Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

790.00/4–1850

Record of the Conversation Between the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) and Representatives of the British Foreign Office, London, March 11, 1950¹

London, March 11, 1950

secret

Japan

Mr. Dening² opened the conversation by reviewing the discussions at Colombo dealing with a Japanese Peace Treaty.³ He said that it had been hoped that there would be available an American Paper on a Peace Treaty which would serve as a basis for deliberation. Failure to receive this Paper had hampered any constructive work on this topic at Colombo. Nevertheless, it was decided to establish a working party in London comprising representatives of the various Commonwealth Governments. On March 10 the British Government had received an inquiry from Australia asking them when the working party was prepared to begin discussions, and likewise the Government was faced with questions in Parliament with regard to a Japanese Peace Treaty. Some useful work could be done in digesting a Paper prepared at the Colombo Conference, but the failure to receive an American Paper was causing increasing embarrassment.

Dr. Jessup said that he had discussed with Nehru certain questions of procedure. According to Nehru, India was quite prepared to negotiate a Treaty without the Soviet Union and the Chinese Government, once those nations refused to participate. Dr. Jessup said he had raised with Nehru the question of how we could get over the initial difficulty of inviting the Chinese Communist Government to a Peace Conference. Nehru indicated that he would consider in a very different light the stationing of American troops in Japan under an agreement freely entered into by Japan, from the continuation of American occupation forces on the present basis.

Mr. Holmes⁴ inquired whether the position of Japan as a trading nation had been given adequate consideration. He said that if an attempt were made to close to Japan Southeast Asia as a market and a source of food supply, the Japanese would have no recourse but to look elsewhere for assistance. Mr. Dening replied that it was recognized that renewed Japanese industrial competition would have to be accepted provided, of course, competition were fair and unsubsidized. Dr. Jessup said that he found both India and Pakistan quite receptive to the revival of Japan as a trading nation. It was generally agreed that of the nations in Asia, only Malaya, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines remained anti-Japanese. Dr. Jessup pointed out that notwithstanding anti-Japanese sentiment in the Philippines, Japanese trade with the Islands was developing rapidly. There was general concurrence in the thought that anti-Japanese feeling would remain a political football in Australia for some time to come.

A Pacific Pact

In reply to a question from Dr. Jessup, Mr. Dening stated that, in his opinion, Australia would feel secure without a Pacific Pact, modeled on the North Atlantic Pact, if it could be reassured that American authority would remain in the area. Mr. Dening expressed the opinion that India’s well-known posture as a neutral in the cold war made her participation in an Asian Pacific Pact out of the question and that without India such a Pact would be valueless. However, he felt that India could likely be brought into the picture through the implementation of the Spender Plan.⁵

Indochina

Mr. Dening mentioned the conversations held in London on March 7 between the French and British Foreign Ministers at the time of the visit of the President of France. He said that responsive to an inquiry from Mr. Bevin,⁶ Mr. Schuman⁷ had reviewed developments since the recognition by Great Britain of the three new States of Indochina, as follows:

(a) It had been definitely decided progressively to increase Bao Dai’s authority;

(b) It had been decided to authorize Bao Dai to send representatives to Washington and London;

(c) The administration of Indochina will be transferred in the near future to a new Ministry probably modeled after the Commonwealth Relations Office;

(d) Bao Dai should be considered the principal obstacle to the spread of Communism in Indochina. The French are finding it difficult to maintain their position in Indochina and are drawing heavily on European sources. The United States, as well as the United Kingdom, had been asked for military supplies. (Embassy’s telegram 1326, March 9, repeated Paris 380.⁸)

Ambassador Jessup expressed the view that in the long run the best results could be obtained in Indochina by winning over the followers of Ho Chi-minh rather than by shooting them. He said that he had asked DuGuardier⁹ and General Alessandri¹⁰ whether it would not be advisable for the French to allow the Vietnam forces their own Officers and that DuGuardier had replied that the French would like nothing better. DuGuardier could not state for sure, however, whether the Vietnam authorities were aware of this. Ambassador Jessup said that the Indian representatives in Vietnam had been sending prejudiced reports and that these had carried weight throughout Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asian countries had not had their own representatives there and had no first-hand knowledge. He felt it would be useful if some of these other countries sent their own observers. It was then noted that in conjunction with the Siamese recognition they had decided to send a mission.

