Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

751G.5 MAP/12–750: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

secret

Paris, December 7, 1950—8 p. m.

3244. Tomap. Reference Legtel Saigon to Department 987 repeated information Paris 482 dated December 2.¹

1. French military unable to understand background from which following statement was made in Legtel 987: “We fail to understand here why the French in Paris based their request for the carrier primarily to prevent smuggling from Hainan.”

2. French military have emphasized need for carrier in Indo-China and have from time to time enumerated reasons why carrier is required. Order in which French have enumerated reasons for desiring carrier have not necessarily been priority of reasons nor priority of importance of the missions which would be assigned carrier. Embtel 2991 dated November 27² gave “closing of smuggling routes” as one of four reasons why CVE was urgently needed in Indochina waters. However, “cooperation with ground forces in providing air coverage in areas where airfields are too distant or dangerously adjacent to enemy facilities” and providing a “striking force readily available for any area in Indochina” are certainly primary reasons advanced in that radio, although not enumerated in that priority.

3. French point out that there exist only two operational airdromes in northern Indochina, one at Hanoi and one at Haiphong. These two airdromes are exposed to enemy attacks, especially by guerrillas, and they can be paralyzed if military situation deteriorates. In the latter case, action of naval aviation would become primary and only aviation available in that area. Furthermore, Viet Minh control areas south of Hanoi–Haiphong and nearest available operational fields are some 300 miles south in the Hue area. French readily recognize and state that missions such as closing smuggling routes and ferrying airplanes are quite secondary.

4. Department will have noted statement by General De Lattre (Embtel 3218 to Department, repeated Saigon 242 December 6) that greatest French needs were planes and aircraft carrier.

In recent conversation with me Pleven brought this matter up and also stressed its urgency on same grounds.³

Department pass Saigon; sent Department 3244, repeated information Saigon 245.

Bruce

1. The reference telegram read as follows:

   “If US Navy absolutely cannot spare carrier there is of course no point in continuing argument. If the Chinese, however, openly invade Indochina and particularly if they place planes at the disposal of the Viet Minh, carrier operating off the coastline northeast Indochina is the only answer in view of the fact there are no good airfields in that area. We fail to understand here why the French in Paris based their request for the carrier primarily to prevent smuggling from Hainan. We recognize privateers and other equipment being sent here would serve that purpose. Even if Chinese troops do not openly invade Indochina, carrier based planes are necessary for defense of the delta and particularly for quick immediate close support of coastal area which French plan to defend. General Brink concurs.” (751G.5 MAP/12–2550)

2. Not printed.

3. Telegram 3181 to Paris, December 9, read as follows: “FYI only Dept Nov 30 queried Def (urtel 3244 Dec 7) whether disapproval carrier loan (Deptel Saigon 645 Nov 27 rptd Paris 2931) wld be reconsidered in view urtel 2991 Nov 27 and Saigon 943 Nov 25. JCS presently studying quesition.” (751G.5 MAP/11–2750) Telegram 852 to Saigon, January 10, 1951, repeated to Paris as telegram 3644, read as follows: “Def reconfirms disapproval carrier loan (Deptel 721 Dec 9) stating US security interests preclude any further carrier transfers on either grant or loan basis. Dept advising Fr Emb Wash.

   “Leg may wish consider advisability suggesting construction airfields by Fr with presently available equip.” (751G.5 MAP/1–1051)