Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

790.5/12–2750

Memorandum by Mr. Robert E. Hoey of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs to the Ambassador at Large (Jessup)¹

top secret

[Washington,] December 27, 1950.

Our comments on NSC 64/1² follow.

Paragraph 1. PSA considered in November that the policy statement proposed by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee had been overtaken by events. It would therefore appear that any discussion of that policy paper would be academic.

Paragraph 3. PSA agrees that a long range or a short range favorable settlement of the security problem in Indochina requires an increased awareness by the people of the dangers of Communism and an increased effort to combat it. Neither the French Union army nor the Vietnam State army has had in the past difficulty in securing volunteers. Therefore the size of an anti-Communist force is presently limited by the fiscal and technical ability of France and the United States to supply training and equipment not available from Indo-Chinese resources. The national army project agreed to on December 8 established the legal basis for a large national army, transferred certain units (7 infantry battalions) from the French Union forces to the Vietnam State army and set forth a working arrangement by which metropolitan France would contribute approximately 1.5 billion piastres toward the pay and maintenance of an increased Vietnam State army.³ The Vietnam Government would contribute approximately 750 million piastres. The equipment for some 30 infantry battalions was requested of the United States on 18 December in a list prepared by the French Military, the Vietnam Government and approved by the US MAAG.⁴ This step is the legal and factual basis for the future development of a Vietnamese National Army whose eventual size would be approximately 45 battalions plus irregulars. If and when achieved this would be larger than the army of Burma. Similar steps were taken with regard to national armies in Laos and Cambodia. PSA, however, does not agree with the third sentence in paragraph 3 regarding the fundamental causes of the deterioration in the Indochinese security situation. The deterioration has been caused by the increased capability of the indigenous Communist movement under Ho Chi Minh realized by extensive Chinese Communist assistance in both materiel and personnel. We believe that this fact is important and should be included in any study of the area.

Paragraph 4. Short-term objectives, paragraphs a, b, c and c(1) have long been a part of Departmental policy. Paragraph c(2): This is a debatable statement. The history of satellites has proven that they were established without “popular support”. To therefore state categorically that popular support of an anti-Communist government is essential may not be entirely correct. Paragraphs c(2) (a), (b), (c), (d), (3), d, and e: These points are raised more or less verbatim from previous Departmental papers. We consider that they have been already accomplished or are in a satisfactory state of development. Paragraph f: The reconsideration of US policy toward Indochina enumerated herein was a part of NSC 64, prepared by PSA in March 1950. The Department is aware of the necessity for recasting political policy in the event of successful Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia but is not aware of any plans of the Department of Defense in such a contingency. The US has advised, not “dissuaded” the French from referring the Indochina question to the UN. In September 1950 having been approached by the French in this regard we advised them that in our opinion the political attitudes of the Asian states in the UN was such that the result of a reference of the Indochina matter to the UN would probably be unsatisfactory. At the same time, however, we made clear to the French that the Department was not advising France or any other country in danger of Communist invasion that such an act should not be reported to the UN. Paragraph g: agreed.

Long-term Objectives

b. While PSA recognizes the desirability of such a happy condition in Indochina as well as in the Philippines, Burma and Malaya the achievement of peaceful conditions or at least those conditions which would permit indigenous forces without outside help to maintain internal security cannot be realized so long as Communist aggression follows its present militant course.

c. We believe that this has already been satisfactorily achieved.

d. Agreed.

e. PSA while recognizing the desirability of regional security arrangements believes that US encouragement of such a body would be the “kiss of death”. Departmental policy, however, supports such an arrangement under Asian sponsorship. This now seems beyond the capability of any Southeast Asian leader.

Conclusion

Since the paper which gave rise to this effort on the part of the Joint Chiefs was prepared in September and was overtaken by November, we presume that it is not a “recasting” of that paper which is required so much as a new NSC paper. From our preceding comments, however, it is obvious that NSC 64/1 does not fill the bill. We recommend that: (a) NSC 64/1 not be adopted, or; (b) that it be revised by a joint State-Defense effort, or; (c) that in view of the near satisfaction of our political efforts that the Department of Defense be directed by the NSC to prepare without delay (1) a strategic estimate of Southeast Asia in which there be embodied studies of the capabilities of the present anti-Communist forces; those forces augmented by the maximum US matériel assistance; the capability and intentions of world Communism toward Southeast Asia leading to a conclusion which would for the first time identify the possible results anticipated from the Chinese Communist invasion of Southeast Asia which now appears so imminent. The Department of Defense should at the same time be directed by the NSC to participate in the military conversations agreed upon in September by the three Foreign Ministers.

1. Jessup was the representative of the Department of State on the NSC Senior Staff.
2. Ante, p. 945.
3. A French-Vietnamese military convention signed on December 8 established a Vietnamese national army by providing for the transfer of certain units from French to Vietnamese control.
4. Lists of firm material requirements for the forces of the Associated States were transmitted in telegrams 1077, December 16 (751G.5 MAP/12–1650), and telegram 1095, December 19 (751G.5 MAP/12–1950), from Saigon, neither printed.