794A.00/8–450: Telegram

The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State

top secret

193. For Department use only. No distribution outside Department. Foreign Minister Yeh yesterday stated had talked with MacArthur for hour early morning August 1 and had told him Chinese Government would naturally deal with Department on all political matters but if MacArthur wished indicate interest in any specific subject he would be provided information; MacArthur indicated he had no interest in political problems of Formosa.

Much of hour apparently spent in discussing complaint by Mac-Arthur that in FEC Chinese Government was most obstreperous, blocked most of his proposals, and made his work much harder.

Yeh claimed he agreed that in some matters of particular interest to Chinese Government it had been stubborn, for instance re reparations which important to an impoverished government; on these matters attitude of Chinese Government cannot be expected change.

Yeh said that as background on preparations for MacArthur visit, when word received on July 28 conference immediately held at which was decided that Chinese Government would not ask for military aid but would have list prepared in event any member of party asked for it; list finished only hour after arrival of group; MacArthur asked for list after briefing afternoon July 31.

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Second decision was not to ask for economic aid because that not in MacArthur field.

Third decision was keep conference strictly on military level.

Yeh criticized briefing because in spots was not straightforward. For example, statement ground forces had 400 trucks erroneous; they have half that number; claim that there are “some underwater defenses” off possible landing beaches is lie because there none now, only plans for them; claim that 700 tanks operable untrue because in examining possibility equipping forces offered for Korea found only 450 operable and some of them questionable.

Yeh then asked Jarrett inform MacArthur of point he had not had time bring up. Prevailing strategy, approved by Generalissimo, was let Communists land and wipe them out on beaches rather than destroying invasion forces at sea before reach Formosa. (This would certainly be of interest to MacArthur and Struble because may mean failure Chinese Navy and CAF do full share in destroying invasion fleet, and ground forces not reliable or mobile enough to risk letting communists ashore in strength.1)

Strong
  1. Mr. Strong sent the following further report in telegram 222, August 8, from Taipei:

    “Remytel 193, August 4. Chen Tai-chu stated yesterday that Foreign Minister Yeh asked him reiterate he had discussed no political subjects with MacArthur other than those raised by latter, namely FEC and seizure of Japanese fishing vessels by Chinese Navy.

    “Re fishing vessels, which Yeh did not mention in previous conversation with me reported reference telegram, MacArthur simply stated no seizures had occurred for some time and he wanted Chinese Government make sure none molested in future. Yeh said he gave such assurance.” (794A.00/8–850)