Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Department of State Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 63D351

Memorandum by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council

top secret
NSC 64/1

Washington, December 21, 1950.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on the Position of the United States With Respect to Indochina

Reference: NSC 64

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the enclosed memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject is circulated herewith for the information and consideration of the National Security Council and referred to the NSC Staff for use in the preparation of a report for Council consideration.¹

In transmitting the enclosure, the Secretary of Defense stated that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained therein are based on their review of a proposed draft statement of policy on Indochina which was formulated by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee early in October.²

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)

top secret

Washington, 28 November 1950.

Subject: Possible Future Action in Indochina

1. In accordance with the request contained in your memorandum, dated 13 October 1950,³ the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied the “Proposed Statement of U.S. Policy on Indochina for NSC Consideration”, which you enclosed, in the light of the message enclosed herewith (Enclosure “A” [Subenclosure “A”])⁴ from Brigadier General F. G. Brink (USA), Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina. You will recall that the Joint Chiefs of Staff withheld final comment on the subject draft policy statement until the Brink report was received.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the statement of United States policy proposed by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee conforms generally to their previously expressed views, including those contained in their memorandum to you on Indochina dated 27 October 1950.⁵ They are of the opinion, however, that the draft statement of United States policy on Indochina proposed by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee should be recast so as to meet more effectively the immediate and critical situation in that country. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the following statement of short-term and long-term policies which they recommend be substituted for those included in the paper prepared by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the military problems of Indochina are closely interrelated with the political problems of the area. Accordingly, many of the policies recommended herein lie largely in the political field. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, however, that the fundamental causes of the deterioration in the Indochinese security situation lie in the lack of will and determination on the part of the indigenous people of Indochina to join wholeheartedly with the French in resisting communism. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, without popular support of the Indochinese people, the French will never achieve a favorable long-range military settlement of the security problem of Indochina.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following short-term objectives for Indochina:

Short-Term Objectives

a. The United States should take action, as a matter of urgency, by all means practicable short of the actual employment of United States military forces, to deny Indochina to communism.

b. As long as the present situation exists, the United States should continue to insure that the primary responsibility for the restoration of peace and security in Indochina rests with the French.

c. The United States should seek to develop its military assistance program for Indochina based on an over-all military plan prepared by the French, concurred in by the Associated States of Indochina, and acceptable to the United States.

(1) Both the plan and the program should be developed and implemented as a matter of urgency. It should be clearly understood, however, that United States acceptance of the plan is limited to the logistical support which the United States may agree to furnish. The aid provided under the program should be furnished to the French in Indochina and to the Associated States. The allocation of United States military assistance as between the French and the national armies of Indochina should be approved by the French and United States authorities in Indochina.

(2) Popular support of the Government by the Indochinese people is essential to a favorable settlement of the security problem of Indochina. Therefore, as a condition to the provision of those further increases in military assistance to Indochina necessary for the implementation of an agreed over-all military plan, the United States Government should obtain assurances from the French Government that:

(a) A program providing for the eventual self-government of Indochina either within or outside of the French Union will be developed, made public, and implementation initiated at once in order to strengthen the national spirit of the Indochinese in opposition to communism.

(b) National armies of the Associated States of Indochina will be organized as a matter of urgency. While it is doubtful that the build-up of these armies can be accomplished in time to contribute significantly to the present military situation, the direct political and psychological benefits to be derived from this course would be great and would thus result in immediate, although indirect, military benefits.

(c) Pending the formation and training of Indochinese national armies as effective units, and as an interim emergency measure, France will dispatch sufficient additional armed forces to Indochina to insure that the restoration of peace and internal security in that country will be accomplished in accordance with the timetable of the over-all military plan for Indochina.

(d) France will change its political and military concepts in Indochina to:

i. Eliminate its policy of “colonialism”.

ii. Provide proper tutelage to the Associated States.

iii. Insure that a suitable military command structure, unhampered by political interference, is established to conduct effective and appropriate military operations. The effective implementation of these changes will require competent and efficient political and military leaders who will be able to cope with the conditions in that country.

