793B.00/6–950: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
839. 1. Tibetan mission headed by Tsepon Shakabpa and including Tseghag Gyalpo and Lachag Taring who acted as interpreter asked to make an informal and unofficial visit on me.
2. Accompanied by Steere, Gilmore1 and Forman2 I received them in chancery and we talked for approximately one and one-half hours. Both sides emphasized fact that conversation was on personal basis and no one was speaking for his government.
3. After usual exchange of greetings and small talk we asked re their plans. They said they wished go Hong Kong to discuss future relationship Tibet with representatives Peiping Government who were to meet them there. Unfortunately although their travel documents were in order they were not permitted to leave because according to UK High Commissioner, UK could not afford recognize Tibetan passport. (Comment: Apparently GOI prevented departure at UK request.) They had talked with UK High Commissioner June 7 and had asked him if UK attitude meant that UK recognized Tibet as under Chinese suzerainty and UK High Commissioner denied that such was significance of UK attitude. Final answer had not yet been received from UK re permission proceed.
4. They asked for our personal advice whether they should negotiate in Delhi, Hong Kong or Peiping. After considerable circumlocution we ventured suggest that Delhi might be most advantageous place for negotiations if agreeable Peiping Government since atmosphere of Delhi probably more friendly to them than that of Peiping or Hong Kong and communication with Lhasa easier.
5. They expressed some doubt re friendliness UK and GOI—of UK primarily because of reluctance to recognize Tibetan passports and of GOI because of Nehru’s announcement several months ago that GOI recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. GOI they said seemed prepared hand Tibet over to Chinese.
[Page 362]6. We pointed out that such interpretation of Nehru’s statement may not be accurate; that recognition of Chinese suzerainty did not necessarily mean India was agreeable to loss by Tibet of its autonomy and of Tibet being incorporated in a centralized Communist Chinese state.
7. They emphasized fact of Tibet’s difficult position and asked us to describe it to US Govermnent especially its long practically undefended frontier with China, limited defense forces and small amount of military supplies. They hoped through negotiations with Chinese Communists to maintain their freedom but if negotiations failed they expected invasion and without foreign help saw little chance of preserving their freedom.
8. Peiping over radio had offered Tibet autonomy but Tibet did not want autonomy; they wanted to stay as they were. We indicated concept autonomy to a Communist state might not be same as autonomy to states with other forms of government. They apparently seemed aware that if Chinese Communists could get their foot into door in Tibet they would eventually gain full control of country.
9. We explained to them reasons which prompted us to inform Lhasa several months ago that it would be inadvisable for Tibet mission to proceed US in present circumstances and they said they recognized that they had made effort to form closer ties with US too late. They said however they felt confident that in the end they could rely on American friendship and they hinted, although they did not say so openly, that they might approach US again.
10. We described Mackiernan affair to them and they said they had not heard previously of it. They expressed deep regret and asked if they could be of assistance. We replied that in our opinion Tibetan Government was doing everything possible.
11. We asked if they were still interested in obtaining high powered radio for Lhasa (Embdesp 274 February 3)3 pointing out that certain types radio might require an American technician to install. They said they thought their government was still interested but gave no direct reply re technician. Impression was that they would communicate again with their government in this matter. We made clear that thus far our government had made no decision in this regard.
12. At conclusion conversation they said they were particularly concerned at delay of negotiations because of telegram received from Lhasa to effect that Chinese Communists have made incursions Tibet’s eastern borders and captured several villages in one of which was mobile radio unit (Embtel 808, June 5).3