751G.00/2–2451: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
1496. New Viet Government has now taken over although its formal investiture will be temporarily delayed.1 Its reception by public has been at best tepid. Last minute Dai Viet withdrawal capping previous refusals catholics, VNQDD, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and independent nationalists to participate new government has provided dramatization narrow base on which second Huu Ministry rests and of measure of its difference from national union project at first envisioned. With 12 to 14 of 16 ministers Cochin Chinese, no new figures of true national stature added, and Huu himself occupying 4 or 5 most important posts, the strength of new Viet Government resides almost solely in south Vietnam particularly and French support.
There is not one figure in this Cabinet capable, on basis of record, of providing popular inspiration or enlisting public enthusiasm. Majority of 16 ministers are generally believed or suspected of being strongly pro-French or subservient French interests. There is no single figure with history of energetic accomplishment in government with exception Huu and possibly Vinh.2 Huu has grown in stature since last fall when he gained some temporary prestige by his newspaper criticism of French policy, and his survival present crisis will have increased his reputation.
From standpoint of protagonists in this period of emergency, Huu and Saigon have been victorious over Bao Dai, Dalat and Hanoi. Bao Dai might have continued his earlier strategy of insisting on Dai Viet participation in new government or he might have refused approve new list and withdrawn Huu’s mandate. He did neither. I would hazard that his explanation will run along line of allowing Huu and his coterie to discredit themselves. But his acquiescence to new Cabinet which accomplishes none of purposes of his national union project appears complete abandonment, even to surrender of Hue or Dalat for Mao [Huu?] investiture, of his brief essay at real leadership.
French role in this later period of crisis is far from clear. That Huu enjoys their confidence is evident and De Lattre may well have felt government crisis and political maneuvering had to be eliminated [Page 385] at any cost. He now plans leave for Paris February 27. De Lattre is evidently far from enthusiastic over this government as I gather he expects that its tenure may not be prolonged. I think it premature, however, to write off Huu government. Nor do I believe that the opposition will have early success in ousting him or that the scattered and somewhat venal opposition elements, in their anger over new government, will foment popular disorder or defect to Viet Minh.
As for Huu, he now seems to hold all the levers of Viet command. He has given proof of certain quiet, obstinate force and the ability to survive. He is an industrious man. He has the broad progressive program of Bao Dai’s Tet address,3 his own advocacy of initiation of representative assemblies, and widely recognized necessity for immediate activation national army on which to build. But even if he does obtain temporary measure of success his government does not approach the ideal which our policy had hoped for. It offers no strong appeal to nationalists; it is not clear answer to political and social propaganda of Viet Minh.
Fact is that Ho Chi Minh is only Viet who enjoys any measure of national prestige. Far after him would come Ngo Dien [Dinh] Diem, the catholic leader now in US. In talk in Paris Pignon told me that he had come to conclusion only solution would be for Bao Dai to entrust formation of government to Diem and he lidded that Prince Buu Loc, Bao Dai’s representative in Paris, who has considerable political insight, had tacitly agreed with him.
I learned this morning that Tri and Quat were at Dalat yesterday with Bao Dai but I gather that Tri did not succeed in reversing Huu. I will see De Lattre when he returns Saigon first of week and Bao Dai, by latter’s invitation, on either 27th or 28th. By this time situation between north and south as well as the vigor and the directions of new government may be considerably clearer. As of this date, however, it must be acknowledged that none of the events since last December, Pau agreements, transfer of revenues, decision to activate national army, Bao Dai’s appeals for unity and support, dynamism of new HICOM, French victories in north, and the Tet program, has had appreciable impact on the Viet political mind.
Sent Department 1496, repeated info Paris 651.
- The formation of a new government was announced on February 18. However, at the first cabinet meeting, February 21, Nguyen Huu Tri (Minister of National Defense) and Phan Huy Quat (Minister of Education) resigned in protest over the refusal of Prime Minister Huu to grant additional portfolios to the Dai Viet party. In the reconstituted government announced the same day, Tran Van Huu held the positions of Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defense, and Minister of the Interior.↩
- Nguyen Trung Vinh, Minister of Finance.↩
- Bao Dai’s lunar New Year address, February 6, announced plans for economic development and agrarian reform. The Chief of State also indicated that upon the restoration of peace, the people of Viet-Nam would be called upon to determine their form of government. The text of the address was transmitted to the Department of State as enclosure 9 to despatch no. 503 from Saigon, February 14, not printed. (751G.00/2–1451)↩