Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

IO Files: US/A/M (Chr) 191

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Sixth Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Hotel Astoria, Paris, November 5, 1951

Paris, November 5, 1951

secret

Present:

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Austin
• Mrs. Roosevelt¹
• Representative Mansfield²
• Representative Vorys³
• Ambassador Jessup⁴

[Here follow a list of advisers present (43), the agenda of the meeting, and discussion of the first five agenda items.]

6. Re Report of the Collective Measures Committee.⁵ Mr. Bancroft referred to this report as a continuation of the principles of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, the momentum of which must be maintained, in order to carry forward the aims of the UN in its collective security aspects. He outlined the history of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, and the chance it offered to the GA to take action in the security field in the event the SC were stymied. He noted that the responses to paragraph 8 of the Resolution numbered some 39–40, of which there were a few negative ones, but some 30–32 affirmatives, in the sense that they agreed to do all they could. Four of these say that they have completed plans for fulfilling this request by designating troops or warships for UN use.

Mr. Bancroft cautioned that there may be some comment on the Report of the CMC by members, in that governments did not in every case have a chance to approve the final draft. The US position on the CMC Report is for the GA to approve and adopt it, particularly because of a vital doctrine contained in it by which it would be established that any state carrying out its obligations under the UN in support of the Uniting for Peace Resolution or action taken thereunder is ipso facto relieved of any treaty obligations contrary thereto. (or inconsistent therewith). Also important in this Report was the recognition of relationships between UN and regional collective security arrangements, particularly NATO. It was a question, not of a Constitutional link, but rather of one of imbedding the concept that collective security depends both on single states and on regional arrangements. The US had a draft resolution to accomplish the above purposes. (SD/A C.1/379, rev. 1)⁶ It concerned earmarking troops, looking at domestic legislation requirements, taking steps to enable constitutional action for providing assistance facilities, including rights of passage, and related rights, for UN forces on duty in a collective security undertaking; question of assistance for the UN from non-Members; the appointment of a Panel of Military Experts by the SYG, and the continuance of the CMC to report to the next session of the GA on its further studies.

Procedurally this matter should come up fairly soon in C.1, perhaps after the disarmament item, and perhaps after Korea, too. Since the Soviets opposed Uniting for Peace, it was to be expected that they will also oppose the CMC report. Many states, including the US, did not wish to see the UN made into an alliance hostile to the Soviet Union, so it might be that it would be wise to consider getting the Soviets into the concrete work of the CMC, or at least to make such an offer. Mr. Bancroft pointed out to Mr. Mansfield that the CMC report had no direct relation to Korea and for this reason could not be considered in connection with the appeals for additional troops for Korea. It was hoped, of course, that this would be a good start, however, on the road to convincing the slower states of the need to make their contributions to collective security just as soon as they were able to. Mr. Mansfield said this seemed to be only a nucleus, but was not enough. We must achieve a world police force.

Mr. Vorys asked whether the US had responded to paragraph 8, and if so, how we rationalized our constitutional limitations with the apparent ability from this resolution for the President to dispatch troops abroad in UN police actions. It was pointed out that the language of the CMC Report and the Uniting for Peace Resolution itself made strict provision for adherence to the domestic constitutional requirements of each state. The US paragraph 8 reply took all this into account.⁷

Ambassador Jessup wanted the language “position of readiness”, in the draft resolution, restudied, since he assumed the CMC did not contemplate nations maintaining armed forces in a state of alert at all times.

1. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, widow of the President; Member of the United States Delegation.
2. Representative Michael J. Mansfield of Montana, Member of Congress; Member of the United States Delegation.
3. Representative John M. Vorys of Ohio, Member of Congress; Member of the United States Delegation.
4. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large; Member of the United States Delegation.
5. GA (VI), Suppl. No. 13 (document A/1891).
6. Ante, p. 668.
7. For the United States reply, June 8, 1951, see p. 644.