794A.00/12–150
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Handling of Formosa Question in the General Assembly
Attached hereto is UNP’s telegram giving new instructions to our delegation respecting the handling of the “Question of Formosa” in the General Assembly.1
In substance, under the new instructions our delegation would seek to have the question of Formosa dropped from the agenda of this Assembly and to prevent consideration of the question by the United Nations for a year. This constitutes a complete reversal of our position, as outlined by the Secretary in his statement at the opening of this General Assembly and permits the direct inference that we propose to continue the course of action with respect to Formosa which we initiated in June and which has since that date caused considerable uneasiness among friendly governments. The action proposed would, in the circumstances, probably create the widespread impression that we are no longer agreeable to UN consideration of the question on its merits and that we intend come what may to follow an intimate power relationship with the Nationalists on Formosa (Ref. CA’s memo of November 22, 1950, subject: Draft Progress Report on Formosa).2 Even if we have decided upon such a course, there would seem to be strong arguments against giving public emphasis to it until those countries supporting UN action in Korea have convinced themselves that there is no possibility of a negotiated settlement there.
The attitude of the Chinese Communists as recently revealed in Korea and New York probably creates a more understanding attitude on the part of our friends and allies for such a course. However, it is by no means clear that, at the present juncture, we could count upon material, or even moral support from them. It seems likely that, if the Chinese Communists continue their present course, support for a strong U.S. position respecting Formosa may grow. If we wish to have such support we should have the requisite patience and demonstrate a willingness to make concessions to the views of our friends and [Page 586] allies. CA is of the opinion that before the U.S. takes the position set; forth in the attached telegram, the views of our friends and allies should be sought.
We must consider the possibility that within the next months there will again be a concentration of Communist strength for an attempt to invade Formosa. If the question of Formosa’s status is under study by the UN, this circumstance in itself might tend to deter Communist action; at least, it would enable us to say that in using U.S. forces to oppose the invasion we were maintaining the status quo while the UN is considering the problem. On the other hand it would seem that having ourselves in effect removed the question from consideration by the UN, we would deny ourselves even that indirect UN cover for our action. The weight of these considerations is obviously lessened, by developments in Korea during the past week, but it is not yet clear that they have disappeared. Nor is it clear that study of the question of Formosa by the GA would seriously restrict our freedom of action, if hostilities with Communist China should expand.
It is to be considered, further, that the “question of Formosa” must be clarified to a degree before we can expect to achieve any progress toward the signing of a peace treaty with Japan to which either the United Kingdom or the National Government would accord.
CA remains of the view that our interests would be best served by providing for continuing and, at least, nominal study of the question of Formosa by some organ of the General Assembly, such as recommended in the draft position paper on Formosa,3 unless it is clear that we should, for one reason or another, be unable to support such a line of action without prejudging the proposed study during preliminary debate. If, on the other hand, we should have to take an adamant stand on the substance of the question at variance to the known views of our friends and allies and thereby provide another public evidence of disagreement, we had better permit the matter to drop, providing this, in turn, is agreeable to our friends and allies.
In summary, CA believes that we must exercise the utmost care lest our unwillingness or inability to make the slightest concession to the views of our allies as regards Formosa give new aid and comfort to the USSR in its campaign to isolate the United: States in the West Pacific area.
- A note on the file copy indicates that the reference is to a telegram drafted on November 30 in the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs. Presumably, this draft telegram was sent out by the Department of State as telegram Gadel 162, December 5, to New York, p. 589. Telegram Gadel 162 bears the drafting date November 30 and the notation by Mr. Clubb that he cleared it for the Office of Chinese Affairs subject to the qualifications set forth in his memorandum of December 1.↩
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