Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

357.AE/10–1951

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Rountree) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)¹

confidential

[Washington,] October 19, 1951.

Subject: Continuation of UN Vigilance in the Balkans

Beginning in the spring of 1950 the Department began consultation with other interested powers looking toward the abolition of UNSCOB and removal of the item of the threat to the peace of Greece from the General Assembly Agenda. Korean events clearly set forth the fact that the Soviet Union was still willing to resort, through its satellites, to aggression against the free world. Furthermore, Korea demonstrated the effectiveness of prompt and impartial reporting in arousing world opinion and in initiating an incontestable basis for UN action. Consequently, the United States joined with Greece and other nations at the Fifth Assembly to continue UNSCOB for an additional year with the power to recommend its own dissolution before the Sixth Assembly if conditions warranted it. Based on evidence collected throughout the year, UNSCOB in its recent report recommended that United Nations vigilance in the Balkans be maintained. This position was adopted unanimously by UNSCOB and had full support of the Governments of France, the United States and the United Kingdom. In supporting this position the interested areas of the Department had three considerations in mind:

1. The threat to Yugoslavia is very real and continuing. The security of Yugoslavia is of direct strategic interest to the United States. This threat has been comprehensively set forth in the Yugoslav White Book, published in February 1951. On September 11 it also circulated to United Nations Members a series of complaints against the Albanian Government. The Yugoslav Government has advised that they intend to propose the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia as an agenda item in the coming General Assembly. For the past six months the Department has been discussing with the Yugoslavs and other interested countries possible means of addressing UN action to the threat to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs believe that the establishment of a UN body to be concerned solely or directly with the threat to Yugoslavia would be provocative to the USSR. For political reasons the Yugoslavs would not accept UNSCOB but might accept some other body not having UNSCOB’s history. They may be willing, however, to consider establishment of a UN body principally concerned with the Greek frontier but which could quickly spread its operation to Yugoslavia should aggressive action be initiated against Yugoslavia.

2. The location of a United Nations Commission or its observers in the sensitive Balkan area has given the West a tactical advantage in the context of the overall strategic relation between the West and the Soviet Bloc; it seems essential to maintain those moral and political deterrents to Soviet expansion. UN vigilance in the Balkans has constituted such an impediment in the international field to Soviet expansion to the Mediterranean. Were this impediment to be removed, the Soviets would gain a very real advantage. While the removal of UN vigilance in this area would probably not be a signal for a Soviet aggressive move toward the Mediterranean, it would, however, relieve the pressure upon them in this area and give them greater freedom of action. The fact that similar tactical advantages are not enjoyed by the West in many other sensitive areas makes it seem essential to retain that advantage in the Balkan area.

3. The threat to Greece, while altered, is nonetheless real. The Department’s judgment in reversing its position with regard to the abolition of UNSCOB appears to have been vindicated in view of events since that time. Prior to the summer of 1950 there had been a noticeable increase in the military potential of the satellites. This military buildup increased steadily during the fall of 1950 and became very much accelerated particularly in Bulgaria during the spring and summer of 1950. Along with this, propaganda efforts against Greece increased in almost direct proportion, taking two lines: first, that a Belgrade–Athens–Ankara axis was being formed directed against Albania and Bulgaria; second, US and UK were mounting a Greek offensive against Albania and Bulgaria. The propaganda program went to the lengths of broadcasting the contents of alleged combat operation orders, imputing a purpose to the movements of prominent Greek and American civil and military personalities (including yourself), indicating Greek troop dispositions, in order to give the idea that an attack was imminent. By twisting actual events and adding false statements a very artful picture was presented which confused even some Greeks. Whatever else may have been the effect of this propaganda it undoubtedly has served to heighten the tension in the Balkans and to whip up public feeling in Bulgaria and Albania, which feeling could be exploited if it were decided to make an attack against Greece. It follows that the threat inherent in the satellite military buildup would seem to be directed toward Greece by this propaganda. On two occasions in January and July of 1951 the intensity of such propaganda compelled UNSCOB to report the untruthfulness of these charges to the members of the UN after having conducted an investigation in Greece.

