641.74/11–1551: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt 1
784. Embtel 689 Nov 12.2 Report ur conversation with Serageddin has been read with much interest and we hope this useful contact will be continued. King’s reaction these conversations (Embtel 702 Nov 15)3 also of interest, although we regret that to date King has shown no evidence of leadership in finding way out present situation. While it is clearly difficult to forecast at this stage how far Serageddin might be able and willing to go in moving from present contact to negots, fact that he is talking in these terms is significant. We recognize that since at present time Egypt are in no mood to negotiate, it wld not be possible or desirable to make specific suggestions to them re reformulation Four-Power proposals. However, we wonder whether Serageddin wld be willing in near future to put on paper for our eyes only (if he wishes) what he has in mind re possible modifications in def proposals. One of our principal difficulties in working with Egypts has been that while they are always ready to reject proposals made to them, they never produce concrete suggestions which they cld seriously [Page 423] expect US, UK or all Four Powers to consider. Egypts must realize from Four-Power proposals that UK and other three Powers have gone quite far (and might possibly go further) to meet their point of view on def issue, but these negots cannot be a one-way street. If as you report in Embtel 6944 Nov 12, Nahas is “extremely unhappy” over present state of Anglo-Egypt differences, way is open for him and Serageddin to make concrete comments on the Four-Power proposals. You might feel it desirable in further conversations with Serageddin to stress that while we are anxious to see early solution to the present problem, we will be unable to make any progress if Egypts do not offer constructive comments which can be seriously considered. In this connection, it might be pertinent to remind Serageddin that during entire PD leading up to presentation Four-Power proposals, we had reason to believe from talks with Egypt officials that multilateral approach to problem wld be acceptable to all concerned.
Re Sudan, Dept has requested FonOff to take another look at this problem to see what further might be offered. Here again value references by Egypts to 1946 Bevin-Sidky protocol5 are not particularly helpful in trying to work out compromise arrangement. It difficult for Brit to do something “satisfactory” on Sudan without any specific idea what Egypts want, except for extreme view that Brit shld evacuate Sudan. Dept wld appreciate ur comments as to whether there is any evidence that Brit have discussed Sudan problem with leaders of Sudanese polit parties with object of determining how far UK cld go in direction Egypts and still retain Sudanese support. It is our impression that to date this has not been done. Ur comments wld also be appreciated re Salaheddin’s plebiscite proposal made before UNGA Nov 16 and effect on Egypts of Brit announcement re Sudan self-government in 1952.
Re Embtel 703 Nov 15,6 principal criterion which shld determine whether or not change of govt shld be manipulated is more than reasonable degree assurance that new govt will carry out desired program. Based on available info we are doubtful whether in immed future any polit leaders, except from extremist elements, wld be willing or able form Govt which wld have sufficient strength to restore status quo ante. While Brit FonOff looks hopefully to King and Army to provide such new govt, there appears to be no evidence so far that [Page 424] King cld or wld take this step and some quest may also arise re Army’s loyalty. Obviously extremist govt wld be disastrous.
We are also concerned by Stevenson’s apparent assumption that ouster of Wafd Govt wld by itself lead to restoration status quo ante. We find it hard to believe sit is that simple.
View above Dept wonders whether better solution might not be offered by working with those elements in present govt, such as Serageddin, who appears anxious re actual and future state of affairs, while at same time fostering purge of rabble-rousers, such as Salaheddin. If approaches by Serageddin mean anything and if he has the power he appears to have, it might not only be unwise but dangerous to embark on “govt-changing” program, particularly when no other polit leadership seems to be in sight. Another factor which shld be borne in mind is diffic sit which wld be created if respons govt change cld be placed on Western powers.
Dept believes that you and Stevenson shld give this whole ques most careful consideration. Ur substantive comments on Stevenson’s recommendations and views expressed above wld be welcome.
- Drafted by Stabler, approved for transmission and initialed for the Acting Secretary by McGhee. Repeated to London eyes only for Ambassador Gifford, to Paris eyes only for Ambassador Bruce and the Secretary.↩
- Supra.↩
- Not printed; it reported that King Farouk knew of Caffery’s conversations with Seraggedin “and highly approves.” Caffery added that the Chief of the King’s Cabinet had informed him that Farouk was “delighted” that Seraggedin had taken the initiative in the conversations and hoped that they would lead to final acceptance by Egypt of defense plans, “with the usual reservation that Brit do something ‘satisfactory’ on Sudan.” (641.74/11–1551)↩
- Not printed.↩
- For documentation on the Bevin–Sidky protocol on the Sudan, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 69 ff.↩
- Not printed; it outlined recommendations submitted by Ambassador Stevenson to London in a “think-piece” concerning Britain’s “future course of action in Egypt” (641.74/11–1551).↩