740.5/6–1551
Memorandum of Conversation, by Ridgway B. Knight of the Office of European Regional Affairs1
Mr. de Margerie called this morning at his request and stated that the French Embassy had received instructions from the French Foreign Office to approach the Department of State at a high level in order to press for military consideration of the Mediterranean Command problem by the Standing Group national representatives. After [Page 534] consideration of the problem in the French Embassy, it was decided, however, to make the first approach at the working level.2
Mr. de Margerie stated that the French Government was most anxious to see the military aspects of the Mediterranean Command problem discussed from the “purely military point of view” in the Standing Group. He referred to the conversation of April 18, 1951 in the Standing Group and alleged a resulting commitment on our part to discuss these problems. In connection with this reference, he did not, however, make clear whether the French Government was anxious for these talks to proceed in the Standing Group acting as the Standing Group, or between the three national representatives acting as such and outside of the NATO context. Mr. de Margerie had seen the Standing Group telegram establishing the command structure of SACEUR’s Southern flank. He expressed the belief, however, that while his Government would welcome this development as a definite step forward, its urgent desire for military discussions with the U.S. and U.K. concerning the Mediterranean as a whole would not be diminished.
In the course of the conversation, Mr. de Margerie indicated that the French favored an extension of Admiral Carney’s command under SACEUR3 and were correspondingly not over-anxious to see the British Middle East Command assume considerably greater importance. When queried about the French Government’s specific views, Mr. de Margerie stated that the Embassy had received no instructions along such lines and that the only purpose of his démarche was to foster a general consideration of the Mediterranean Command problem on the military level arid not to express any definite views. It was made clear that the French are quite conversant with our difficult situation with the British concerning the appointment of Admiral Fechteler as SACLANT. He stated, however, that regardless of this and other political considerations, it was the French Government’s view that the military discussions concerning the overall Mediterranean setup could and should be pushed forward.
Having only recently returned from three weeks in Europe, I was able to state that I was not informed as to the latest developments in this field other than the Standing Group action concerning General Eisenhower’s Southern Command. Mr. de Margerie specifically requested information as to the reasons which were preventing the joint consideration of this problem, allegedly agreed on April 18, and the prospects for such talks in the near future. It was made clear that the [Page 535] French Embassy will take further steps in connection with this question in the absence of what it may consider an answer satisfactory to the French Government.
- Copies to Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, Nitze of the Policy Planning Staff, Perkins and Martin of EUR, Byington and Godley of WE, and Colonel Hartshorn of Defense for Admiral Sherman.↩
- In a conversation at the Department of State with Perkins and Godley on June 5, Mr. C. E. Steel of the British Embassy stated “that he had received a telegram from the Foreign Office to the effect that the French in London were exerting ‘tremendous’ pressure on the British Foreign Office to arrange the follow-up meeting re Malta” (770a.5/6–551)↩
- Admiral Carney was Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.↩