Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/9–2551: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Turkey ¹

top secret
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Washington, September 26, 1951—9 p. m.

247. Dept most appreciative prompt and understanding response Turks as outlined Embtel 289 Sept 25.²

Dept can appreciate reluctance Turk Govt to discuss mil and Command arrangements prior to action by legislative bodies of present NATO members to formally accept Turkey in NATO. We believe Turks shld know, however, that NATO members were informed at Ottawa that we were considering sending high milit officer to discuss milit arrangements with Turks on informal basis and that UK and France might do likewise. Hence we do not feel that smaller NATO nations wld react unfavorably to informal Tripartite mission.

We have taken position that no command setup can be prepared for prelim consideration by present NATO nations until matter is discussed with Greece and Turkey. Furthermore no NATO command structure involving Grk-Turk participation can be approved by NATO until Grk and Turk reps are officially sitting as members of the Milit Comite and Council, fol their acceptance into NATO. It was our idea that the top milit reps of the US, UK and France, were the ones who shld discuss command arrangements with the highest Turk authorities. We considered this arrangement as being the one which wld indicate to the Turks and the Grks our appreciation of their importance in the Org and that it warranted a visit by our highest milit auths.

The procedure wld be that after discussions on the NATO command arrangements, the ideas of the Turks and Grks wld be incorporated, along with the ideas of the other nations concerned, into a staff study which wld then be presented to the milit reps of all the countries concerned including Greece and Turkey. After further comments from these nations, the paper wld then be amended as necessary and resubmitted to those nations, in order that all NATO nations including Greece and Turkey can be prepared to act on it in the milit comite and Council mtgs after the formal admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO.

While we believe the above to be important, we also believe it is urgent that MEC arrangements be worked out earliest and we do not see how this can be done without discussions between representatives of the US, UK and France and Turkey. While Turkey may feel that Gen Bradley can appropriately discuss ME Command arrangements informally with Turks on behalf all three, Dept requests you pt out to Turk FonMin why we feel Bradley–Slim–Fr Mission is so important. UK will lead in presenting proposals to Egypt. If Bradley alone visits Turkey this likely be interpreted by Egypt as reflecting adversely UK status MEC in which Brits will play major role.³ Slim–Bradley–Fr visit designed originally emphasize solidarity powers and multilateral character proposals partly as background for approach Egypt. Thus while we fully understand reasons why Turk desire to restrict visit to Bradley, we are nevertheless confronted with above dilemma and wld appreciate Turks giving matter most serious consideration. We believe another important factor from Turk viewpoint is that tripartite mission wld give Turks valuable opportunity to present their views on MEC to highest level mil reps of three countries.

Re Arab states, we agree with Turk Govt that we must proceed with caution and careful preparation. While undoubtedly there will be elements in those states opposed to any form of collaboration with Western powers, we believe that MEC will gain support, perhaps gradual at first, because (1) it may be basis for settlement Anglo-Egypt question and (2) it provides structure for ME defense in which Arabs are vitally concerned. We consider that multilateral nature of MEC, including Turkish participation, has important appeal and shld be stressed. On balance therefore we believe tripartite milit mission to Turkey wld have desirable impact on Arab States and set stage for multilateral coop.

Due other pressing commitments, it may be ten days before Bradley or tripartite mission can arrive in Turkey. Despite this delay we wld welcome Turk reaction on above earliest.

Pls keep Brit colleague fully and simultaneously informed on all developments (urtel 290 Sept 26).⁴

Acheson

1. Message drafted by Jones and Stabler of NE and Moore of GTI, cleared by Perkins and Defense, and repeated to Paris, London, and Cairo.
2. Supra.
3. Ambassador Caffery in Cairo reported on September 30 that there had been as yet “No significant Egypt reaction NATO invitation Greece-Turkey.” He added that “Considerable speculation and comment on reports Britain planning propose Middle East defense plan and Turkey mentioned in story from London as possible three power del to seek Egypt’s views. Reactions rumored Brit proposals skeptical to negative among officials public and press.” (Cairo telegram 389, 740.5/9–3051)
4. Not printed.