Atomic Energy Files, Lot 57 D 688

The British Ambassador (Franks) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Dear Mr. Secretary: I am writing to you as Chairman of the Combined Policy Committee to thank you for the counter proposals which you put forward in September 1951 in response to our approach requesting facilities to test an atomic weapon at Eniwetok. As you know, Dr. Penney, who will be in charge of the U.K. test, came to Washington later in September to discuss them. His visit was extremely helpful to us and resulted in the drawing up of an agreed clarification and amplification of your counter proposals.

2. Dr. Penney returned to London on the 10th October and his report has since received very thorough consideration by the British authorities concerned. We are all very grateful for the efforts which you, the Department of Defence, and the Atomic Energy Commission have made to provide us with facilities for a test within the limitations imposed by your legislation—limitations which, as we fully recognise, restrict your freedom of action in cooperating with us on a test.

3. His Majesty’s Government have now reluctantly come to the conclusion that despite the considerable work which went into the preparation of your offer and the evident good will which inspired it, we should proceed with our test in Australia. I hope you will not find this a disappointing answer to your offer after you have taken so much trouble on our behalf. Frankly our Ministers were faced with a perplexing decision. Our predilections were for carrying out our test in cooperation with you. On the other hand, you cannot provide facilities for the sort of test we really want, i.e. a shallow water burst. Furthermore, your counter proposals cannot provide for full cooperation and reciprocity in that they prohibit access by our scientists to U.S. restricted data. This is a difficult limitation for us, since in the nature of things we have no say in defining what constitutes “restricted data” or in interpreting the applicability of the definitions in [Page 799] specific cases. We might therefore find ourselves faced with a situation where data which we would consider essential to a satisfactory test were denied to us by the use of this classification or by interpretation of it. Indeed if they were rigidly and strictly interpreted, certain provisions in your counter proposals could be most inhibiting to our ability to obtain from the test the results we require.

4. We cannot afford to make two alternative sets of preparations simultaneously—one for a test at Monte Bello and the other for a test in Nevada. Ministers therefore had to decide either to go to Australia or to accept your offer in Nevada subject to the element of uncertainty which we realise is inevitable. On the whole, therefore, they have felt that it will be wiser not to risk an unsatisfactory or partially unsatisfactory test and have decided for Australia.

5. We shall not be making any public statement about this decision and I would be grateful if the fact that you made us an offer for the use of your facilities and that we felt bound to decline it were regarded as Secret.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Franks