat agreement April 8, but there was feeling of nervousness in view past experience with Indo-Pakistan agreements. This feeling heightened by presence Liaquat in Washington2 and fact that he had at once made speech which to Indians seemed in bad taste. Moreover, he had already asked US for two things, economic aid and modern arms. No one could object to his asking for economic aid, but Indians could only ask themselves against whom does he wish to arm. If he were to receive promise of arms at this moment, it would undermine pact of April 8 and destroy its prospects of success.
In outlining foregoing, Menon said that when India had moved its troops to East Punjab, Pakistan had thought India was about to fight and as result Liaquat came to Delhi and negotiated. He seemed to imply that in coming to terms in Delhi, Liaquat had gained time which he was now using to try and obtain modern weapons wherewith to balance India’s superior strength.
Parsons told Menon that US Government fully appreciated delicacy of situation and that he absolutely confident that no action would even be considered which might appear as intervention in favor of one side or other or which might seem to upset balance. He said success of pact was of immense moment to entire world including US as well as to two countries most intimately concerned and that no one was more anxious than US for it to succeed. Menon expressed appreciation of this.
Parsons then said we had been much embarrassed by recent Sulzberger story3 to New York Times from Karachi stating Ambassador Warren, worried by trend Indo-Pakistan relations, had come Delhi with result I intervened to bring about Nehru–Liaquat meeting. He said he had been very grateful that Government and press here had apparently realized this story pure fabrication and had played it down. Menon said he remembered this well as both Patel and Nehru had seen and commented on story, but had realized US Government or its officials would not have inspired it.
I believe Patel’s indirect approach (which presumably made through Menon because subject was outside his field and in that of Nehru as Minister External Affairs) is evidence of anxiety here over Liaquat’s visit and indication that restoration of mutual confidence of Indian and Pakistan leaders in each other has not yet progressed very far. It seems to me most important that anything which may [Page 1410] be said to Liaquat publicly or even privately should be studied with as much care from standpoint of Indian reaction as of that of Pakistan. Menon is, I fear, correct in his estimate of affect [effect] on pact of any indication of a promise of US arms to Pakistan. I hope Department will find it possible to keep GOI as fully informed as possible of US talks with Liaquat.
Parsons understands it our policy not to give any substantial military equipment either to Pakistan or India so long as outstandings dispute exists, but quite correctly in my opinion did not so state, since it would have been inappropriate make unilateral statement this effect in these circumstances.
It might be helpful if I could be authorized tell Menon informally that I understood from general information received my Government that Liaquat not thus far taking advantage his visit US to press US to support Pakistan in connection any of its differences with GOI in case, of course, such statement is true. I would like to add that I was sure Liaquat was not expecting arms from US under present conditions.