357.AB/11–1750

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Howard Meyers of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

secret

Subject: Kashmir Dispute: UK–US Discussions on Future Action

Participants: Mr. Robert Fowler, CRO, UK Delegation to the UN
Mr. Michael Walker, First Secretary, British Embassy
Mr. Elbert G. Mathews, Director, SOA
Mr. William L. S. Williams, SOA
Mr. Edward Maffitt, USUN
Mr. Howard Meyers, UNP

1. On 17 November, Messrs. Fowler and Walker came to the Department to discuss possible courses of action open to the UK and US in the Kashmir Question, since matters appeared at a standstill.

[Here follows a lengthy account of alternative actions that is largely repetitious in background information.]

Out of these discussions the following plan was evolved and tentatively agreed upon:

a.
The UK should make an informal approach to the Indians, preferably to Bajpai who had recently indicated his great interest in the matter, and ask the Indians if they were prepared to present their proposals for acceptable modifications of the conditions previously suggested by Sir Owen Dixon for a plebiscite in the Vale of Kashmir. The UK should let the GOI know that, if such proposals were not forthcoming, the UK would support Security Council action confirming the parties commitments to a state-wide plebiscite, and determining what remained to implement this overall plebiscite. If the Indians presented reasonable proposals, informal negotiations could be entered into with the Pakistanis.
b.
If the Indians would not present their ideas of reasonable modification, or if the proposals presented were so unreasonable as to indicate clearly no Indian desire for negotiations toward partition [Page 1440] and a plebiscite in the Yale, then a meeting of the Security Council would be called requiring an explanation from the Abdullah Government regarding the 27 October resolution of the Kashmir National Conference.1 As a result of this meeting, a resolution would be presented referring to the Kashmir National Conference action and insisting that the Security Council be reassured that nothing which is being done in Kashmir will prejudice settlement of the problem in accordance with past SC resolutions and the prior agreement of the parties. Norway will be asked to sponsor this resolution.
c.
Either as part of the resolution referred to above, or as separate therefrom, a resolution will be presented by which the Council will appoint a judicial figure (preferably Justice Bagge of Sweden) to examine the existing commitments of the parties under the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, to determine wherein they have been implemented, and to report what remains to be implemented. Norway, again, will be asked to sponsor this resolution.
d.
Following the report of Justice Bagge and the parties comments thereon, another SC resolution will be introduced:
(1)
calling on the parties:
(a)
to carry out their part of the commitments which remain to be implemented;
(b)
to consult together to work out their difficulties in carrying out these commitments;
(c)
in view of the attitudes of the parties expressed in previous meetings as well as the UNCIP and Dixon reports, to consult together and examine alternative solutions to the dispute;
(2)
Appointing a representative or representatives of the Security Council to aid the parties in these consultations.

6. Mr. Fowler had only one reservation to this plan worked out above, believing that London might object to the language, in the proposed Security Council resolution which would require the parties to examine alternative solutions to the dispute [d, (1) (c)].2 He suggested that it might be better to refer only to working out ways of implementing the agreed solution rather than coming out so bluntly for an examination of alternatives. Mr. Meyers pointed out that the Council, in its 14 March 1950 resolution and the explanation made subsequently by Sir Terence Shone3 of the UK, had clearly brought out the possibility of the parties working for alternative solutions on the Kashmir dispute. Mr. Fowler agreed that we could always go [Page 1441] ahead with the preliminary approach before we have agreement on this particular point, and will telegraph London regarding these proposals.

H. Meyers
  1. Resolution to the effect that elections would be held for the formation of a constituent assembly in the part of Kashmir under India’s control, to confirm the state’s political relationship with India.
  2. Brackets in the source text.
  3. Deputy UK. Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Alternate U.K. Representative on the Security Council.