611.931/11–2750
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
I believe that our fundamental policy execution with respect to Communist China is confused. The reasons for this confusion are understandable and require no discussion. I feel strongly, however, that the confusion must be cleared away because many of our actions are mutually antagonistic and self-defeating in the absence of clarity in our own minds as to what we seek.
I think this is a time for over simplification of the problem.
Our objective, of course, is to destroy the basis for a durable alliance between the Soviet Union and China. Three policies or courses of basic action could logically advance us toward this objective.
First, we could make an effort to replace the present Communist regime by another Chinese government. The only possible available substitute is Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government. I do [Page 582] not think anyone who knows China believes that in the foreseeable future Chiang Kai-shek could return to the mainland and reinstall himself as the national government unless accompanied by American forces, including infantry, on a scale which the world situation and our military resources would make impossible. Such a judgment, of course, does not exclude the very real possibility that under certain circumstances we might encourage him and within reason support him in making such an effort.
Second, we could seek to change the character of the present Peiping government first to neutrality and then to a neutrality benevolent to us, and lastly to a firm friendship. Such a course would seek to exploit the historic conflicts of national interest between Russia and China, and it would rely on the asserted nationalistic orientation of the Chinese people. It was on this course that from the outset the British launched themselves with more precipitance than judgment. It was this course, I believe, which we visualized we would accept a year ago as a long-term pattern for action. The attitude and actions of the Chinese Communists themselves, however, by this time a year ago had made clear that this avenue was closed.
Third, we could seek to destroy China as a useful ally to Russia by concentrating our efforts on fragmentation. There are powerful traditional and current centrifugal forces at work in China.
The fact that we cannot pursue simultaneously all three of these basic courses or any two of them is self-evident. Obviously, we cannot attempt to wean Peiping from Moscow while we recognize Chiang, nor can we give political assurances to potential defectors on the mainland while we support Chiang for ultimate return to the mainland.
I believe that the third course holds by far the greatest promise of success and should be pursued without regard to the fact that its pursuit would foreclose the other two possibilities. It would not require, however, withdrawal of recognition or support from Chiang on Formosa, nor would it mean that we were abandoning any ultimate hope of a successor government in Peiping which would be anti-Russian. The difficulties are great. Not least of them is the fact that this policy would require heavy reliance on … measures, in the execution of which we are still inexperienced and inept. It would also require conscious restraint, e.g., we should not encourage rebellion where the odds of failure were too great.
The decision which I feel is required does not necessarily have to be published. The important thing to my mind is that a handful of men (you, Doc Matthews, Phil Jessup and the Secretary; the JCS, [Page 583] General Marshall and Lovett; General Smith1 and the President) should be agreed among themselves on one of these three policies and test against it every move before important action is taken.2