611.94A/1–1550
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)
We called on the Generalissimo at 4:00 p. m. at his summer home at Tsoashan. Mr. Strong told the Foreign Minister1 that our whole group would call, this having been decided upon to give the meeting an informal social character rather than a confidential interview. The Gimo’s house is located quite high in the mountains but only about a 20-minutc drive from the center of Taipei. There was one pillbox with one sentry in one of the many curves of the mountain road, and we saw a few soldiers about but there was no great display of military protection. We were greeted by Ambassador James Yu, Chinese Ambassador to Rome, who had been on their Delegation at the last UNGA and who had previously been one of my students. Although someone else had been supposed to interpret, he had arrived late and Yu interpreted. Consul Edward Martin told me later that on the whole the interpretation was quite accurate and that there was no evidence of any attempt to color either my statements or the Gimo’s. The Gimo and Madame Chiang came in shortly and we were seated so that I could talk with the Gimo while Mrs. Jessup talked with Madame [Page 281] Chiang. After the usual exchange of pleasantries in which I gave the Gimo the message of greeting from Sigmund Rhee,2 the Gimo began to ask a detailed series of questions about Japan. His central interest was the question of communism in Japan and his firm conclusion was that after the Occupation forces were withdrawn there would be great danger that Japan would go communist. He wanted to know about the extent of economic recovery, about the success of the land reform, the general lot of the farmer now as compared to prewar, the state of the export trade and particularly wanted to know about the rice supply, the amount we were contributing for the importation of food stuffs and the increase in the population. It was particularly in terms of the increase of population and the shortage of food that he based his conclusion that Japan was likely to go communist. I gave him as accurate a picture as I could of the progress of SCAP in the various reforms and the conviction of SCAP that communism was well under control. I told him particularly about the lack of success of the Soviet indoctrination of the returned prisoners of war. It seemed evident that the Gimo was determined to believe that the communists would take over in Japan. He asked me also about my present trip and the various places I was going. He talked about the British recognition of the Chinese communist regime and asked me what I thought of their policy. I told him that I could not undertake to comment on British policy either to defend it or to attack it. I said, however, that it did seem to me that regardless of what one thought of their policy of recognizing the Chinese communists two factors had to be kept in mind. One of these was that the British Government is clearly opposed to communism in the whole world situation. The second is that the British in the light of their history and traditions clearly did not ignore the importance of the Far East. The Gimo said that his interpretation of British policy was that they wanted the final fight against communism to take place in Asia rather than in Europe, and that their recognition of the communists was designed to strengthen them to the point where the final clash would come in Asia itself. I tried to make sure that the interpretation of these remarks was accurate and it seemed clear that the Gimo was talking in terms of motivation of British policy and not merely in terms of a diagnosis of its results. Although the Gimo referred from time to time to the assistance which the Russians were giving to the communists, he did not talk so much in terms of the Soviet Union as in terms of communism. The Gimo had already stressed his view that communism presented a world problem and that the struggle with world communism would probably be settled in Asia, particularly [Page 282] in China. He said that he could not agree with my interpretation since the British recognition of the communists would undoubtedly strengthen them throughout Asia and would thus contribute to the success of communism throughout the world. In order to make sure that there was no misunderstanding, I repeated that I was not attempting either to attack or to defend the British recognition policy and that whether the Gimo’s estimate was correct it seemed to me that the other two factors were basic in British policy as a whole. There was considerable sparring since it seemed to me that the Gimo was trying to lead the conversation to a point in which he could argue that further American aid to him was the only way in which the world could be saved. He said that he hoped I would convey to President Truman his view that the situation in China was the crucial one in the world struggle against communism. At one point in response to his saying that he hoped the United States would realize the communist menace, I told him there was no question that we recognized the world problem of communism. I told him that we had to face that problem not only in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East, in Africa and in the Americas. I pointed out that there were necessarily short-range and long-range problems which had to be solved. (Mr. Martin told me later that the idea of “long-range problems” did not get over in the translation.) As the Gimo commented on the probability of the communists sweeping over Southeast Asia if not checked in China, I asked him whether the large Chinese communities in the Southeast Asian countries had turned communist and whether anything was being done to hold their allegiance. Again there was some confusion in the translation, but the Gimo’s general idea was that, if the communists were successful in China, one could not expect the overseas Chinese to stay loyal since they would of course follow the events on the mainland. He seemed to have no concept whatever of the possibility of influencing the opinions of these groups.
He insisted several times that he considered my mission to the Far East of great importance and said that I had the responsibility of determining whether China would be free or not and whether there would be peace or war. I pointed out to him in general terms the broad extent of the special consideration the United States was giving to the problems of Asia and the Far East and spoke of our conference in Bangkok.3 The Gimo was very particularly interested in knowing when I would be back in Washington. He asked for details concerning the further stops on the trip and how I planned to return to America. I told him that I expected to be back there the first part of March. In the course of the conversation, I was watching for indications [Page 283] of the Gimo’s familiar view that war between the Soviet Union and the United States would break out soon. While much of his conversation was along this line, he did not say anything very definite on the subject before I stated that, while we were combating communism throughout the world, we did not believe that the solution was to be found through war and we did not expect war with the Soviet Union. Not in direct reply to this but rather soon afterward, the Gimo in again commenting on the danger arising from the loss of China suggested that war was bound to come “in a few years.”
Just before it was time to break up the interview after an hour and a half, I talked briefly with Madame Chiang. She began at once with great bitterness to speak of the British recognition. She likened it to Munich and thought it was motivated by the search for the almighty dollar. Madame spoke with bitter contempt of the view that recognition had nothing to do with approval or disapproval. I tried to point out the general thinking in the views of some governments on the recognition question, but it was of course clear that there was no use in attempting to argue with her.
The Gimo seemed to be in excellent health. There is no question of the closeness with which he holds all the lines. For example, Mr. Jen* who lunched with us at K. C. Wu’s told me that he had twice talked with the Gimo before he had agreed to accept K. C. Wu’s invitation to serve as Commissioner of Finance of the Provincial Government. Jen wanted assurances that his financial administration would not be blocked by politics and that the Gimo would not appoint or defend people except on the basis of merits. (I was quite impressed with Jen. He is the one who had charge of the rice rationing in Shanghai when K. C. Wu was mayor. Mr. Strong told me that he considers he is as honest and as competent as his conversation indicates. He is evidently trying to do a good job and particularly to control inflation.) A variety of other incidental comments and bits of information further indicated the Gimo’s wide range of political activity and control.
- George K. C. Yeh.↩
- Syngman Rhee was President of the Republic of Korea, which Ambassador Jessup had visited prior to his trip to Taiwan: see vol. vii, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Reference is to the Conference of United States Chiefs of Mission for East Asia and the Far East which Ambassador Jessup attended in Bangkok, February 13–15, 1950; for documentation, see pp. 18 ff.↩
- Hsien-chun Jen. [Footnote in the source text.]↩