(3) At an appropriate time the United States should institute checks to satisfy itself that the conditions set forth in subparagraph c–(2) above are being fulfilled.

d. The United States should exert all practicable political and diplomatic measures required to obtain the recognition of the Associated States by the other non-communist states of Southeast and South Asia.

e. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist forces against Indochina, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China but should, in concert with the United Kingdom, support France and the Associated States by all means short of the actual employment of United States military forces. This support should include appropriate expansion of the present military assistance program and endeavors to induce States in the neighborhood of Indochina to commit armed forces to resist the aggression.

f. The United States should immediately reconsider its policy toward Indochina whenever it appears that the French Government may abandon its military position in that country or plans to refer the problem of Indochina to the United Nations. Unless the situation throughout the world generally, and Indochina specifically, changes materially, the United States should seek to dissuade the French from referring the Indochina question to the United Nations.

g. Inasmuch as the United States-sponsored resolution, “Uniting for Peace”, has been adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations,⁶ and should a situation develop in Indochina in a manner similar to that in Korea in which United Nations forces were required, the United States would then probably be morally obligated to contribute its armed forces designated for service on behalf of the United Nations. It is, therefore, in the interests of the United States to take such action in Indochina as would forestall the need for the General Assembly to invoke the provisions of the resolution, “Uniting for Peace”.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following long-term objectives for Indochina:

Long-Term Objectives

a. United States security interests demand that this government, by all means short of the actual employment of United States military forces, seek to prevent the further spread of communism in Southeast Asia generally and, in particular, in French Indochina.

b. The United States should seek to insure the establishment of such conditions in Indochina that no foreign armed forces will be required for the maintenance of internal security.

c. The United States should continue to press the French to carry out in letter and in spirit the program referred to in paragraph 4—c–(2)–(a) above, providing for the eventual self-government of Indochina either within or outside of the French Union.

d. The United States should continue to favor the entry of the three Associated States of Indochina into the United Nations.

e. The United States should encourage the establishment of an appropriate form of regional security arrangement embracing Indochina and the other countries of Southeast Asia under Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter.

6. There is enclosed (Enclosure “B” [Subenclosure “B”]) for possible use by the National Security Council Staff the Analysis which was prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with their study of the problem. This Analysis, however, has not received their detailed approval.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

[Subenclosure “A”]

[Here follows telegram 763 from Saigon, November 4; for text, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 8, pages 405–410.]

[Subenclosure “B”]

Analysis Prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee

top secret

[Washington, November 17, 1950.]

Analysis

1. On 5 April 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in which it was stated, among other things, that:

[Here follows point 2 (subparagraphs a through g) of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State in a letter dated April 14; for text, see page 780.]

2. The series of defeats suffered recently by the French in northern Tonkin serves to focus attention upon the urgency of the current military situation in Indochina and points up the fact that the Viet Minhs now constitute a direct threat to the French military position in Indochina. The current military situation is serious since the effect produced by the impact of French defeats can gain momentum which may have dire repercussions upon an already deteriorating political situation in Southeast Asia. By taking over border posts, the Viet Minhs now can maintain uninterrupted liaison with Communist China. At this time when a majority of the Indochinese are favorably disposed toward the Viet Minhs, as opposed to the French and Bao Dai, any increases in popular support of the Viet Minhs could have alarming consequences. The deteriorating military and political situation in French Indochina demands that the United States policy toward Indochina be recast in order to assist in restoring the balance in favor of the French and Vietnamese.

