Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Europe: Political and Economic Developments, Volume IV, Part 2

No. 645

740.5/10–2251: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford), at London¹

secret

Washington, October 22, 1951—8:01 p.m.

Todep 261. For Spofford and Embassy. Dept requests you raise for discussion in CD question of best method handling Moscow econ conference scheduled for Dec (ref Paris tel 2142 Oct 11, rptd London 528;² Paris [Rome] tel 1713 Oct 15, rptd London 163³). Conference has its origin in the Sov sponsored World Peace Council, principal Commie front org for Sov “peace” offensive, and it is clear despite Sov emphasis on “objective” nature proposed conference that basic purpose is propaganda.

Dept wishes matter discussed in CD both because line of action adopted clearly more effective if all NATO countries following roughly same tactics and also as useful post-Ottawa evidence of our desire develop NATO as forum where this type question can be discussed.

We therefore suggest that Spofford outline to CD US view that in accordance action we have taken previously on conferences this kind, best course is to issue calm factual statements exposing conference for what it is and to make known our attitude to private individuals considering attendance. If despite such knowledge, individuals still desire attend, we wld not place particular obstacles their path except as already required by law, regulation or practice. Statements might point out connection between proposed conference and World Peace Council, expose hollowness of WPC activities, emphasize fact that if Bloc countries genuinely interested in objective discussion internatl econ problems adequate UN orgs already in existence, cite examples of Russian unwillingness discuss substantive econ problems in these bodies and fact that USSR does not even participate in certain UN econ orgs, e.g. Bank, Fund. It might be suggested to prospective anti-Commie invitees that they could no doubt ascertain nature conference by inquiring sponsors’ attitude toward various criteria genuinely free gatherings such as guarantee of access to floor during mtgs, assurance that voting wld be by individuals rather than by delegations and assurance that Western newsmen wld be given right to cover conference and send uncensored reports.

You can add that we have considered alternative line of approach which might be to encourage attendance at conference of a number of competent and reliable persons who wld not only seek to counteract Commie propaganda at conference, but wld be in a position effectively to condemn the conference afterwards by citing from first-hand experience, but we believe successful handling such approach unlikely in circumstances under which conference to be held.

A point which may be useful in discussion of means of counteracting propaganda value of conference is fact we understand no invitations have been sent any Yugos. We wld appreciate any info on this point other countries may have.

Comments from Rome, Paris, London, and Moscow Embs wld also be appreciated.

Acheson

1. Drafted by Camp (EUR/RA) and Barbour (EUR/EE), cleared by Byington (EUR/WE), Haselton (EUR/BNA), Smith (EUR/EE), and Mellor (EDS), was concurred in by Bohlen (C), and signed for the Secretary by Bonbright (EUR). Repeated to Paris, Rome, and Moscow.
2. In telegram 2142 the Embassy reported having been advised by the French Foreign Ministry that several French economists were playing roles in organization of the planned Moscow Economic Conference and that 50 or more French industrialists, bankers, trade unionists, public officials, and journalists had been invited to attend the Conference. The French Government sought discreetly to discourage attendance by French citizens at the conference. As already discussed by Begougne de Juniac with Barbour on October 18 (see Barbour’s memorandum of conversation, supra), the Foreign Ministry saw two possible courses of action in connection with the conference. (561.00/10–1151)
3. Telegram 1713 commented on the French proposals for joint U.S.-French-British consultations on the projected Moscow Economic Conference. It warned that limitation of consultations to the “Big Three” would invite resentment and produce feeble support if not actual opposition among other Western countries. The Embassy noted that the trend toward “Big Three” dictation was generally harmful to Western interests and interest in NATO objectives. (740.5/10–1551)