Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

330/11–1851: Telegram

The Chargé in Syria (Clark) to the Department of State ¹

secret

Damascus, November 18, 1951—3 p. m.

286. Yesterday Sec Gen Fon Off discussed sit demil zone at length with Leg officer. He agreed personal attacks on Gen Riley by “mil spokesman” (Legdes 267, Nov 16)² tactless but asserted all Syrian mil and civil leaders believe Riley’s actions re dispute and his interpretation SC res of May 18 leave him open to serious charges partiality. In face Riley’s attitude and his failure achieve implementation res, Syria unwilling participate further MAC mtgs.

Sec Gen said in Syrian mind there are three separate issues which shld not be mixed:

(1) First, May 18 res must be fully implemented before MAC cld meet. Shld Syria participate MAC in present circumstances it wld be acknowledging UN’s inability achieve implementation res and wld be acquiescing in status quo in zone. Israel para mil forces wld still be in zone, Arabs forcibly removed from zone by Israel wld have been repatriated in token numbers only, and Israel wld be continuing engineering operations because of Riley’s untenable interpretation of May 18 res. Effect wld be to force Syria to accept Israel faits accomplis. Syria’s bargaining position in MAC wld be prejudiced by Israel’s de facto control of zone.

(2) Syria recognizes necessity for definitive line instead of zone as suggested as early as last Feb by Qudsi (Legtel 400 [404] Feb 20).³ As Qudsi then pointed out, Syria cannot for polit reasons propose adjustment herself but willing study proposals made by others. Syria had hoped something wld come of French proposal to take dispute to PCC but had heard “informally” that US had killed this idea. (Leg Officer commented this untrue but that US had always urged such matters be kept in context MAC as provided under art 8 of armistice.) However, before adjustments cld be considered May 18 Res must be implemented. Otherwise, Syrian case lost from start and Syria wld be in fact negotiating under duress.

(3) Although any line agreed on wld be as definitive as other armistice frontiers of Israel, a “final” settlement of frontier lines and sovereignty, even in limits demil zone, unthinkable until all UN resolutions including repatriation, compensation, and partition (sic) executed. All adjustments made in demil zone wld be made as part of armistice and cld not be allowed prejudice final determinations. Thus, so far as Syria concerned, any proposal involving final settlement wld be ipso facto unacceptable as basis for discussion. How cld Syria expect unprejudice final settlement if Israel refused implement any of several UN resolutions? And if UN cld not enforce May 18 res, how cld it be expected enforce final settlement or zonal adjustments?

Comment: Re-airing of demil zone dispute cld have disastrous effects on Syrian consideration MEC and MSP. Although recent statements by “mil spokesman” have not yet provoked public interest on scale of last May and June, Syrian leaders nevertheless preoccupied failure Israel implement May 18 res. Sooner or later this preoccupation, some new incident in zone, or SC action to expropriate Arab lands will lead to interjections whole issue into MSP and MEC discussions by extremists and Syrian press.

Syrians are clearly unwilling present adjustment plan themselves, and it may be difficult persuade them consider proposal from any other party if Govt sticks to Secy Gen’s line that there can be no MAC mtgs until May 18 res fully executed. In any case atmosphere heated by Israel’s failure implement res will make talks bitter.

With success MSP and MEC at stake here it seems essential Israel Govt or Riley shld be persuaded put forward proposal suggesting adjustments in zone (Tel Aviv tel 58 July 20⁴ to Dept). Assuming Syria cld be persuaded return to MAC to comment on such proposal, this seems only means determining Syrian price for adjustment. Unless we know Syrian price there seems little hope for adjustment either in or out of MAC.

Clark

1. Repeated for information to Tel Aviv, Paris, London, the Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and Ankara.
2. Despatch 267 from Damascus, November 16 (not printed), transmitted the text of a statement on the Syria–Israel demilitarized zone which was released to the press by a Syrian “military spokesman” on November 14, and which was largely a personal attack on General Riley (330/11–1651).
3. Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 591.
4. Ante, p. 785.