740.5/6–151: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State 1
2047. Infotel May 22,2 Paris 6830 to Dept May 10.3 In light of expressions of apprehension of Sov reaction to admission of Greece and Turkey into NATO, Emb is encouraged to submit comments on general subject of possible Sov attitude toward proposed formal guarantees to those countries under any of the alternatives suggested.
Although aware of Russian sensitivity to military situation in Black Sea area, Emb believes that, particularly in light of recent developments in Iran, need to check any trend toward neutrality on part of Turkey outweighs foreseeable risk. If Emb’s analysis correct, greatest provocation to Sovs is increasing general buildup of military strength in US and Western Europe and any resort to broad military action by Sovs as means of dealing with situation would be geared to meeting this menace rather than to dealing with individual problem arising from what in reality as far as present period is concerned, is largely just formalization of existing short term physical capabilities and political attitudes. Present Brit and Fr undertakings with respect to Greece and Turkey as well as Amer mil assistance to them must surely be interpreted by Sovs as indicating that under present circumstances, at least, the defense of these two countries would be fully supported by the three major powers concerned. Thus chances are that unless they could feel confident of coping with the bigger problem, the Sov reaction [Page 527] would be more vigorous employment of psychological, political and economic weapons in effort to nullify long range advantages that could be derived from participation of these two countries in tighter collective security arrangements.
Bilateral US–Greece and US–Turkey treaty guarantees would draw fiercest fire from Sovs who would undoubtedly quickly seize opportunity to blast away at basic justification for present free world collective security arrangements and exploit what they would picture as righteous indignation at direct US guarantees to states occupying strategic positions in immediate proximity to USSR.
Although inclusion Greece and Turkey in NATO rather than in a Mediterranean pact would probably provoke more violent Sov propaganda reaction, it may be that the Sovs would as a practical matter consider this alternative better suited for their purposes. Whatever prospects they may have for success, Sovs seem for the present to be making a big play for mass popular support as means of reinforcing security of USSR, rather than undertaking new governmental agreements with free world states directed toward this end. As part of this program they have relied heavily on picturing themselves as intended victims of projected aggression. As the Paris talks further stress, Atlantic Pact is important element in this campaign. Since Sovs have from its inception labelled pact as aggressive they can be expected to make full use of one interpretation already expressed in West that inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO allegedly transforms nature of that organization from a defensive to an offensive one. Likewise, they would be quick to exploit diverging views which would arise in discussions in Parliaments of NATO countries as means of promoting disunity throughout the area.
In addition this propaganda bonanza, inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO would give rise to new situation in the NE highly susceptible to Sov exploitation in their growing endeavor to penetrate into that area. With both Greece and especially Turkey in NATO, the Arab countries, Israel and perhaps even Iran, could well feel that they had been somewhat isolated by this development and had nowhere to go for collective security arrangements of greater immediacy than UN. Sovs might be able to play profitably upon this theme in NE countries particularly if Iranian problem4 does not reach early solution.
Mediterranean pact composed of US, Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey at outset might serve more as rallying point to those countries if and when their need for collective security becomes greater.
Having in view problem presented by intention on part of Sov Union to expand outward at any point along perimeter of Sov orbit if [Page 528] opportunity permits, eventual maintenance of security for neighboring states through collective arrangements would seem to call for more flexible procedure of regional problems taken into account. Mediterranean pact might be linked to NATO on somewhat flexible basis and established basis for forging continuous chain of defense groupings along entire Sov orbit periphery.
Under such arrangement effectiveness of NATO as homogeneous pivotal unity as pictured by Spofford in Dept airgram of Mar 31 (control 4798)5 would be enhanced.
There could hardly be development more encouraging to Sov hopes to disrupt free world unity and determination to resist aggression than failure to admit two such willing and effective applicants as Greece and Turkey into formal collective security arrangements with three major Western powers. Embassy adds its support to active measures being taken in this direction.
- Repeated information to Paris as 627, London as 370, Athens as 26, Ankara as 24.↩
- Circular telegram to Ankara, Athens, Moscow, and the NATO countries other than France and the United Kingdom, not printed, enclosing a packet of documents regarding the question of Greek-Turkish participation in NATO (740.5/5–2251).↩
- Telegram from the Chargé in Paris, Bohlen, not printed, which referred to the Soviet reaction “which is sure to be strong in view of extreme sensitivity of Soviets about anything military affecting Black Sea area and Turkey.” (740.5/5–1051)↩
- See volume v .↩
- Circular airgram quoting the text of Spofford’s telegram Depto 666 of March 22, p. 505.↩