611.43/9–1450
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Horace H. Smith, Senate Liaison Officer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations1
| Participants: | The Honorable Norman J. G. Makin, the Australian Ambassador |
| The Honorable Percy C. Spender, the Australian Foreign Minister | |
| Mr. Douglas J. Billington, Secretary to Australian Foreign Minister | |
| Senator Tom Connally (D., Tex.) | |
| Senator Alexander Wiley (R., Wisc.) | |
| Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.) | |
| Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R., Ia.) | |
| Representative Thurmond Chatham (D., No. Car.) | |
| Mr. Francis Wilcox, Chief of Staff, Sen. For. Rel. Com. | |
| Mr. Boyd Crawford, Adm. Officer, House For. Affairs Com. | |
| Asst. Sec. Jack K. McFall | |
| Mr. Horace Smith, Senate Liaison Officer |
At 3 p. m. on Thursday, September 14, the Australian Foreign Minister, accompanied by his secretary, Mr. Billington, and the Australian Ambassador, by virtue of previous arrangements made by Assistant Secretary McFall, arrived at the Committee on Foreign Relations for a joint meeting of that group with the House Foreign Affairs Committee. As none of the Senate or House Members had arrived by that time, Mr. Spender and party were ushered into the Chairman’s private office, where preliminary discussions took place with Messrs. McFall, Francis Wilcox, and Boyd Crawford until the arrival of Senator Connally and Senator Wiley, when conversation covering substantive matters began. During the course of the conversation, Senators Fulbright and Hickenlooper and Representative Thurmond Chatham joined the group, the latter being the only representative of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Urgent last-minute legislative developments in the House of Representatives caused this unfortunate development.
The Australian Foreign Minister said that his visit was in a sense [Page 215] following up on the visit of the Prime Minister six weeks before. He had seen and talked with the President and hoped to have an opportunity to have a talk with Secretary Acheson in New York.2 He had particularly looked forward, however, to the opportunity to talk with the Senate and House Committees dealing with foreign affairs, for he wished to bring to their attention the conviction he and his Government have formed to the effect that the time has come for the negotiation of a Pacific Pact, similar in terms to the Atlantic Pact, which would make it possible for Australia and New Zealand and other interested countries to act more freely and effectively in the event of the outbreak of a global war or larger-scale outbreaks in the Pacific or the Middle East in taking immediate action that would be effective. He pointed out that Australia had fought in the Middle East throughout the last war, even though its homeland had been under extremely serious threat from Japan during most of that time, and as evidenced by the Australian action in sending troops and naval and air support to fight in Korea, Australia continues to stand ready to send her men to fight on foreign shores. He stated, however, that her Government does not wish to see Australia again placed in a position where they are obviously badly needed and withholding them for the defense of Australia’s own shores in the face of a lack of any guarantee that, in the event an aggressor moved against Australia at a time when Australian forces were engaged elsewhere, the United States and other powerful allies would be clearly obligated to come to Australia’s aid without delay.
The Foreign Minister pointed out that Australia was in fact frequently placed in the position of having to accept the decisions of the Atlantic Pact countries with regard to world strategy and to play an inescapable part in the implementation of these decisions without having the right to sit in on the formulation and discussion of the decisions before they are finalized. He said that the thought sometimes expressed that the British Government could be expected to maintain consultation in advance with the Australian Government did not always work out in practice. Frequently on matters of great interest to Australia she has been presented with a fait accompli on matters in which she felt a special competence to advise and was left no alternative but to accept and go along or reject entirely solutions that could have been much improved with her prior advice. He pointed out that in any world conflict, even though it started in the Atlantic, Australia [Page 216] should certainly be counted upon to play a part much greater than any part that could be played by several of the smaller nation members of the Atlantic Pact put together, and even Luxembourg has a right under the Pact to participate in the formulation of world strategy that is denied to Australia. He urged that this was an additional reason for the formulation of a Pacific Pact and stated that he thought that if this was not possible, consideration should be given to some method of providing better Australian representation in Atlantic Pact consultations.
