601.9193/7–550: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
21.1. At request Bajpai SYG MEA I called on him noon today. He showed me telegram just received from Pannikar Indian Ambassador to China, main points of which were as follows:
- a.
- Condemnation by Communist Chinese Government of US for latter’s recent activities re Formosa and branding of US as aggressor against China should not be dismissed as mere propaganda.1 Underlying purpose was to enable China, if it so desired, to call on Russia for assistance under terms recent Sino-Soviet treaty in which Russia promised assist China in case latter was victim aggression.
- b.
- Hundreds of telegrams from individuals and organizations were being received by Communist Chinese Government pledging support and condemning US for aggression against China. There seemed to be rising feeling in China that US was using Korea merely as pretext to strengthen armed forces in Far East which would eventually be used to assist Nationalist China against Communists.
- c.
- In Pannikar’s opinion GOI should redouble efforts get Communist China into SC so that Russia also could return. Unless SC could begin functioning with Russia and Communist China participating, world might well be drifting to third great war. One hopeful aspect was that Peiping showed tendency differentiate between problem of Korea and that of Formosa. In his opinion Peiping did not wish to become involved in Korean fighting. Its attitude toward Formosa, however, indicated firmness and determination.
2. Bajpai said that although certain allowances must be made for atmosphere in which Pannikar was working, nevertheless he considered that points made in telegram had much force and should not be ignored. He sincerely hoped that in not too distant future Russia and Communist China would be in SC.
3. I said I was wondering what practical benefit would accrue from presence of Russia and Communist China in SC at this stage. It seemed to me they would both be likely adopt SC attitude similar to that which they were taking outside SC. So long as they adhered to their present positions their mere physical presence in SC would not necessarily lessen danger of war. If they were admitted into SC their first move I supposed would be to denounce all actions taken during their absence by SC as invalid and their second move would be to [Page 369] present resolution condemning US for aggression against China. Making of such moves might give rise to considerable bickering and confusion but I doubted they would accomplish anything constructive.
4. Bajpai said there was always possibility that if Russia and Communist China were represented in SC way would be clear for private conversations outside of SC which might solve problem both of Korea and Formosa. He referred to settling of Berlin dispute as example. Another advantage their presence would be that it could no longer be said SC had degenerated into organization composed of group of nations revolving around US and other western powers.
5. I thanked Bajpai for the information which he had given me and promised transmit it immediately to Washington.
- For the text of a message along these lines sent on July 6 by Chou En-lai to U.N. Secretary-General Trygve Lie, see U.N. document S/1583.↩