793B.00/10–3150: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
1042. 1. I discussed Deptel 632 October 27 with Bajpai at noon today and left with him contents first three paragraphs to talk over with Nehru. I asked him when talking with Nehru to make clear (a) we were not suggesting any course of action to GOI since latter bore weight of responsibility for results action or inaction, (b) we merely desired to be cooperative and helpful and (c) if Nehru would [Page 549] like to discuss this matter with me before our dinner on November 3 I was at his disposal. (Embtel 1031 October 31.1)
2. Bajpai was courteous and apparently appreciative and frank. He repeated in utmost confidence that he personally had almost arrived at opinion that Peiping was mere puppet of Moscow and represented grave danger Asian peace. Reply to GOI note had just come in from Peking2 (Embtel 1031 October 31). It was not conciliatory. Peiping pointed out that it had informed India of its desire to solve Tibetan problem by peaceful means if possible. It could not afford in context world situation to wait long for Tibetans to make up their minds. It still was prepared to negotiate in Peking for peaceful settlement. Regardless of whether negotiations would take place or other outcome Peking could not tolerate any foreign interference in solution of Tibetan problem which was entirely Chinese internal affair.
3. In reply my inquiry as to whether Tibetan mission planned proceed to Peking, Bajpai said he did not know. Members had gone to Kalimpong to pack their effects and he assumed would receive their final instructions from Lhasa. GOI had recommended that mission not be sent in view Peking’s resort to arms.
4. Bajpai asked me what I thought China intended to do. I said that basing myself entirely on actions Communist-controlled states of past, Peking would continue conquest Tibet regardless of Indian sensibilities. After completion it would turn friendly disarming face on India; express its regret at being compelled take action disagreeable to India; reiterate feelings of friendship for India and desire as much closer neighbors to cooperate with India in ridding Asia of last vestiges of colonialism, etc. It would then quietly work out new adventures.
5. Bajpai said such course of action would not be entirely smooth. There would be some rough spots. Peking in order close Tibet entirely to India must order Indian mission out of Lhasa and Indian military training mission out of Gyangtse. It had been definitely decided to leave both missions in Tibet and he was drafting instruction to Panikkar asking latter to inform Peking at once of GOI decision. If Peking would object to presence these two missions in Tibet—and he was sure it would eventually—there would be breach which could not so easily be closed.
6. I said Peking may not concentrate all its efforts on Tibetan front. There was evidence that it was gradually increasing its aid to Ho Chi [Page 550] Minh and at any time mask of connections between Viet Minh and Peking might be dropped. Bajpai said that GOI was becoming more and more aware of these connections.
7. I cannot too earnestly urge that every effort be made to guard these telegrams re Peking and Tibet from leaks.
- Not printed. In telegram 1031, Ambassador Henderson explained that regrettably he had not received Department telegram 632, October 27, in time for his talks on October 30 with Bajpai and Nehru. He said, however, that, as his telegram 1030 of October 31 indicated, he had followed the general line suggested by the Department. (793B.00/10–3150)↩
- The text of the Chinese note, dated October 30, is printed in Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950, p. 551.↩