740.5/7–651
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)1
| Participants: | Mr. B. A. B. Burrows, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Mr. James C. H. Bonbright, Acting Assistant Secretary | |
| Mr. G. Lewis Jones, Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs |
Mr. Burrows called today at his suggestion to advise the Department of the initial Turkish reaction to the British Foreign Secretary’s message of July 3rd to the Turkish Foreign Minister on the subject of Turkey’s admission to NATO in connection with Turkish participation in a Middle Eastern defense set-up.2 The British Ambassador in Ankara delivered Mr. Morrison’s message to the Turkish Foreign Minister on the 4th of July. Mr. Köprülü said that Turkey received the indication of British support for Turkey’s membership in NATO with [Page 555] “pleasure and relief”. Mr. Köprülü seemed “pleased” and the British Ambassador felt that he understood fully the “package deal” involved, i.e., UK support for Turkey in NATO is contingent upon Turkey’s being prepared to associate itself in the defense of the Middle East along the lines set forth in Mr. Morrison’s message.3 The British Ambassador reported that he felt Mr. Köprülü “favorably disposed to play the role that the UK wants in Middle East defense”. Mr. Köprülü stated that Turkey is prepared to collaborate with the US, UK and France in the defense of the area. However, the Turkish Foreign Minister’s acceptance was only in principle and the definitive Turkish reply will follow later.
Mr. Burrows commented that the Foreign Office felt the Turkish response “rather satisfactory”.
He then went on to mention two or three points which he said would be put up to us at the meeting next week which Sir Oliver Franks spoke to Mr. Matthews about today. These points include the following:
- (1)
- Would the US be willing to put pressure on the Turks to accept the “package deal” as a condition to coming into NATO? (We told him that this idea of a “package deal” had not come to our attention before we saw Mr. Morrison’s message to the Turkish Foreign Minister yesterday,4 and that, as Mr. Burrows knew, our approach to the Turks with regard to entering NATO had been without strings. We could not say at this stage that we would go beyond this.) Mr. Burrows emphasized that he thought it would be most helpful if the US could push the Turks along at this stage.
- (2)
- Next in importance to the British is our approach to the French, and Mr. Burrows hoped that we would be willing to put added pressure on them immediately. (In this connection the British have informed the French of their approach to the Turks, but so far have not approached any other NATO country.)
- (3)
- The British appreciate that the approach to the smaller countries will also involve difficulties, but an important factor in securing their acquiescence to Turkey’s membership in NATO will be the members of the Standing Group showing a united front.
- The memorandum was prepared by both Bonbright and Jones.↩
- The British memorandum of July 3, and its covering note, neither printed, were shown in strictest confidence to Ambassador Wadsworth by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü, on July 6. In telegram 16, July 7, from Ankara, not printed, Wadsworth transmitted the bare substance of the memorandum and said that Köprülü, had not pressed him for comment (740.5/7–751). A copy of the memorandum was handed to the Department of State on July 5 by the British Embassy and transmitted on that date to Ankara as telegram 12, repeated to Cairo for information as telegram 26, not printed (740.5/7–551).↩
- The message proposed that Turkey (and Greece) be invited to accede to NATO under Article 10, and at the same time Turkey join the United States, United Kingdom, and France in establishing an integrated Allied command headquarters in the Middle East. Also, the three Commonwealth countries likely to produce forces for that area, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, together perhaps with Egypt, should be invited by the Four Powers to participate in this command. Additional arrangements should be made for associating the other Middle East countries with the defense of the area. (740.5/7–551)↩
- See footnote 2, above.↩