751G.5/3–1251: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
niact
1608. There is undeniably some awkwardness in De Lattre proposal for confidential talk with Eisenhower (Deptel 1175, March 11)1 but war at times requires cutting directly to heart of matter. Key to entire range French plans and operations in Indochina is question reinforcements De Lattre has requested and which both Chief MAAG and MSA certify as reasonable in number and critically urgent in need. De Lattre is gambling he can make Paris trip and return before new VM offensive opens last 10 days March (Legtel 1603 March 11).2 He must get his answer on reinforcements shortest possible time for strategy French defense Tonkin depends on availability, numbers, arrival date reinforcement troops. If VM attack opens in fact between [Page 395] March 15–20 De Lattre must be able communicate his instructions to field commanders in light reinforcement probabilities.
Attitude Eisenhower toward transfer metropolitan troops to Indochina is the important element. Le Tourneau indicated to me in Paris-French could come to no decision re reinforcements in absence Eisenhower views and De Lattre obviously holds same opinion. I think we must assume De Lattre knows current Indochina military situation better than any French military or political figure now in Paris. His length stay France, presentation of problem, appraisal difficulties will all depend on what he can learn of Eisenhower’s views re operating concepts for European defense. He believes he must see Eisenhower immediately; he proposes to do so confidentially as a friend; he has asked our assistance only in transmitting his message. He certainly has no wish create friction between himself and French Government officials at this particular time, and I believe he can be counted on to handle matter smoothly.
Re possible embarrassment in our own relations with French figures, De Lattre wants to see Eisenhower not as US officer or representative but as Supreme Commander NATO military. I suggest first the urgencies of war in Indochina must take precedence over the possibility, which I doubt is very great, that French military or political officials may display a temporary pique and second that problem cannot be conceived terms Washington–Paris relationship alone but must include Saigon and the defense of SEA as well. In any event I am more than confident that De Lattre’s personality is so well-known in Paris that assuagement possible injured dignities would be no great task for our representative there.
Please reply urgently.
Sent Department 1608, repeated info Paris 696.