Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 641

S/P–NSC files, lot 62D1, NSC 15

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)

secret

Washington, September 24, 1951.

Subject: Second Progress Report on Implementation of NSC 15/3,¹ entitled: “United States Civil Aviation Policy toward U.S.S.R. and its Satellites.”

NSC 15/3 was approved as Governmental policy on January 6, 1950. It is requested that this “Second Progress Report,” dated September 24, 1951, be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

(1) Prior to September 11, 1951, when CSA services were suspended, the Czech (CSA) and Polish (LOT) airlines were the only remaining Soviet satellite airlines providing air services outside the Soviet orbit. Even now, LOT flights from Warsaw over Western Germany to Brussels and Paris continue to be justified, under the principles laid down in NSC 15/3, by the need to maintain landing rights for Western diplomatic courier plane service into Warsaw (operated by the British but available to the United States). On the other hand, CSA flights to areas outside the Curtain, orginally extensive, have been progressively restricted. The curbing of CSA flights has been particularly active during the last several months and has constituted a problem of substantial concern, not only as it relates to NSC 15/3 but, even more importantly, in formulating United States action in connection with the Czech detention of United States jets and pilots as well as the Oatis case. A review of this situation as it has developed during the last three months may be of interest to the Council.

(2) As indicated in the “First Progress Report”, dated June 5, 1951,² the United Kingdom terminated BEA’s service to Prague on May 19, 1951; and CSA’s service to London was terminated, at British request, on June 17, 1951. Accordingly, CSA’s permit, when renewed by HICOM Germany for July 1951, authorized overflights of Western Zones, Germany, only on the route Prague to Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam.

(3) At the expiration of CSA’s yearly permit on March 31, 1951, HICOM Civil Aviation Board adopted the practice of extending the permit on a monthly basis, notification of such extension being sent to the Czech Military Mission. Berlin, on the 15th of the preceding month.^* As a result of Czech detention of two United States jet aircraft and their pilots, force-landed in Czech territory early in June, HICOG Civil Aviation Division, on the Department’s instruction, with the British and French concurring, delayed the notification of renewal. The United States at the same time approached the British and French Governments to secure their concurrence in suspending CSA’s operating permit if the pilots were not released by June 30. On June 26, both the British and French members of HICOM CAB stated that they favored renewal of CSA’s permit. The Czech Government’s notification to our Embassy in Prague, on June 28, that the pilots would be released and the jets returned avoided any disagreement on the issue of renewal and, on June 29, CAB informed the Czechs that CSA could continue, until July 31, to operate its Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam service.

(4) While the United States was exploring, with the British and the French, the suspension of CSA’s permit as one of several measures to effect the release of Oatis, the Swiss formally requested HICOM to reconsider the November 1950 suspension of CSA’s overflight permit for the Prague–Zurich service. The Swiss request was prompted by an indication that the Czechs would terminate Swissair’s service to Prague as of July 31. The United States and the British opposed, while the French member of HICOM CAB favored, restoration of this permit on a month-to-month basis. The matter was thereupon referred to HICOM, General Committee, on July 30, where it now rests. Despite Czech threats to terminate Swissair’s Prague service on July 31, continuation of such service was extended, first to August 15 and, subsequently, to September 15, 1951. The extension was effected by a “gentlemen’s agreement” between Swissair and CSA, pursuant to which CSA will continue to receive the financial benefits of the previously existing “pool” arrangement despite the fact that CSA does not operate the Prague–Zurich route.

