Office of the Historian

394.31/1–2151: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Torquay Conference (Corse)1

confidential
niact
Washington, January 15, 1951—5 p. m.

316. Reurtel 343. State, ECA/W, Labor, Agriculture, Commerce, Treasury have agreed on fol in substance:

We have given careful consideration to Blankenstein proposal as given to Brown2 early Dec. Fol is position by which you shld be guided in TAC discussions and on which you shld seek obtain TAC agreement.

1.
You shld support Blankenstein proposal, and shld do utmost to put in operation at Torquay.
2.
Merits of Benelux complaint that low-tariff countries not in position bargain effectively with high-tariff countries cannot be overlooked. Relevant GATT negotiating rules bearing on question, while helpful, do not appear to be sufficient to deal with problem.
3.
Solution to problem wld contribute significantly to reduction trade barriers in general and in intra-Eur trade in particular.
4.
As we understand it, Blankenstein proposal, unlike others originating in Eur, does not involve preferential tariff structure and is [Page 1325] designed avoid breach of MFN principle. Proposal provides in part that OEEC countries engage in multilateral tariff negots re products of particular significance to intra-Eur trade, with US and Canad making concessions for secondary benefits of such negots. All results wld be applied on MFN basis.
5.
See no conflict in principle between this approach and commercial policy principles of GATT, provided any other group of GATT countries free to use same approach.
6.
Believe sympathetic reception for proposal, even if not followed up by tangible results in early future, wld improve chances Benelux adherence to Torquay protocol and general attitude Benelux to GATT. Therefore, although we have considerable reservations whether Blankenstein scheme will in fact prove more effective than negots by pairs in achieving tariff reductions, we believe you shld support his proposal in principle and shld bend efforts to solution technical, other difficulties. However, you shld take reasonable steps to insure that proposed multilateral negots wld result in bona fide reductions rather than in proposals which on balance represent increase in Eur tariff levels. Fact that tariff experts and relevant data are assembled at Torquay seems to us substantially to facilitate laying groundwork for these negots.
7.
In this connection, US ability to participate in tariff negots contemplated in Blankenstein proposal depends on when and under what circumstances they take place. US cld participate actively these negots if conducted during Torquay conference, or even possibly as limited extension Torquay meeting, and within scope present offers.
 
We are, however, basing request to Congress for renewal of TA Act3 in present form on fact no large-scale negots contemplated during life renewal. In any event, wld be in impossible position with Congress, already intolerant of speed with which tariff negotiating conferences have followed each other, if we announce new negots with large group Eur countries, immediately on conclusion Torquay meeting. Therefore, only hope US active participation is if negots can be concluded at Torquay or limited extension Torquay or if they are undertaken after substantial interval of time, probably at least a year.
8.
ECA/W requests OSR lend every support above position in Torquay and Paris.

Acheson
  1. Repeated to Paris for OSR as 3718, and on February 23 to Rome as 3751.↩
  2. Browns permanent position was Director of the Office of International Trade Policy, Department of State.↩
  3. The authority under which the United States Executive entered into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and continued after 1947 to negotiate within its framework, was the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934 (48 Stat. 943), as amended and extended. The life of such legislation was variously 1–3 years. The 1949 Act—the latest—was due to expire in June 1951.↩