851G.00R/3–851: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State 1

secret

1567. I had conversation with De Lattre two days ago which, taken in conjunction with his talk with Blum (see Toeca 227, March 3)2 [Page 389] represents very disturbing development. I bad to break off my conversations with De Lattre because of the hour and therefore did not report it hoping continue it next day. Unfortunately De Lattre has been running low temperature, presumably because of long-standing ear infection and has not been receiving visitors.

De Lattre told me that he had asked me see him because of an article by Tilman Durdin in New York Times which mentioned that new Huu Government was meeting with criticism from “nationalists” as having too many members identified with French interests and observed further that Americans were disappointed see Tri leave governorship in north because of his ability utilizing American economic aid. De Lattre said his advisors had wanted him censor this despatch. He had refused but was “hurt” since the Durdins had enjoyed his hospitality and facilities. I told him I thought the article was not harmful their policy or prestige but when occasion arose I would discuss with Durdin passages De Lattre objected to. I reminded De Lattre however he had recently enjoyed an excellent press in the US for his accomplishments here and advised against doing anything to interrupt this generally good relations with American correspondents. Certainly there would be from time to time articles he would dislike but on other hand there would be many which would be very helpful to him and all interests concerned. As he knew, our American press was fiercely independent and resented any efforts at influence or censorship. He then remarked that Viet Minh would seize on this article for material for its accusation that Tri is America’s “straw man”. He added that if he thought Tri was our “straw man” he would withdraw his support of him. I remarked humorously but very emphatically that, of course, he knew perfectly well that we neither had nor wanted any of what he called “straw men”. In view his recent remarks to Blum I told him I thought it advisable review main lines our policy with which he was undoubtedly familiar. We were here to supplement but not supplant French efforts and assist loyally in supporting the evolutionary policy of support and independence for Associated States within French union. We were occasionally accused by certain disgruntled Viets “Nationalists” of supporting French designs and I had argued with Viets who had voiced distrust and complaint of French intentions of granting true independence to Vietnam. I added that I had never lost any such argument with one exception of one with an irrational Viet Minh sympathizer.

I said he knew our policy looked toward maintenance of fraternal arrangements of Associated States with metropolitan France and that we appreciated advantage to India of maintaining association [Page 390] with states of British commonwealth. De Lattre interrupted here to say that, of course, Associated States could not enjoy same status as former British colonies within commonwealth since France had spent too much wealth and blood in protecting them. I let that rather surprising observation go by without comment or reply.

De Lattre then returned to question of ECA activities saying the irrigation dam project in north would not meet needs of present military situation. He admitted it had been approved by former French commander and when latter were thinking in terms of defense against overt Chinese invasion but said it might interfere with his operation plans in the new situation. We must, he said, consider any arrangements made with Pignon administration as subject to review or cancellation in view of change in situation. ECA he said was giving only six million piasters for road projects in Tonkin which would cost 100 million piasters and making large publicity for this contribution which was very small. I contented myself with remark that, of course, we would discuss any projects and listen to any suggestion for ECA projects in military area. (I have just sent letter to De Lattre pointing out that his commander in north has just confirmed previous approval of irrigation project. This project, by the way, would restore some 25,000 acres of land to cultivation before next rice planting and provide livelihood for several tens of thousands of Viets in the refugeeridden north.)

In conclusion I again referred to [garble] and disinterested character of our policy. I said humorously that I took philosophically fact that some Viets and unfortunately good number Frenchmen here could not believe our policy was as disinterested and altruistic as it in fact was. I had to interrupt De Lattre good many times during this interview to get in my own statements but it ended in customary friendly fashion.

In addition my own talk with De Lattre, a member of military mission tells me he recently talked with Colonel Beaufre of De Lattre’s staff. Beaufre quoted De Lattre as having said to him recently that “Heath was a dupe, presenting an honest face while all sorts of American machinations were transpiring behind our backs.”

Whatever cause, we are confronted with sudden access of suspicion and objection to American operations and policy in Vietnam on part De Lattre. This may be caused by resentment at amount publicity which American economic and military aid to Vietnam has received and De Lattre’s resentment may have been deliberately fanned by some of De Lattre’s civilian advisors who are of old colonial stripe. I do not believe any of his French military hierarchy hold any such suspicions [Page 391] or resentment our aims and programs. They are on contrary most appreciative of the excellent armament they have been receiving. Again it is possible that French Surete has been giving De Lattre tendentious reports concerning movements and activities of ECA and other American personnel. It may also be that with the Chinese menace possibly lessened and postponed by reason our operations in Korea and with De Lattre’s victories over Viet Minh last January, De Lattre and his Cabinet here are having return of confidence and feeling of self sufficiency and with that a desire turn back to days when French authority and influence were exclusively maintained.

I hope have frank talk with De Lattre at earliest possible moment.

Sent Department 1567 repeated information Paris 681, Hanoi unnumbered.

Heath
  1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
  2. Not printed.