The Foreign Minister then went over the articles of the Atlantic Pact, item by item, and pointed out that with a very minimum of alteration he considered that its provisions could be used as a basis for the negotiation of a Pacific Pact. He pointed out that even though the Atlantic Pact was in fact a very loose obligation, it was the type of obligation that would be much more satisfying to Australia than the more nebulous, though sincerely intended, statements made from time to time by American officials and leading citizens that, if Australia were attacked, we of course would come to her aid.
The Foreign Minister suggested that Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Canada, Great Britain, the United States, Mexico, and appropriate South and Central American states bordering upon the Pacific might well become the original members of the Pacific Pact. He stated that he realized that it would be helpful to have India and other Asiatic countries in the organization eventually, but he felt that there were many reasons why this might not be advisable at the present time. He pointed out that India would probably be the most desirable additional member from many points of view, but that he was convinced that Nehru would not be able to swing his countrymen behind him in joining such a Pact, and he was even doubtful if Nehru himself would wish to do so at this time.
Senator Connally thanked the Foreign Minister for his frank expression of his views on this matter and said that, as the Foreign Minister was no doubt aware, the desirability of some such Pact had long been under consideration in the United States but that this discussion had not yet reached the point of action, so far as the Senator was aware. The Senator thought that it was most helpful to have the views of the Foreign Minister, and he felt sure that his colleagues would wish to draw out in more detail the Minister’s opinion with regard to the current state of affairs in the Pacific.
Senator Connally inquired about the number of Australian ground [Page 217] forces that were scheduled to be thrown into the Korean fight and when it was expected that they would actually arrive. The Foreign Minister explained that over 2,000 have volunteered to fight for the United Nations in Korea and that he believed a force of 1,000 men was already in Japan or en route there for training prior to being staged into the Korean battle by the U.N. Commander.
Senator Wiley then asked the Foreign Minister about progress in building the economic strength of Australia, the progress of the large-scale immigration and settlement program, and the plans made for increasing the strength of the armed forces.
Senator Fulbright asked for information as to the exact size of the Australian armed forces and what total forces could be expected from the conscription program mentioned by the Foreign Minister.
Senator Hickenlooper inquired about the methods used by the Australians in ferreting out Communist subversives within the country and the program for dealing with them. The Foreign Minister described the system of proclamation of individuals considered to be Communists or Communist sympathizers, who, once proclaimed, were thereafter prevented from holding any job as a union official in a key industry or a Government job unless they went to court and obtained an order for their removal from the proclaimed list. He pointed out that if the individual charged took the witness stand and under oath swore that he was not a Communist, the burden of proof of Communist affiliation rested with the State. On the other hand, if an individual chose not to deny his Communist membership, under oath, then the burden of proof that he was not a Communist or a dangerous fellow traveller who should remain on the proclaimed list remained with him.3
In closing the conversation, the Foreign Minister, after answering the questions of the Senators, again stressed the importance of bringing into being at this time, with the utmost expedition possible, a Pacific Pact which would not only strengthen the determination of the countries concerned to resist but would increase their ability to do so by freeing them from the uncertainties that at present beset them with regard to the action that other countries facing their common enemy could be unequivocably counted upon to take.
The Chairman again thanked the Foreign Minister for his visit.
- For the Australian External Affairs Minister’s own brief account of this conversation, see Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, pp. 41–42, Regarding Spender’s two-day visit to Washington, see Assistant Secretary of State Perkins’ memorandum of September 15 to the Secretary of State, infra.↩
- Regarding Spender’s meeting with President Truman on September 14, see Simmons’ memorandum of conversation, supra. For the Secretary of State’s memorandum of his conversation with Spender in New York on September 18, see p. 222.↩
- A handwritten marginal notation in the source text opposite this paragraph reads as follows: “This is the outline of the Bill not yet passed by the Aust. Parliament.” A law to proscribe the Communist Party in Australia was passed by the Parliament but was rejected in a nationwide referendum in 1951.↩