No.60

850.33/6–2151: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom ( Holmes) to the Secretary of State 1
secret   priority

6707. For Perkins. In accordance with instructions in Deptel 5987, June 192 (Paris 6916, Frankfort 8659), Emb presented US views on Schuman Plan conference strongly to Stevens of FonOff emphasizing adverse public reaction to Brit position on continent and in US. He made fol points in reply:

1.
Brit position as set forth in statement given to Paris conference was strongly held in view taken at Ministerial level and any change in this position wld have to be referred to Ministers.
2.
Position strongly held because of vital importance of increased effort and long record of failure of Germans to live up to promises to improve their performance in scrap supplies to UK. Stevens mentioned particularly the MacCready–Erhard agreement of last winter and also Morrison’s trip to Germany last month in which he discussed scrap problem with Adenauer. Adenauer gave assurances that he wld take steps to increase scrap supplies to the UK but so far as Brit can see nothing has been done. Morrison was described as “very angry” about this.
3.
Brit Govt felt that scrap problem was so important that they must take advantage of every possible bargaining point with Germans in order to increase supplies. Since record of bad performance by Germans was generally admitted they had hoped that French and US wld be able to associate themselves with UK in using Germany’s desire to be relieved of controls over coal and steel as bargaining point to increase German scrap export commitments.
4.
Stevens said that negots now under way for trade agreement with Ger had been most unsatisfactory, that Brit had offered greatly increased prices for scrap, that he believed this was not an obstacle and that Germans had flatly refused to include any exports of semi-finished steel.
5.
In commenting on US offer to participate in talks with Gers to increase scrap deliveries (para 3 reftel), Stevens pointed out that difficulty with persuading Ministers to accept this alternative was that it had already been tried and had not produced results. He said they were very grateful for assistance given by HICOG last winter and that this had contributed greatly to successful conclusion of MacCready–Erhard agreement but that despite this agreement scrap had not been forthcoming in agreed quantities.
6.
Stevens agreed, however, to prepare more specific proposal along lines para 3 reftel and discuss it with us with view to proposing [Page 123] this to cabinet in order to enable Brit to withdraw reservation to Ruhr agreement protocol.
7.
Stevens also aware of strong adverse reaction from both French and ourselves to Brit paper and of danger to successful completion of Schuman Plan which it represented. He said that he believed French thought Brit were trying to sabotage Schuman Plan itself and that scrap issue was only incidental in their minds. He also agreed this might be public reaction in US. He denied this flatly and assured us that if they cld be satisfied on scrap point they wld withdraw reservation.

We believe UK officials will sincerely attempt to formulate proposal promptly along lines Dept’s suggestion para 3 reftel. Since above approach was made prior to receipt of Deptel 6017, June 20,3 rptd Paris 6957, Frankfort 8696, and since Stevens is responsible UK official whose views Morrison wld require before making a decision, suggest we give Stevens chance to make recommendation to Morrison before deciding on approach to latter. Perkins approach to Steel will also be helpful in impressing Brit with urgency of matter. In meantime it wld be desirable avoid publicity this matter since this wld complicate problem of gaining acceptance UK Govt to alternative.

Holmes
  1. Repeated priority to Frankfurt and Paris.
  2. See Document 56.
  3. Telegram 6017 requested the Embassy in the United Kingdom to “approach Brit at whatever level necessary to be effective” arid give them the substance of views contained in telegram 5987. (850.33/6–2051)