Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

683.84A/7–1451: Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State ¹

secret

Damascus, July 14, 1951—8 p. m.

26. We have been reviewing problems underlying Syro-Israeli dispute in light stimulating tels such as Depcirtel 2, July 2;² Deptel 8, July 6³ also Tel Aviv 895, June 23 [21]⁴ re necessity for facing up to territorial question. We are convinced this last problem shld be dealt with speedily and courageously together with that of water rights. Fol paras continue our comment (see Legtel 6, July 5)⁵ on points raised in Depcirtel July 2.

In seeking solution this vexing problem our aim shld be reduce irritations in gen so that we can proceed step by step to larger issues. We note Emb Tel Aviv report SC res May 18 had both beneficial and adverse aspects in Israel. As for Syrians they had made their case prestige-wise and we are sure that had initial good effect not been dissipated by Israel non-compliance and Riley’s decision for resuming drainage work Syrians cld be brought to accept settlement along lines whereby Israel’s legitimate objective wld have been gained. It does us little good to talk about this now except that we must take into account Syria’s sense of outrage in considering future lines of action. Syria’s June 20 proposal for ad hoc talks looked good to us and we deplored Israel’s “all or nothing” attitude toward this proposal (Tel Aviv’s 14 July 9).⁶ Reiteration of our stand for gen settlement can only be expected to evoke flat rejection and thereby stop us from moving toward precisely that objective. It seems to us that for Israel to refuse bona fide negots on individual components of peace leave it open to charge of hypocrisy. To Syrians goodwill is lacking when Israel flouts ad hoc talks while temporizing on SC res of May 18. Assertion that talks wld be designed serve Syrian territorial ambition (Tel Aviv’s 2, July 3)⁷ is no more valid than Arab claim that full peace talks cld only serve Israel. Any step toward partial settlement is step toward full peace. Cannot point be made that reduction of friction along comparatively short frontier with Syria through ad hoc talks might pay dividends in lasting modus vivendi with perhaps most embittered Arab State?

Leg forwarding by despatch its analysis Syrian territorial and other claims and interests in zone. UK Leg here has also submitted report presumably available to Dept. We believe Syria cld be persuaded settle for moderate territorial gain for prestige purposes if interests in water rights protected. Possibility resettling zone Arabs now Israel in any territory given Syria on east side of Jordan shld make division of zone attractive to Israel.

Israel’s insistence on claiming exclusive control of Jordan as its “lifeline” points up once more dangers to area peace inherent in water rights question. Judging from recent action Israeli doctrine seems to be that expansion its population and economy justifies and may necessitate diversion to Israel or otherwise manipulating of all water resources around its periphery. We trust this is not in fact Israel policy as Syrians believe it to be. In case of Jordan River such policy wld affect legitimate, vital rights of Syria and Jordan as well and we believe Riley fully justified in views expressed Beirut tel 1, July 3.⁸

There is also third party to dispute in state of Jordan which lays claim to Hammeh area (Amman tel 175, April 6)⁹ and has made complaints re use of Jordan water. Moreover we do not forget that other water projects such as Syrian and Jordan Yarmuk projects will create additional complications. If ad hoc talks can be arranged some way shld be found to take into account Jordan claims. Consideration might then be given to creation of internatl machinery to supervise use of water (which is key problem in this sensitive area) until final peace can be achieved.

In connection with ad hoc talks we believe PCC might provide a suitable frame for discussion. We also approve idea that polit reps might be added to MAC’s. Well chosen reps under control of MAC chairman might discuss specific issues with profit, clarifying policies disputants and at same time accustoming all parties to idea of discussion face to face. We are not terrified by prospect that such discussion wld be useless and sometimes acrimonious. One of worst aspects of present situation is that both sides are uninformed on the real situation and state of mind in each others country. We have had to live with fact that both Israel and Syria have been using Arabs as pawns of national policy. Perhaps we can better cope with this problem if by broadening scope of discussions this can be brought into open.

We suggest consideration be given to fol lines of action:

(1) Communicate to Syria and Israel and publicly announce our concern over Israel’s noncompliance with res re return of displaced Arabs and withdrawal paramilitary forces. Statement by US and other sponsors on their attitude toward Israel’s noncompliance cld recapture in Syrian and other Arab states some of good will with which they originally recd res.

(2) In coordination with other sponsors take Syrian, Jordan and Israel into our confidence to our thinking on desirability their settling territorial and water rights questions and necessity prompt completion drainage project. We cld also suggest possibility settling displaced zone Arabs on east bank of river shld they so desire. (This does not represent modification Leg belief all zone Arabs shld be returned to their villages even though they might reside in tents while destruction of villages being made good.)

(3) At same time announce our support of action to prevent resumption Huleh drainage operations on Arab-owned land until SC res May 18 in other respects fully complied with and zone Arabs given opportunity make free decision re their lands.

Unless some such plan involving settlement by agreement can be evolved only alternative would seem to be SC action to impose settlement. We need not labor point that “simple solution” such as expropriation of Arab land against Syrian opposition wld revive other griefs in Pal dispute.

Cannon

1. Repeated for information to London, Paris, Tel Aviv, the Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and Ankara.
2. Ante, p. 739.
3. The same as telegram 12 to Tel Aviv, July 6, p. 752.
4. Not printed.
5. Ante, p. 744.
6. Ante, p. 757.
7. Ante, p. 742.
8. Beirut’s telegram 1 to Damascus, the same as its telegram 6 to the Department, not printed, reported General Riley’s impression from a discussion with the Prime Minister of Jordan on June 28 that the Jordanian policy was to postpone indefinitely any work on the Huleh project, this being the same line taken by Syria. Riley stated that the Jordan River may be considered as much a lifeline for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as for Israel. (785.022/7–351)
9. Not printed.