McGhee Files: Lot 53 D 468: “Syria and Lebanon 1948 Memoranda”

Memorandum of Conversation, by Richard E. Gnade of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

secret
Participants: Dr. Malik, Minister of Lebanon
Mr. McGheeNEA
Mr. KopperNE
Mr. GnadeNE

Dr. Malik came to call on Mr. McGhee at 3:00 p. m. November 9, 1951 for a final talk before departing on the following day for Paris where he will be a member of the Lebanese UNGA delegation.

Dr. Malik opened the conversation by asking what he might tell his Arab colleagues at Paris when they asked for the latest views of Mr. McGhee, of the Department, and of the American Government regarding Middle Eastern affairs. Did Mr. McGhee have a message for them or for Egyptian Foreign Minister Salahuddin?

Mr. McGhee answered that this was a time of crisis in the relations between the Arabs and the West and an opportunity to demonstrate whether enduring relations between the two areas can be built up or not. The Egyptian situation was disillusioning and disappointing. MEC was long planned and thought out. It was a fine opportunity for Egypt to reach a reasonable solution of the Suez problem, but instead, the Egyptians jumped the gun on the MEC proposals and refused to give them any consideration when they were presented. The United States position on Egypt was a fundamental position and not subject to change. Secretary Acheson’s statement1 supporting the [Page 420] view that the treaty cannot be abrogated unilaterally stands as basic American doctrine.

Dr. Malik asked whether there was any way out of the impasse.

Mr. McGhee replied that the multilateral approach envisaged in MEC was a good solution. He and his colleagues had spent months meeting Salahuddin’s problems and working to find an adequate solution. Egypt was to be a full partner—but she gave the idea absolutely no consideration and rejected it out of hand. As the MEC concept was being elaborated, he had hoped that Egypt would join in the discussion and planning. The eleven MEC principles show what we have in mind. They offer a broad and flexible “solution with honor” for Egypt. It is the only solution, since the West cannot let Suez lie undefended. The United States will play a full role, and there will be no colonial-type regime such as the Egyptians seem to fear. Initially the British must supply the forces to garrison the Canal because they have them available and the other participating powers do not.

Dr. Malik asked “Where do we go from here? How can Egypt’s face be saved?” The United States must face the possibility of talking over with the British a time limit for British withdrawal from Suez. This, in Dr. Malik’s eyes, was the only possible ray of hope in the situation.

Mr. McGhee answered that MEC was the real ray of hope. Egypt should take an active role, free from the old British bond.

Dr. Malik questioned what the nationality of SACME would be. Where would the headquarters be?

Mr. McGhee said that the headquarters would be in Egypt.

Dr. Malik asserted that the Egyptian demand for immediate withdrawal should not be taken too seriously. He thought that they would negotiate a time for withdrawal. A compromise and middle ground must be found, and he felt this could be done by a definite termination of the date of British withdrawal.

Mr. McGhee stated that there was no intention of appeasement of Egypt. She had no other way than MEC out of this dilemma.

Dr. Malik admitted that the Egyptians had acted childishly and foolishly. He wondered whether the British would be interested if the Egyptians offered to negotiate a British withdrawal within the period of a year.

Mr. McGhee said that although the West was always receptive to discussion, it would make no commitments on proposals. It was basically interested in discussing only MEC.

Mr. Kopper pointed out the possibilities of a long-term arrangement on Suez within the frame of MEC.

Mr. McGhee reiterated that the Western Powers could not see Suez left undefended and asked where the Egyptian line leads. Dr. Malik replied that the Egyptian line of action meant a satisfaction of Egyptian [Page 421] public opinion that the British were out of the country after 80 years of domination.

Mr. McGhee requested that Dr. Malik tell Salahuddin of his keen personal disappointment at the manner in which Egypt had recently acted regarding MEC, which had been worked out with Salahuddin’s ideas in mind. The Egyptians had discarded the proposal without even considering it and had brought Egypt into direct conflict with the West.

Dr. Malik asked what the role of the other Arab States should be. Mr. McGhee replied that we are not pressing the other Arab States to join now but eventually we would like them all to associate themselves with MEC as fully participating members in a cooperative effort at Middle East defense. He hopes that the other Arab States will not follow Egypt’s example, and equally hopes that Egypt will change its attitude. The United States has taken the initiative in this vital matter of the Middle Eastern defense since last January, and it was also extensively discussed at the Chiefs of Mission conference at Istanbul. He felt that the principles should be acceptable to Lebanon.

[Here follows a discussion of United States-Lebanese relations quoted in the editorial note, page 1012.]

  1. See editorial note, p. 397.