Dr. Jessup stated that he was favorably impressed with Bao Dai and some of his personnel. He inquired as to the advisability of suggesting to the Vatican that it exert its influence in the Catholic areas of Indochina with a view to winning over the Catholics to Bao Dai. He said that his conversation with the Catholic priests there indicated that they took rather a gloomy view of the progress already made in winning over the Annamite Catholics to the side of Bao Dai.

It was the general impression that the French had handled very badly their publicity with regard to recent developments in Indochina and that thought should be given to this problem by the British and American Governments.

In reply to a question by Dr. Jessup as to the possibility of other Asiatic States recognizing Laos and Cambodia, Mr. Dening felt that as yet Asiatic States were hardly Laos- and Cambodia-conscious. Mr. Holmes suggested that if tension in Kashmir were to die down, perhaps Pakistan might be persuaded to recognize Bao Dai and that the Indians would be less inclined to be unfriendly.

India-Pakistan Quarrels

Dr. Jessup inquired whether, if the India and Pakistan Governments were jointly to accept the Security Council’s resolution on Kashmir,¹¹ it would be possible to move in on the economic issues. Mr. Dening said that at Colombo there was an attempt to discuss economic issues, but it seemed that the financial delegates from these two Governments were of too low rank adequately to represent the views of their respective Governments. He recalled that in conversations with Assistant Secretary of State McGhee in Washington, it was suggested that the question of water rights be placed on a technical basis and divorced from political issues. Sir William¹² expressed relief that the Indians had been less intractable on Kashmir than had been feared would be the case. Mr. Dening likewise seemed to feel there might be some ground for encouragement in that Nehru and Liaquat were finally in touch with each other, and said that for the first time in months there appeared to be a ray of hope. Dr. Jessup quoted Ambassador Henderson as stating that Liaquat’s failure to accept Nehru’s invitation to tour the troubled areas was based largely on a fear that Nehru would hold the center of the stage.

Burma

Dr. Jessup mentioned that while he was in Burma he had discussed the question of the Commonwealth loan. He remarked that the Burmese were very suspicious of British intentions toward Burma and that they had suggested that the United Kingdom might be trying to manoeuvre them into an agreement to lower the price of rice and to enter into negotiations with the Kirins [sic]. Mr. Dening complained that the Burmese habitually make unlimited demands for military supplies, but refuse to indicate the end use for these supplies. He said the United Kingdom had no desire to see arms supplied by it fall into the hands of the Kirins [sic]. He pointed out that it was inevitable for consumer countries to try to keep the price of Burmese rice within reason and that the ultimate aim of all such nations was a lowering of the price of rice through increased production. Dr. Jessup pointed out that production would increase as pacification of the country progressed.

Communist Penetration

Dr. Jessup mentioned the Burmese fear of Chinese Communist penetration via Tibet. He said that Chinese imperialism was probably more feared by the nations of Southeast Asia than Chinese Communism and that the traditional imperialistic tendencies of the Chinese, Nationalist or Communist, might be a useful subject for publicity. Mr. Dening suggested that Chinese Communists might overplay their hand in Southeast Asia, with resultant anti-Chinese feeling which would possibly develop into anti-Communism. He said that India and Pakistan were also worried about Tibet whose capture by the Chinese Communists would facilitate Communist penetration into the Indian Peninsula. The Indians were very much concerned over Communist penetration of Nepal. Dr. Jessup pointed out that the Indians felt that the Nepalese political refugees might turn to China for help in gaining control of the Government in Nepal because the Indian Government had refused to give them such assistance. This would not be because of any pro-Communist affiliation but merely to get some foreign support. Mr. Dening concurred, stating that the Nepalese Ambassador in London had indicated that what Nepal feared was an invasion from the South rather than from the North.

China

Mr. Dening expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists were attempting to delay entry into diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom for as long as possible and said that the United Kingdom, for its part, does not wish to indicate over-eagerness on this point. He said that Hong Kong would not experience too much difficulty in holding out against a military attack and it could sustain indefinitely an economic blockade. He said there was evidence that some of the deported ring-leaders of the recent labor disturbance in Hong Kong were Communist agents.

