794A.00/7–2450: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
492. Personal for the Secretary from Douglas. On at least two occasions I have indicated the urgency of attempting to reach some common understanding with the British in regard to Formosa. I want again to repeat what seems to me to be an urgent necessity of making this effort as promptly as possible. Please do not misinterpret this to mean that we should alter the position we have taken. What I am suggesting now is a full explanation of the reasons which have influenced us to take the position that we have taken and combined with an agreed position in regard to both our interim and ultimate intensions. As an example of interim intentions Formosa might be placed in the custody of the UN until peace has been restored, security recaptured and the island disposed of under the terms of a peace settlement with Japan. I recognize of course that this presents difficulties vis-à-vis the Nationalist Government and I do not mean to imply that this example of interim intentions is the only, or even the best, way of clarifying our position but I do mean that we should make every effort as soon as possible to arrive at a common understanding with the British.
Let us suppose that the Chinese Communists attack Formosa and that there will have been at that time no common understanding with the UK in regard to Formosa. It is not unlikely that the more conservative elements of the Labor Party would sympathize with our position but would nevertheless, as they have done consistently since they came into power, give hostages to the less conservative elements of the party. They would probably take this action because the ghost [Page 389] of ’31 always sits at every council table of the Labor Party and influences it to take no steps which would result in a division of the party. In this case the hostage would be to refrain from supporting the US. Although, generally speaking, the conservative party would vigorously side with the US in regard to Formosa, there are other non-Communist but mushy-minded groups in Britain that would align themselves with the Labor Government. Thus the UK and US might divide on this important question.
So long as British and US do not see eye to eye, it is hopeless even to attempt to persuade India. Failure fully to explain our stand in regard to Formosa with a view to obtaining HMG’s agreement and with a view to persuading India, if this is possible, that our position is at least not hostile to her interests would, if the Chinese Communists attack Formosa and we intervene as we should intervene, produce more than a division between the US and the UK. It will probably also produce a division among the remaining free Asiatic peoples of which India is the principal spokesman.
It is not necessary to elaborate on the complications which would thereby be created except to say that under the circumstances recited and enumerated here, the Chinese Communists undoubtedly, having asserted their right of jurisdiction over Formosa would brand intervention by our armed forces as an act of aggression and would try to invoke the assistance of the Kremlin in accordance with a possible interpretation of the recent Sino-Soviet treaty. What the results would be no one can foresee but under the most favorable circumstances they would not be pleasant.
It may be impossible for us to explain our position to HMG and to arrive at a common understanding but I suggest that we should make the effort and make it promptly. If we are successful we might then be able to muster HMG’s power of persuasion and the powers of persuasion of the other members of the Commonwealth, individually and separately, to undertake the formidable task of persuading India of the correctness of our position and even, possibly, of their expressing to the Peking Government the serious consequences that would follow an attempted invasion of Formosa.
I am repeating my conviction about the urgency of this matter because there are a great many evidences of a substantial division of opinion in Britain on question of Formosa. London Times published a letter from Crossman,1 the New Statesman is hammering at the question and every member of the Conservative Party with whom I have discussed subject, while supporting us, believes that it would be very desirable to arrive if possible at some common understanding [Page 390] with the British. Menzies2 has indicated the need for such an understanding. A substantial group of fuzzy-minded people but nevertheless decent and insofar as I can tell uncontaminated by Communism called on me Friday3 and raised the question of Formosa. There are other evidences which it is not necessary to make reference to here but altogether they indicate we may be in serious trouble should the Chinese Communists attack Formosa and should there not be an agreed position with the UK.