123–Kirk, Alan G.
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union ( Kirk)
Subject: Ambassador Alan G. Kirk’s call on President Truman1
Calling at 3:00 p.m., 11 January, 1951, at the White House to say goodbye to the President, the following topics were touched upon:
- (1)
- CFM : My comment was that the American Delegation at the Paris CFM of June 1949 had most successfully dominated the situation. It seemed to me, therefore, that in the current proposal for a CFM, our Delegation would certainly be able to deal again with the Soviets. The basic problem was to be certain our two allies, Great Britain and France, were of the same mind with us on all points.
- (2)
- Western Rearmament: It was mentioned briefly that our rearmament was essential in order to have our voice respected by the Soviets. It seems evident our rearmament has been forced upon us by the Soviet actions since the War, and that as our strength increases so our voice will be better listened to.
- (3)
- China: It was represented that the Soviet Government would scarcely find satisfaction if China were on close and friendly terms with the United States, because we would then be furnishing China with heavy industrial equipment, technical advice, and capital investments, with accompanying increased exchange of goods and services between the two countries. This was hardly the Soviet line and it was for consideration whether Moscow really wanted Peking recognized by the United States.
- (4)
- Declaration of war against the Peking Government: In considering the various aspects of the current military situation in the Far East, it was suggested that prudence was necessary in the matter of a formal declaration of hostilities against the Peking Government. The provisions and implications of Article I of the Treaty between Moscow and Peking, as signed last February 14, should be attentively examined in this connection. It is well known that Soviet press and other propaganda media have been intimating the United States is using Japanese aid in the Korean theatre, with the insinuation that this shows Japan is our ally. While the Politburo is always capable of disregarding or distorting any commitment, yet some significance must attach to this propaganda concerning Japan as an ally, which could be the peg on which Soviet intervention in the Far East might be hung.
On leaving the President, he indicated he hoped the Moscow Embassy would continue to keep its ear to the ground, especially for any signs of internal strains in the Soviet Union. As regards the [Page 1525] length of my stay at the post in Moscow, the President said he understood perfectly why a third winter there would be excessive.
- Ambassador Kirk was in the United States on home leave and for consultation from December 16, 1950, to January 20, 1951.↩