3. There is an important difference between the strategic importance of Indochina to the United States in a major war and its strategic importance in a cold war. Current war plans do not contemplate the deployment of United States military forces for the retention of Indochina in the event of global war. However, if the communists gained control of Indochina at any time other than in the course of a global war, this would bring about almost immediately a dangerous condition with respect to the internal security of all of the other countries of Southeast Asia, as well as the Philippines and Indonesia, and would contribute to their probable eventual fall to communism. Even India and Pakistan would be threatened. Thus the loss of Indochina to communism would have direct implications on United States security. In addition, this loss would have widespread political and psychological repercussions upon other non-communist states throughout the world. In view of United States security interests in the country, and the critical situation now existing there, the United States should take action, as a matter of urgency, by all means practicable short of the actual employment of United States military forces, to deny Indochina to communism.

4. It appears that the French are only now beginning to recognize the military and political measures which must be undertaken in order to secure the French position in Indochina. The French attitudes and actions, however, must not be permitted to obscure the United States interest in the solution of the Indochina problem.

5. It has been suggested that if the French remain in Indochina that country might be lost to communism, regardless of the military aid programs which the United States may implement. This thinking presupposes either such a low order of military power in France and her colonies as to make it utterly impossible for that nation to cope with the Viet Minhs or such intransigence and unrealism in the French Government as to preclude it from facing facts. Current intelligence estimates do not accord France and her colonies this low order of military power. While, up to this time, the attitude of the French Government toward French Indochina has been one of temporization and consequently one of weakness, it is believed that the seriousness of the situation, particularly the political situation, may now have been recognized by the French Government.

6. The United States should urge France to meet its responsibility by taking the military, political, and economic action, including the injection of new leadership, necessary to save Indochina from communism. If France decides to withdraw from French Indochina, there would, in all probability, be only a slight chance that the United Nations could retrieve the situation in that country in favor of the Western Powers.

7. The following are the three major courses with military implications which might be adopted to achieve peace and security in Indochina against either the internal threat of the Viet Minhs or the external threat of Communist China:

a. Through armed action by France and the Associated States of Indochina together with the forces of the United States and/or other Western Powers;

b. By armed action by France and the Associated States of Indochina supported by United States military aid and assistance; and

c. By United Nations action either under the United States-sponsored resolution, “Uniting for Peace,” or by French withdrawal from Indochina and action by the United Nations similar to that followed in the case of the Netherlands and Indonesia.

8. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist forces against Indochina the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China and should not, therefore, commit United States forces to that area; neither should the United States commit its military forces to Indochina in order to assist the French in restoring internal security. The considerations underlying these views are:

a. Involvement of United States forces against Viet Minh forces would be likely to lead to war with Communist China;

b. A general war with Communist China would, in all probability, have to be taken as a prelude to global war;

c. Our major enemy in a global war would be the USSR;

d. Our primary theater in the event of a global war would, in all probability, be Western Europe; and

e. The forces of the Western Powers are insufficient to wage war on the mainland of Asia and at the same time accomplish the predetermined Allied objectives in Europe.

9. While minor commitments of United States military forces might be sufficient to defeat the Viet Minhs in Indochina it is more probable that such commitments would lead to a major involvement of the United States in that area similar to that in Korea or even to global war. Accordingly, there would be great potential danger to the security interests of the United States in the commitment of any “token” or “minor” United States forces in Indochina.

10. Indochina is an area in which the French bear primary responsibility, and the problem of restoration of peace and security to that country should continue to rest with the French. Overt intervention by any foreign power on the side of France would immediately enhance the danger of a global war and would lay France and the other foreign powers open to a charge of imperialism.

11. Thus far the French apparently have failed in Indochina to provide adequate political and military leadership, to develop sound military plans, and to utilize properly their military resources. The urgency of the situation in Indochina, however, is so great that the present United States military aid program for that country should continue, and steps should be taken to expedite shipment of the matériel earmarked for that area. However, it would be desirable for the United States military assistance program to be based on an over-all military plan for Indochina developed by the French, concurred in by the Associated States of Indochina, and acceptable to the United States. This plan should be developed as a result of staff talks conducted in Saigon among representatives of the three countries. It should be made clear from the outset that United States acceptance of the plan is limited to the logistical support which the United States may agree to furnish. If time permits, military representatives of the United Kingdom also might be invited to attend. There should be a timetable to the plan. Estimates of matériel requirements which the United States would be expected to provide on an accelerated basis should also be submitted.

