Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

794A.00/7–2850: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom ¹

top secret   niact
priority

Washington, July 28, 1950—7 p. m.

522. For Douglas from Acheson. Reurtel 492 July 24. We agree high desirability reaching common understanding with UK on Formosa. Pls therefore urgently discuss matter in gen terms with Bevin² for purpose (1) getting US–UK joint position on immed aspects problem, (2) exploring with Bevin UN aspects Formosa question, (3) assuring Bevin we shld welcome further exchange views on longer-run questions on which we might not be able to agree at this time. Your approach shld be made as soon as practicable in view Malik’s³ announcement he wld join UNSC in Aug and shld reflect clear desire on our part give careful and sympathetic consideration UK viewpoint in our desire find better basis common policy in Far East. We maintain, of course, views expressed Deptel 132 of July 10.⁴ Ur presentation shld be along fol lines:

1. Action re Formosa taken by Pres as announced June 27 was for purpose eliminating or reducing risk Comie occupation and mil exploitation this strategically located island in crisis created by Korea attack, to safeguard sea and air flank of forces operating in Ryukyus–Japan–Korea area, and to prevent if possible general extension hostilities into wider areas of Pacific and FE.

Bevin will surely appreciate situation which confronted us in FE at time Korean attack. Demonstration that Sov orbit prepared use organized aggression in pursuit its objectives raised immed problem of other areas likely to be attacked and, indeed, problem as to whether USSR was intent on general war. Our action to neutralize Formosa was attempt to upset if possible any prearranged time tables and to limit fighting to Korea until general security situation could be assessed. We still have no assurances that Communist forces will not embark upon fresh adventures elsewhere.

From mil point of view, western strategic frontier for essential defense areas vital to US rests generally along islands extending from Aleutians through Japan to Philippine archipelago. With Kuriles already in hostile hands, Formosa’s location is such that in hands of power hostile to US it wld constitute dangerous enemy salient in very center that part our position now keyed to Japan, Okinawa and Philippines. In event Formosa came into hands Chi Communists and latter made it available to hostile purposes to Sov forces at time US forces heavily engaged in Korea, grave danger wld result for entire US position in western Pacific. Its value to potential enemy is shown historically by its previous use by Japan as springboard for mil aggression against areas to south. Further seizure Formosa by Chi Commies at hour when UN forces resisting aggression Korea wld be considerable stimulus to morale of destructive forces in Asia and thus work to detriment US and other friendly states having interests in west and southwest Pacific. Denial of Formosa to Chi Commies was in circumstances an attempt which we had to make as matter of elementary precaution at time of grave uncertainty.

There was in our action no desire to force an answer to the many polit questions connected with Formosa problem; on contrary, it was hoped polit problems on which various govts had divergent views chld be frozen until the security situation cld be clarified. We very much hope Bevin will see the great desirability of our putting longer-range polit aspects Formosa on ice and that we can take common view on immediate need for mil standstill. You shld not imply to Bevin we think mil standstill prevents our strengthening Chi forces on Formosa; in face of very great Chi Commie build-up along mainland coast, 7th Fleet may not be able guarantee Formosa against hostile land and forces on island wld have important role to play in resisting attack.

2. You can give Bevin complete assurance US has no designs on Formosa and specifically has no intention of seizing Formosa unilaterally for LS mil exploitation. Our action was not designed as step in any US offensive against mainland nor to place auths on Formosa in position to mount offensive against mainland. Aggravation highly inflamed situation Pacific by hostilities between mainland and Formosa, mil problems connected with Korean campaign, longer-range threat of Soviet-exploited Formosa to security western Pacific, and widespread polit blows dealt free world in Asia by Commie seizure Formosa at this juncture are the real and, we believe, sufficient reasons. In event Chi Commies launch attack against Formosa as they now threaten, 7th Fleet is under instructions perform mission indicated Pres statement June 27. In this contingency, or if Chi Commies intervene in Korea, our desire not to take action against Chi mainland wld have to be reviewed. We do not wish become involved in any way with general operations against Chi and wld seek to limit mil action to minimum requirements UN action in Korea and our determination to deny Formosa to enemy exploitation. If Chi Commies leave Korea alone (which we suspect they are not doing) and if they leave Formosa alone, there will be no fighting between US and Chi Commie forces. Further, Chi Commie attacks on Indo-China, Burma or Hong Kong would also raise very grave questions.

3. Pending settlement of Korean aggression acceptable to UNSC, US must continue patrol of Formosan strait for prevention hostilities between mainland and island. We recognize, however, that unilateral character our action has unsatisfactory aspects and we should be glad to have any further views Bevin has on this. Does he see any point in UN consideration of Formosa? If so, on what basis, in which organ, and how wld he see UN aspects developing? Wld UN consideration of mil standstill re Formosa be embarrassing and create serious differences among non-Soviet world? As we see it, it is unlikely that UNSC cld produce enough votes to pass a res on Formosa (not counting Malik’s veto) unless US and UK supported common line in SC. Since USSR or some other Member might bring matter into UN, US and UK shld try to concert positions on this aspect of matter as soon as possible.

4. We do not underestimate substantial nature long-term problems of Formosa question. Foregoing has applied to problems of immediate present. From longer-range view, we shall have to consider applicability Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, Formosa aspects Jap Peace Settlement, and ultimate status of Formosa itself. These questions greatly complicated at present time by fundamental divisions among govts of world as to Chi and recognition question.

There come to mind number of factors, generally unenvisaged at time Cairo Declaration, which lead us not to accept that Declaration as necessarily last word on subj Formosa.

(a) Commitments by USSR in connection with Cairo and Potsdam (e.g. independence of Korea and support of Natl Govt of Chi) have been grossly flouted;

(b) Record of Chi Natl Govt in Formosa, which assumed responsibility fol VJ-Day, has not been satis;

(c) It appears to us to be one thing to turn Formosa over to Rep of Chi as constituted at time Cairo Declaration; quite another to turn it over to Peiping regime which is acting in support of Moscow conspiracy against free nations;

(d) In view drastic change in situation in Chi and hostile totalitarian regime now established Peiping, are democratic countries not entitled to question the turning of Formosa over to such regime without consulting Formosans or applying principles of UN Charter applicable to dependent peoples? These and other aspects of the general problem are fully open to discussion as far as we are concerned, and we believe an early exchange of views with UK wld be helpful.

Dept recognizes complexity problem and importance early US–UK agreement if possible on immediate security and UN aspects without commitments as to longer-range questions.

You might desire explore with Bevin probable significance which policies on Formosa wld have for UK in connection with Brit defense position Hong Kong and Malaya, as well as for general peace Far East. We do not believe Formosa can be limited to a facet of Chi problem; it involves our attitude toward present Commie determination to seize Asia, a determination which US feels we must oppose in the interest our own natl as well as world security.

Acheson

1. This telegram was repeated to New Delhi as 135 for the Ambassador.
2. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin.
3. Yakov A. Malik, Soviet Representative on the U.N. Security Council.
4. For the text of this telegram, see vol. vii, p. 347. In it, Mr. Acheson emphasized the fact that United States action concerning Formosa resulted from the carefully planned aggression which had taken place in Korea and strongly insisted that no benefits should accrue to the Soviet Union and Communist China as a result of blackmail resulting from the North Korean aggression. (795.00/7–1050)