690D.91/8–1550: Telegram

The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Embassy in India

top secret

14. Eyes only Henderson. Dixon in conversations last night and this morning told me he has obtained Pakistan acceptance his proposal to receive and consider an alternative solution of Kashmir problem by means of partition and partial plebiscite subject to reservation that Nehru must commit himself to accept the plan for implementation of partial plebiscite before negotiations may be resumed at Karachi.

The Pakistanis are suspicious that Nehru may take decisions without fully informing Patel, Rajagopalachari and possibly other members of his cabinet of the proposed conditions and asked Dixon to go to Delhi today. Dixon however feels that negotiations have reached such a stage they should all be a matter of record and has drafted with Pakistan approval, specifically approval of Liaquat, Zafrullah, Gurmani and Mohammed Ali, a telegram to Nehru which will be despatched in course of the day. He permitted me to read draft message and suggested that I acquaint you with a paraphrase of its essential points should there come to your attention a distorted interpretation.

(1)
He informs Nehru that Pakistanis stand firm on position for impartial overall plebiscite in accordance with the three pertinent UN resolutions. Liaquat was unwilling in conversations of last week to receive or consider any alternative proposal.
(2)
In further conversations between Liaquat, Zafrullah and Mohammed Ali that took place Sunday and yesterday, Dixon assured the PM of his understanding of Pakistan’s position and said he was certain that UN officials would not hold he abandons his position [Page 1423] should he receive and consider an alternative proposal. Unless all possible solutions are explored Dixon feels that he has not completed his function and that if either government refuses to go along they will be “lacking a fulfillment of duty resting on both countries to give willing consideration to any plan that might settle the problem.”
(3)
Based on these assurances of Dixon’s, Pakistan is now willing to attend a conference on the basis that “limited plebiscite will not be insuperable objection.” Pakistan fears that proposed conference may break down due to India’s inability to accept Dixon’s conditions for a limited plebiscite. Dixon does not share these fears on account of the impression he had in Delhi that any plebiscite must insure free expression of the will of the people uninfluenced by presence of troops or threat of reprisals. Dixon believes also GOI recognizes that operation of a limited plebiscite will not present obstacles identical to holding of an overall plebiscite. It would be unfortunate if Nehru were to attend a conference only to find he could not subscribe to the proposed conditions of a limited plebiscite.
(4)
(a)Dixon therefore informs Nehru in advance that he proposes to set up a UN administrative body in the plebiscite area until after the poll is completed; (b) the chairman will be the plebiscite administrator or his representative; (c) other administrative officials will be UN personnel selected from experienced men who will function to carry on administrative and not initiate new policies; (d) the administrative power will be able to exclude from the area troops of every description; (e) if troops are necessary they will be so determined by the administrative power and the parties must provide them on request; (f) the administrative power will insure equality to both sides to secure the right to lay their views before the people and in other respects.
(5)
If Nehru feels inclusion in plan for these provisions to secure freedom and fairness for plebiscite after considering it “as a whole” make it impossible to accept it, Dixon requests that he be informed at Karachi.
(6)
Otherwise Dixon will proceed to draft his detailed proposal in the next four days and call a meeting at Karachi.

Sent Delhi 14 eyes only Henderson, repeated information Department 156. Eyes only Secretary.

Warren