320/11–1550: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
Delga 290. For Secretary from Dulles. Re Formosa: Formosa matters discussed yesterday and today at delegation meeting. (Re Delga 289, November 15.1) At conclusion Austin summed up situation by saying it was apparent to him that there was virtually unanimous opposition on the part of the delegation to the resolution as drafted and that this should be reported to the Department.
The objections raised by Mrs. Roosevelt and Senator Sparkman could probably be met by a redrafting of the resolution which would delete or subordinate the reference to the Cairo Declaration. Objections on the part of Austin, Lodge, Cooper and Ross are more fundamental since they feel that no resolution would be acceptable to the Senate or to American public opinion unless it made clear beyond doubt on its face that under it there could be no turning over of Formosa to Chinese Communists. I expressed the opinion that the differences within the delegation were such that I doubted that there could be anything like unanimity within the delegation on a form of resolution that the British would go along with or indeed that would have much chance of adoption and that if the Department wanted us to go along the lines of the present draft it would be necessary to invoke the legal authority to instruct the delegation.
My personal judgment is that it is unwise from many standpoints to present this item in the Assembly at the present juncture. From standpoint of domestic policy, there is great sensitiveness regarding [Page 573] Formosa. There is popular belief of a divergence of opinion between Administration and some Republicans and undoubtedly the contemplated action would be misinterpreted as a desire to put the future disposal of Formosa out of the US Government’s independent control just in time to prevent the new Congress from asserting its influence upon this most controversial item of American foreign policy. Also, from the purely military standpoint the proposal may have present disadvantages greater than advantages as it now seems that the need of the fleet to protect the Korean flank will persist for a considerable period of time, irrespective of fresh UN action whereas the UN action would have some tendency to make the Chinese Communists feel that they could concentrate their troops in North Korea without fear of possible attack from the Nationalists on Formosa. From the standpoint of relations with the UK and other friendly powers who disagree with us about Chinese Communists we doubt that any co-sponsorship would serve for long to conceal our present underlying differences and that the debate would be bound to bring these differences into sharper relief than if the matter were not publicly dealt with here. Under all the circumstances, recommend that we state at this afternoon’s meeting that in view of the rapidly changing and unpredictable situation developing in China since the item was proposed and in view of the prospective discussion of Formosa in the Security Council, we ask that the item in the GA be dropped to the foot of the agenda and that the present consideration be suspended subject to the possibility of taking up the matter at a later date should developments make this seem the wise course in the interest of international peace and security. Austin concurs.2 [Dulles.]
- Not printed. It transmitted a summary of the discussion at the 40th Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, the minutes of which are printed supra (320/11–1550).↩
- At the meeting of the First Committee at 3 p. m. on November 15, Mr. Dulles proposed that the debate on the Question of Formosa be deferred, and the Committee assented by a vote of 53 to 0, with 5 abstentions (U.N. document A/C.1/SR.399). This question was not taken up again during 1950; see telegram Gadel 162, December 5, to New York, p. 589.↩