With regard to the Sino-Soviet Treaty,¹³ he pointed out that, if in 1952 Port Arthur and Dairen were handed back to the Chinese Government, this would serve as a precedent for a Chinese demand to return Hong Kong and Macao. He said that his Government had no concrete evidence of friction between the Chinese and Russian Governments. In his opinion, the Treaty was, on the one hand, a propaganda success for the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, a tactical success for the Chinese Communists. He suggested that there were possibilities for the development of friction between the two Governments and said that the date of 1952 could have been selected for no reason other than as the end of a waiting period to see how the Chinese Communists would behave.

Spender Plan

With regard to the plan developed at Colombo for the economic rehabilitation of South and Southeast Asia, Mr. Dening stated that the program adopted was based on an amalgamation of Ceylon’s ten year plan and the so-called Spender Plan. What was proposed was a joint examination of the economic problems of the area at a meeting in May at Canberra. The British proposal to participate in this meeting had been submitted to the Cabinet far decision. He expressed the fear that at Canberra the various participating Commonwealth nations would be divided into the Asiatic “have-nots” and the European “haves”—a tendency which, if unchecked, might lead to serious East-West conflict. He said that India, Pakistan and Ceylon would be asked to produce a paper showing their present economic situation, what they are doing about it, and what outside assistance they need to carry out their programs for reconstruction. Thereafter the Commonwealth Governments might consider what they could do in Southeast Asia as a whole and then what could be done to fill in the gaps. He said that closely associated with this problem was the problem of sterling balances which was now being discussed in Washington.

He said that short-term problems would have to be handled on an ad hoc basis. However, he pointed out that Communism is an immediate issue and reconstruction is a long-term problem. Nevertheless, even an integrated plan for economic improvement, adequately publicized, will tend to stabilize the Governments now” in power.

Mr. Dening admitted the possibility that as a result of the Canberra Conference, the United States would be presented with a staggering bill. However, Mr. Dening said, the United Kingdom was approaching the problem realistically.

American Regional Head for Southeast Asia

Mr. Dening said that he had mentioned to Mr. Butterworth during the latter’s recent visit to London¹⁴ the possibility of appointing an American Regional Head for Southeast Asia who would be endowed with powers similar to those of Malcolm MacDonald who would work in close conjunction with him. He said it was realized that there might be practical difficulties in the way of such an appointment, such as the sensibilities of American officials in the area.

Afghanistan¹⁵

With reference to the Afghanistan-Pakistan dispute, Mr. Scott¹⁶ mentioned that the Commonwealth Relations Office had just sent a telegram to its High Commissioner in Karachi asking him to inquire of Liaquat whether Pakistan considered that approaches to the Afghan Government by the British Government and perhaps by other Governments would serve a useful purpose. In the event of a favorable reply, the Foreign Office will be prepared to discuss any such approaches with the United States and other Governments concerned.

1. This memorandum, by Arthur R. Ringwalt, First Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, was transmitted to Washington in despatch No. 1935, April 18, not printed (790.00/4–1850). It constituted a revision of the memorandum transmitted to the Department of State in despatch No. 1218, March 14, not printed (790.00/3–1450), in light of comments by Ambassador Jessup transmitted to the Embassy in instruction No. 139, March 29, not printed (790.00/3–1450).
2. Sir Esler Dening, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
3. For documentation on the preparation of a peace treaty for Japan, see pp. 1109 ff.
4. Julius C. Holmes, Minister in the Embassy in the United Kingdom.
5. Reference is to the program for extending economic assistance to countries of South and Southeast Asia, submitted by Percy C. Spender, Australian Minister for External Affairs, at the Colombo Conference of British Commonwealth Foreign Ministers, January 9–14, 1950.
6. Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
7. Robert Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
8. Not printed.
9. Roger Robert du Gardier, Diplomatic Counselor to the French High Commissioner in Indochina.
10. Gen. Marcel Alessandri, Commander of French troops in northern Vietnam.
11. Documentation on the Kashmir dispute is scheduled for publication in volume v .
12. Sir William Strang, British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
13. Reference is to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, signed in Moscow on February 14, 1950; for text, see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 226, pp. 3 ff. For information on the treaty and other documentation on Sino-Soviet relations, see p. 256 ff.
14. See footnote 2, p. 19.
15. Documentation on Afghanistan is scheduled for publication in volume v .
16. Robert H. Scott, Head of the Southeast Asia Department, British Foreign Office.