On quite another score it is notable that the satellite governments have been training Greek guerrillas in infiltration, underground, reorganization, and subversive tactics. Groups of these people have constantly been entering Greece clandestinely to collect intelligence of the Greek armed forces, to foment discontent, and to lay a basis for a future attempt to overthrow the Greek Government. While no substantial headway has been made in this direction, it is not impossible for a resurgence of guerrilla activity in Greece to occur. Removal of UN vigilance from Greece would encourage the renewal of guerrilla penetration across the frontiers as is now daily occurring along the Yugoslav satellite frontier. Such a movement could be materially assisted by trained guerrillas now in the satellites amounting to possibly as much as 20,000.

The recent national elections have resulted in a stalemate. While it is possible for an EPEK–Liberal Government to be formed, it would probably be no more effective or durable a government than those of the recent past. The prospect of improvement in political stability is not good. Inflationary pressures are making for considerable latent discontent. In such a situation when a reduction in American assistance is imminent, withdrawal of UN vigilance from Greece might be interpreted as a lessening of American interest in Greece and result in a weakening of Greek morale. While Greece has been invited to join NATO, the effect of this move cannot be fully felt in Greece for quite some time. Furthermore, the NATO guarantee is not adopted to meet the threat to Greek security which could result from a revived guerrilla threat.

UNSCOB, while it has performed a valuable task in the past, is a cumbersome body not well adapted to meet the threat in the Balkans today. UN machinery in this area is in need of freshening up, which could only be accomplished by a new body and a new mechanism better suited to the needs of the situation. While Britain and France, as well as many other governments, are inclined to favor the retention of UNSCOB in a revised form, the Department has, for the past month, been in consultation with other interested nations, in an attempt to convince them of the need of more compact and efficient machinery in the Balkans. The Department proposes the establishment of a subcommission of the POC which would sit in New York and be composed of members of standing delegations there. Its membership would be reliable, since a majority of the POC can be relied upon to make such a selection. A small observer group of 10 to 15 persons would be located in Greece to keep a watch on the Greek borders with Albania and Bulgaria but ready to operate any place in the Balkans. The subcommittee would be empowered to provide for observation in other areas of international tension in the Balkans at the request of any government concerned, and could itself go to the scene of trouble. Perhaps from one-half to two-thirds of the present costs of UNSCOB would be saved through the operation of this new body. This subcommittee, from the point of view of the Greek problem, would be a disengaging process which, if events warranted it, could be removed from the Greek scene. On the other hand, it could be ready to act immediately in case of an emergency anywhere in the Balkans.²

1. Drafted by Dixon (GTI).
2. On November 20, John Politis, head of the Greek Delegation to the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly at Paris, informed the Ad Hoc Political Committee that the Greek Government considered that the situation in Greece had been restored to a point where the UNSCOB was no longer necessary and therefore should be dissolved. In view of the opinion given in the last report of the Special Committee that potential Communist danger still existed and that continued vigilance in the Balkans remained necessary, a resolution sponsored by Greece, France, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States was presented which, after expressing deep appreciation of the work of the UNSCOB, recommended its dissolution within 60 days and its supersession by a Balkan subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission (POC). The resolution was adopted by the Ad Hoc Political Committee on November 23 by a vote of 50 to 5, with 3 abstentions after rejection of a Soviet amendment which called on the United Nations to condemn the United States for “interference” in Greek affairs and called also on the Greek Government to declare a general political amnesty and to reestablish “normal diplomatic relations” with her neighbors. The plenary session of the General Assembly upheld the resolution on December 7, by a vote of 48 to 5 to 1. In telegram 3058 from Athens, January 8, 1952, Ambassador Peurifoy informed the Department that a special meeting of the UNSCOB on January 7 had voted to dissolve the organization by formal meeting on February 5 (357.AE/1–852). Documentation on the work of UNSCOB during 1951 and on the negotiations leading to its dissolution may be found in file 357.AE.