12. Popular support of the Government by the Indochinese people is essential to a favorable settlement of the security problem of Indochina. Therefore, as a condition to the provision of those further increases in military assistance to Indochina necessary for the implementation of an agreed over-all military plan, the United States Government should obtain assurances from the French Government that:

a. A program providing for the eventual self-government of Indochina either within or outside of the French Union will be developed, made public, and implementation initiated at once in order to strengthen the national spirit of the Indochinese in opposition to communism;

b. National armies of the Associated States of Indochina will be organized as a matter of urgency. While it is doubtful that the build-up of these armies can be accomplished in time to contribute significantly to the present military situation, the direct political and psychological benefits to be derived from this course would be great and would thus result in immediate, although indirect, military benefits;

c. Pending the formation and training of Indochinese national armies as effective units, and as an interim emergency measure, France will dispatch sufficient additional armed forces to Indochina to insure that the restoration of peace and internal security in that country will be accomplished in accordance with the timetable of the over-all military plan for Indochina; and

d. France will change its political and military concepts in Indochina to:

(1) Eliminate its policy of “colonialism”;

(2) Provide proper tutelage to the Associated States; and

(3) Insure that a suitable military command structure, unhampered by political interference, is established to conduct effective and appropriate military operations.

The effective implementation of these changes will require competent and efficient political and military leaders who will be able to cope with the conditions in that country.

13. At an appropriate time the United States should institute checks to satisfy itself that the conditions set forth in paragraph 12 above are being fulfilled. The United States should also continue to maintain the situation in Indochina under continuing review and should be prepared to revise its policy when conditions warrant.

14. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese Communist forces against Indochina, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China but should, in concert with the United Kingdom, support France and the Associated States by all means short of the actual employment of United States military forces. This support should include appropriate expansion of the present military assistance program.

15. Any appeal by France to the United Nations would, in all probability, be embarrassing for the Western Powers since the rule of France over its colony is not likely to be well received by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The USSR has recognized the Viet Minh Government and, therefore, a veto by the USSR of any assistance for France would have to be expected in the Security Council. In view of the foregoing, unless the situation throughout the world generally and in Indochina specifically changes materially, the United States should seek to dissuade the French from referring the Indochina question to the United Nations.

16. Inasmuch as the United States-sponsored resolution, “Uniting for Peace,” has been adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and should a situation develop in Indochina in a manner similar to that in Korea in which United Nations forces were required, the United States would then probably be morally obligated to contribute its armed forces designated for service on behalf of the United Nations. It is, therefore, in the interests of the United States to take such action in Indochina as would forestall the need for the General Assembly to invoke the provisions of the resolution, “Uniting for Peace.” Should France, however, refer the question of Indochina to the United Nations, the United States should give consideration to adopting a position favoring early French withdrawal from Indochina and action by the United Nations similar to that followed in the case of the Netherlands and Indonesia.

17. It appears that, in view of the unrest in Southeast Asia generally and in Indochina specifically, any military victory in Indochina over the communists would be temporary in nature. The long-term solution to the unrest in Indochina lies in sweeping political and economic concessions by France and in the ultimate self-government of the three Associated States within the French Union or their complete independence of France. From the viewpoint of the United States, pressure on France to provide the much needed leadership to initiate these reforms and to grant self-government will prove less expensive in United States lives and national treasure than military commitments by us.

1. Report not completed in 1950.
2. Reference is to document SEAC D–21, Rev. 1, October 11, p. 886.
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. For the text of “Enclosure [Subenclosure] A”, telegram 763 from Saigon, November 4, in which Brigadier General Brink analyzed the military situation, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 8, pp. 405–410.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. For documentation on the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution, see vol. ii, pp. 240 ff.