Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

320/11–1650: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

secret

Washington, November 16, 1950—6 p. m.

Gadel 117. Fol outlines in greater detail than Gadel 113 Nov. 15¹ Depts position re El Salvador’s request “invasion of Tibet by foreign forces” be added to GA agenda:

1. You should support El Salvadoran request as item of important and urgent character under Rule 15. We have always taken the position that when a complaint of aggression is made to the UN, there should be an opportunity to have the complaint heard and considered if any state so desires.

2. We do not, however, wish to take initiative on this question. We doubt UN can bring effective pressure upon Chi Commie Govt to withdraw or agree to respect Tibet’s autonomy. Nevertheless, we think that GA consideration of the problem may be of some value, as propaganda in exposing Chi Commie actions.

3. If India’s special interest, due to proximity Tibet and past Brit Empire relations with Tibet, induces Indians to play active role in supporting El Salvadoran request, we would wish to support them. To this end, you should consult with InDel and ascertain UKDel’s reaction to Tibet complaint, explaining our position and that we wish consult with UK and India in working out joint position. USDel shld of course avoid giving Indians impression that by this action we are seeking to bring about worsening GOI-Chi Commie relations.

4. We see fol possible advantages from UN consideration:

(a) Propaganda advantage in public debate demonstrating the aggressive tendencies of the CPR Govt and falsity of the position which seeks to justify its actions in Tibet by saying that imperialist powers threaten the country. This might aid us in Korean situation and in hearings on question of Formosa and air force bombings of territory of China. It might assist in marshalling of world opinion against Chi Commie aggressive actions in Far East.

(b) FYI India, assuming it wld be a principal proponent of action, wld have a first-hand opportunity to learn what it is like to deal with USSR in matter in which USSR undoubtedly wld be in opposition. A widening breach in India-Commie China and India–USSR relations, probably resulting from active Indian opposition to Chi actions in this case, might induce India to be less neutral and more realistic about Communism in general. Hence India might be more willing to support US on Major issues against USSR and its satellites.

(c) FYI US support of Indian lead wld aid in developing better US–India relations.

5. A position paper will be prepared and forwarded shortly.²

Acheson

1. The text of telegram Gadel 113 reads as follows:

   “Re Tibet. Confirming instructions telephoned by Hickerson, Dept feels question is one of concern primarily to India and that any leadership given to its management in GA shld come from India. US Del wld therefore fol Indian lead in handling of item and shld consult Indian Del before initiating any action itself. This shld not be construed as suggesting any course for Indians to fol or needling them to take the lead on this item.

   “Re Salvadoran proposal inclusion Tibet item GA agenda, US wld of course vote in favor its inclusion in line with our historical policy of not objecting free discussion controversial questions. Indian Del shld be so informed.” (320/11–1550)

   The text of the Salvadoran proposal is contained in U.N. document A/1453.

2. Not printed. Concerning United Nations handling of the Tibetan matter, see telegram 794, November 28, to New Delhi, p. 583.