793B.00/7–1550: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
96. 1. Embassy doubts that recent events in Korea (Deptel 48, July 11)1 have rendered Indian authorities more amenable to assisting Tibet. Embassy believes that Indian relations with and concern about Chinese are such as to cause GOI to maintain attitude on assistance to [Page 377] Tibet which. Embassy previously has reported, and that GOI would object to any initiative by another power, particularly the US to extend military aid to Tibet.
2. Embassy’s information obtained from UK High Commissioner is that GOI has delivered all weapons (but no more) heretofore asked by Tibetans (Embtel 301, March 8) and that latter were satisfied. We were also told that Indian military training group at Gyangtse had been strengthened.
3. On the other hand, we believe GOI might find it difficult to refuse if Tibetans themselves should request GOI (as suggested in your paragraph 2–f) to allow them to procure in India or abroad additional supplies and equipment they may require to reinforce Tibet’s defense. GOI might well have reservations on amounts of such “purchases” but might be prepared to agree to some negotiated figures if convinced Tibetans were ready to take risks of resistance and could defend country with effectiveness.
4. Embassy favors approach to Tibetan delegation as suggested in Department’s reference telegram but believes it should take form, under reference to their approach to Embassy (Embtel 887, June 18),2 of statement we had informed our government of Tibetan inquiry re US aid, and were now in position to tell delegation that US Government had given matter careful consideration and was prepared in principle to give assistance; and that Embassy had instructions to obtain particulars re specific needs and to discuss methods and routes of delivery, et cetera. We believe that early steps should be taken in order that Tibetans might have opportunity to consult Lhasa in advance of any discussion which they might have with Chinese representatives in India now that latter have arrived in New Delhi. We consider it would be essential in approaching Tibetans that we be in position to give definite assurance re US readiness to assist, particularly in financing such material (your paragraph 2–g). We also believe that Department should seek and obtain British support at highest levels for such an approach to Tibetans, as well as their agreement not to inform GOI about matter. Embassy’s thought is that if Tibetans request and press GOI for increased aid that matter might be handled or could be developed in such a way as to cause GOI to enter into some form of cooperation.
5. Matter of providing radio transmitter, et cetera, as well as other points in Department’s telegram will be discussed with Tibetans if [Page 378] Department approves Embassy’s above suggestions and instructs us accordingly.
6. Shakapba mission understood be Calcutta; we are endeavoring ascertain definite whereabouts and travel plans.
- Not printed. It stated that the Department of State and other interested agencies were considering the advisability of approaching the Tibetan Mission currently in India with a promise of secret United States aid in the hope that this would help the Tibetan authorities to resist Chinese Communist encroachment on Tibet (693.93B/7–1150).↩
- Not printed. It reported on a conversation on June 16 between American Embassy officials in New Delhi and members of the Tibetan Mission led by Tsepon Shakapba. In response to a direct query from Shakapba on the possibility of United States aid in the event of a Chinese invasion of Tibet, the Americans said that in fairness they could not encourage the Tibetans to believe that the United States Government would consider such aid feasible but added that they were without instructions to say that such aid would definitely not be forthcoming in such an eventuality. (611.93B/6–1850)↩