793B.00/11–350: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

1072. 1. During my talk with Nehru on evening November 2 (Embtel 1067, November 3)1 we touched on problem Tibet. He said he [Page 551] had personally been deeply disappointed in decision Peking, in spite of its knowledge of Indian sensibilities re Tibet, to launch invasion at time Tibet mission was preparing depart for China for conversations. He believed that friendly relations between China and India were in interests of Asian and world peace. He was concerned at attitude on part Peking which invasion reflected. This attitude, if adhered to, might result in considerable friction in future.

2. I did not think it would be wise at this juncture to say anything which he might construe as attempt to drive any deeper wedge between India and China. I therefore referred to recent statements made in Washington re Tibet2 and said that US Government also deeply regretted Peking’s action. It agreed with India that this action was not in interests of peace. We realized that in view of geographic and historic factors main burden of Tibet problem rested on India. US did not want to say or do anything which would increase this burden; on contrary we desired to do what we could to help. What suggestions, if any, did he have to offer as to what we might do or should not do at this juncture?

3. Nehru said he thought US could be most helpful by doing nothing and saving little just now. Series of announcements by US Government condemning China or supporting Tibet might lend certain amount credance to Peking’s charges that great powers had been intriguing in Tibet and had been exercising influence over India’s Tibet policies. He had seen reports that Chinese Nationalist Government was planning to present matter Tibet to UN. US could be of service in his opinion if it could prevail on Chinese Nationalist not to do so. Motives of Formosa in this regard would be suspect. Furthermore among charges made by Peking was that Chinese Nationalists had been active in Tibet. Presentation of matter by Formosa would give fresh ammunition to Peking.

4. I obtained impression that although Nehru was not planning to launch crusade against Communist China he had for time being at least lost much of his enthuiasm for Peking regime. Nevertheless, as will be indicated in another telegram he apparently is still convinced that Communist China should be admitted into UN.3

Henderson
  1. This telegram (not printed) dealt with the question of United States-Indian relations; related documentation is scheduled for publication in volume v.
  2. At his news conference on November 1, Mr. Acheson had observed that very little information was available on the situation in Tibet but the United States would view seriously any new evidence of Communist aggression in that area.
  3. Reference is to telegram 1077, November 3, from New Delhi; not printed. For documentation concerning Chinese representation in the United Nations, see vol. ii, pp. 186 ff.