Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 37 Series

The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

top secret

Washington, December 4, 1950.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: Reference is made to your letter of November 15, 1950, requesting the United States to defer taking an official position or introducing a resolution respecting Formosa in the United Nations until the Joint Chiefs of Staff have had an opportunity to comment on the draft resolution enclosed with my letter of November 11 and expressing the view that it might be timely and appropriate for the National Security Council to review the current position of the United States with respect to Formosa.

Consideration of the status of Formosa in the United Nations General Assembly has been deferred through a rearrangement of the order of agenda items in the concerned committee and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in Mr. Lovett’s letter of November 24 will be given full consideration in formulating any official United States position or draft resolution respecting this question.

The Department of State concurs in the view of the Department of Defense that it would be desirable for the National Security Council to review United States policy respecting Formosa. The Senior Staff of the National Security Council has already discussed this problem briefly.

The present views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would, of course be an important factor in such a study. In this connection, it is noted that the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in Mr. Lovett’s letter of November 24, 1950 indicate that the military neutralization of Formosa would not, under present circumstances, meet United States military strategic needs. This appears to be a substantial modification of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained originally in their memorandum of November 24, 1948.¹ It is not known to what extent existing circumstances may have caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise their opinion respecting the strategic importance of Formosa set forth in NSC 37/3² and reaffirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memoranda of April 2, 1949³ and August 17, 1949.⁴

The Department of State accordingly recommends that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be asked to review their previous estimates respecting Formosa in order that their current views may be available for the consideration of the National Security Council in its examination of the Formosa problem. The present views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the following questions would be particularly helpful:

(1) Would denial of Formosa as a base to the Chinese Communists meet the military strategic needs of the United States, in so far as these needs can be foreseen? If not, what are the additional United States strategic needs respecting the island?

(2) If these military needs cannot be met through diplomatic and economic measures, should the United States accept a commitment of its armed forces to insure that they are met?

It is believed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider these questions both from the short-term viewpoint, taking into account special circumstances arising from hostilities in Korea, and from the long-term viewpoint.

Sincerely yours,

Dean Acheson

1. Text in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ix, p. 261.
2. Dated February 111, 1949; text in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ix, p. 284.
3. Not printed.
4. Text in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ix, p. 376.