Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 633

S/P–NSC files, lot 62D1, NSC 15

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

secret

Washington, June 5, 1951.

Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 15/3¹ entitled: “United States Civil Aviation Policy toward U.S.S.R. and its Satellites”

NSC 15/3 was approved as Governmental policy on January 6, 1950. It is requested that this “First Progress Report”, as of May 23, 1951, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

1. Discussions with the British regarding coordination of United States policy, as expressed in NSC 15/3, with the British position, began in late June, 1950, several months after the British Foreign Office was advised of the substance of our revised policy. The discussions continued throughout 1950 and finally resulted in an understanding with the British Government. One important point which extended these discussions and on which no British concurrence has as yet been given is the addition of Communist China to the list of U.S.S.R. satellites to which the policy is to apply.

2. After the first of the year, the British Foreign Office advised its missions of the understanding reached with our Government. After careful consideration with the geographic bureaus of the Department and in consultation with the Department of Defense, instructions for United States missions were dispatched on March 2, 1951.² These instructions (a) pointed out the differences between the new policy and the preceding one (NSC 15/1³); (b) emphasized the global character of NSC 15/3 as distinguished from the regional character of NSC 15/1; (c) underlined the fact that NSC 15/3 maintained integrally the prohibition against the sale and export of aircraft and associated equipment to the U.S.S.R. and the satellites and against major over-hauling of aircraft of those countries; (d) indicated that an exchange of commercial air rights could be considered if, after evaluating all relevant factors (especially military security), it could be shown that a net balance of advantage would accrue to the west; (e) advised the missions that this Government sees no need at this time for informing other foreign governments which agreed to the policy laid down in NSC 15/1 in view of the relatively minor revision of that policy and instructed them to act accordingly if approached by British representatives. As to countries to which no approach had been made on NSC 15/1 (largely Latin American, Far Eastern and African countries), the lack of any previous problems and the improbability of problems arising in the immediate future led to the conclusion that no discussions of the new policy with these governments is required at the present time. However, through the Department and its missions abroad, developments in these areas are being kept under careful and continuous scrutiny.

3. Although various foreign governments follow the common course of action with varying degrees of enthusiasm and determination, implementation of our satellite aviation policy may be considered as being quite successful.

• (a) As far as the air transport aspect of the policy is concerned, U.S.S.R. and satellite airlines are contained behind the iron curtain with the exception of LOT (Polish Airline) service from Warsaw via Brussels to Paris; and CSA (Czech Airline) service from Prague to several Western European capitals. LOT’s service is permitted in exchange for a British courier service to Warsaw (which is deemed helpful for the United States and United Kingdom Embassies in Warsaw). The French, Dutch and Belgian, and, until very recently, the British Governments have permitted CSA service because they attach importance, for political and other reasons, to continued reciprocal services of their respective national carriers to the Czech capital. However, CSA’s operating permit across Germany to Zurich and Rome was suspended by HICOG last November following an unauthorized mass overflight of the Western zones of Germany by CSA aircraft. The British Government has just completed a review of its position regarding BEA service to Prague and on May 18, 1951, informed the Czech Government that, effective immediately, BEA services to Prague were discontinued and that effective June 17, 1951, no facilities would be granted for CSA to operate a scheduled service between Czechoslovakia and the United Kingdom. With regard to China, the British have not yet agreed to include China among the satellites for the purposes of this policy. Accordingly, no approach on the question of including China among the satellites has as yet been made by the United States to any other foreign government.
• (b) As far as the sale and export of equipment aspect of the policy is concerned, implementation has been quite successful even though the process of attrition is a lengthy one. Admittedly, some material may be evading the more or less rigid controls and the effectiveness of such controls doubtless varies from country to country. Nevertheless, the results appear to be satisfactory and should serve as an incentive for constant and increased vigilance.

James E. Webb

1. Dated January 5, 1950, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 1.
2. Document 616.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, p. 451.