UNP Files: Lot 58 D 224
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)
Subject: Discussion with the Ambassador of Israel re 1) Future of PCC; 2) Opportunity Missed; 3) Condemned Iraqi Jews; and 4) Shishikli and Syria.
| Participants: | H. E. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel |
| G. Lewis Jones—NE |
Israeli Ambassador Eban invited me to lunch with him today. The general discussion can be summarized as follows:
1. Future of PCC: Ambassador Eban said that Mr. Sharett had been disturbed by Mr. Lie’s idea of an eleven-member committee to carry on the work of PCC. Israel believed PCC had outlived its usefulness. Heretofore Israel had thought and talked in terms of peace with the Arab States but it had now come around to the conclusion [Page 954] that a general peace settlement with all of the Arabs is a long way off; this is true also of peace settlements with individual Arab States. Ambassador Eban said that his Government is now convinced of the great importance of the Armistice Agreements to peace and stability in the Middle East. These agreements were signed documents. They could be altered by agreement of the parties and such alterations, including alterations in Armistice lines, need not receive wide publicity. He thought in the present circumstances it was easier for both the Arab States and Israel to operate within the framework of the armistices. For this reason, Israel hoped that whatever happened General Riley’s relationship to the Armistice Agreements would remain unchanged. General Riley’s title might be changed but he is fundamentally the guardian of the armistices and such he should remain.
Under his aegis, Israel might work out in the MACs settlements of outstanding problems with individual Arab States. If such settlements should continue to be called “armistice agreements” that was all right with Israel.
I said that there was the question of what should be done with “compensation” and “repatriation”; these were very important to the Arabs and must be taken care of if great discussion was to be avoided in Paris.
Ambassador Eban suggested that since these two points have to do with the Arab refugees, he thought that they should be assigned to Mr. Blandford.
I took strong exception to the idea of loading “repatriation” and “compensation” on Blandford. I said that the UNRWA in its resettlement activities had not yet kept up with the birthrate. Just as I agreed that General Riley should not be loaded down with jobs which would make his truce-keeping more difficult, so Mr. Blandford should not carry the extra weight of these political problems. I said that Blandford himself felt that his resettlement efforts would be jeopardized if he were given “compensation” and “resettlement”.
Ambassador Eban said he was not aware that Blandford held this view and seemed impressed by the argument that nothing should impede refugee resettlement.
I told Ambassador Eban that we had taken no decision on this matter; that there were various schools of thought, one of which included an inactive residuary legatee of PCC at the New York headquarters of UN.
2. Opportunity Missed: I could not resist telling Ambassador Eban, on a strictly personal basis, that I thought Israel may have muffed a chance during the recent PCC meetings. I said that there was no need for me to reiterate with him our idea that the “orthodox” approach of Israel towards peace with the Arabs had shown no results and was [Page 955] unlikely to do so. He knew that we favored the “unorthodox” approach. In the case of PCC, Israel had let itself get into the hands of “orthodox” lawyers. Instead of the Israeli side of the story as printed by PCC being a bold avowal of their willingness to make sacrifices to live at peace with its neighbors—a document which we could cite to Israel’s detractors—instead the Israeli story was the closely reasoned, legalistic “orthodox” line. I said that we would never know whether Israel had taken the right or wrong decision, but there were those of us who had hoped that Israel would not stand upon technicalities and ceremonies but would make full use of the PCC forum. To my surprise, Eban did not take issue with me on this point; on the contrary, I had the feeling that his sympathy with the “unorthodox” approach might be growing.
3. Condemned Iraqi Jews: Ambassador Eban said that Mr. Kollek would be coming to see me shortly to discuss the case of the condemned Iraqi Jews. He said that irrespective of the facts of the case (Israeli information showed that the evidence and trial were not all they should have been) a far better approach to the Iraqis would be not to find fault with their legal procedures but to raise the question of the general desirability of showing clemency to the condemned Jews by committing their sentence to life imprisonment. Ambassador Eban said that Israel had had a number of cases involving Arabs, in some instances espionage by Arabs, in which the death sentence was fully justified. However, on political grounds Israel had decided not to execute the men. He hoped that Iraq would take a similar line. I gave no substantive reply.
4. Shishikli and Syria: Ambassador Eban asked for information regarding developments in Syria. I told him the facts of the Syrian coup and mentioned the fact that it was Colonel Zaim who signed the Armistice with Israel. I said that it was my understanding that the Syrian military is dissatisfied with the present situation along the Israel-Syrian Armistice line; they would like to see this liquidated.
Ambassador Eban remarked that he thought Shishikli might be a force for good in Syria. He said also that there were in the armies of the Arab States generally some good young captains and majors who know their business and were reasonable men.