(5) In the meantime, the United States continued to urge the British and French—in HICOM CAB as well as in London and Paris—for concurrence in suspending entirely CSA’s permit after July 31. It was pointed out that this measure is not now intended solely as implementation of NSC 15/3, but as one of several pressures the Allies may bring to bear on the Czech Government to release Oatis and to make it realize, generally, the Western Powers’ determination to respond in kind to offensive Czech Government conduct toward the Free World. For a variety of reasons, both the British and French exhibited initial reluctance to concur with the course of action urged by the United States. At the outset, the British and French members of HICOM CAB, apparently under instructions of their respective governments, were prepared at most to put the renewal of their permit on a “day-to-day” instead of on a monthly basis. The British took the position, in brief, that suspension might cause more harm to the Allies than to the Czechs, and strongly advocated consultation first with Belgium and the Netherlands. The French based their initial reluctance to go along, partly on “commercial reasons” (among others, Air France’s interest in maintaining Paris–Prague service, which it operated in pool with CSA) and, partly, on French interest in effecting the release of French citizens imprisoned by the Czechs. Desiring to maintain Allied unity, the United States agreed, on July 31, to a notification to the Czechs, stating that CSA’s permit was still under consideration but that CSA was permitted to continue services to Paris, Amsterdam and Brussels, on the same schedules and frequencies as in July “pending further communication from HICOM”. Although we initially desired to avoid directly connecting suspension of CSA overflight authorization with the Oatis case, we agreed to the British suggestion for a preliminary approach to the Czech Government, hinting at such a connection. We also agreed to approach, concurrently with the British, the Belgian and Netherlands Governments; and made it clear to the French that while we attribute great importance to the Oatis case, this and other retaliatory measures are intended for the protection of Western nationals generally, not for the promotion of purely American interests. On August 22, the French cabinet approved suspension of Czech overflights as a measure of Western solidarity. The Belgians indicated concurrence with the proposed measure, and the Dutch, after initially expressing some reluctance to go along unless other Western powers whose carriers operated to Prague would equally share the risks involved, also agreed. The agreement of all affected countries having been obtained, HICOM, on September 10, 1951, informed the Czechs that they had “suspended until further notice the permit of the Czech airline to fly across the territory of the German Federal Republic effective midnight September 11, 1951.”

(6) Upon the approach of the widely-advertised “Youth Congress” in East Berlin, sponsored by the U.S.S.R., the United States instructed HICOG, on July 20, to deny requests from any carrier for overflight of Germany, to or from Prague or Berlin, in regard to special or extra flights which were connected with this Congress. In this instance, the British and the French promptly concurred in the proposed course of action.

(7) Early in June, the Department received reports that an Indian carrier, Himalayan Aviation Ltd., may be planning the establishment of air services between India and China. Reportedly, two routes were under consideration: (a) Calcutta –Rangoon –Bangkok –Hanoi –Canton or Chunking; (b) Calcutta –Mandalay –Kunming –Chentu –Hangkow –Peking or Canton. Our Missions were promptly alerted and inquiries made at New Delhi indicating to GOI our interest. It does not appear at the moment that this plan is anywhere near realization, although another Indian carrier (Bharat Airways) is reportedly also interested in such a service through Southeast Asia and ultimately into China. It seems virtually certain that the French would not grant landing rights to such a service in Hanoi; and the Burmese apparently have not been approached as yet. Our Missions are keeping a watch on this situation and, in the case of more concrete indication that establishment of such a service will be pursued, appropriate steps will be taken.

(8) As indicated in the First Progress Report (para. 3 (b)) the implementation of the equipment aspect of the policy has been satisfactorily achieved. Most countries agreed in one form or another to institute and maintain controls over the sale and export, direct or indirect, of aircraft, spares and associated equipment to the Soviet bloc. United States Missions, particularly in countries where such equipment is manufactured and in countries used for transshipment, maintain a continuous watch to preclude, as far as possible, evasion of such controls.

On balance, it is the opinion of the Department that the policies contained in NSC 15/3 are now as fundamentally sound and applicable as when approved in January 1950. Major difficulty arises in effecting the coordination with foreign friendly governments that is necessary before the restrictive provisions of this policy can be effectively applied against the Soviet or its satellites. Frequently, the United States has called on these governments, principally the French and British, to give up some economic advantage they presently possess, such as a profitable air service, and some reluctance to do so has been evidenced, principally by the French. Often, however, such difficulties as exist between the United States and the other countries are of a procedural nature relating to the manner in which restrictions are to be imposed rather than whether restrictions should be imposed.

James E. Webb

1. Dated January 5, 1950, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iv, p. 1.
2. Document 633.
3. The Czech Military Mission in Berlin protested, on June 18, against the monthly renewals of CSA’s permit and requested a permit for “at least” one year as a matter of international right and practice. This request was rejected by HICOM CAB on the ground that in areas of military occupation the exercise of air rights is, under international agreements, subject to such approval as the military authorities may require. [Footnote in the source text.]