S/S Files: Lot 63D351: NSC 64 Series1
Progress Report by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the National Security Council
Subject: First Progress Report on NSC 64, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina”.
NSC 64, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina”, was approved as government policy on March 27, 1950.2 It is requested that this first progress report as of March 1, 1951, be circulated to members of the Council for their information.
I—Policy Implementation
Military Aid
The Military Aid Program to Indochina enjoys the highest priority immediately after the military effort in Korea. The first deliveries began in June 1950 and by the end of January 1951 military assistance totalling approximately $50 million had been delivered to Indochina. Approximately $113 million in further military aid already has been programmed and is at varying stages in the supply process. An additional $52 million of military aid is now being programmed out of remaining FY ’51 funds and something approaching $170 million for this purpose has been included in the tentative budget estimates upon which the President’s FY ’52 budget was based. This aid program follows in general the request submitted to the United States Government by the French Government in March 1950. During August 1950 Indochina was visited by a Joint Survey Mission under the chairmanship of Mr. John Melby of the Department of State, of which Major General Erskine, USMC was the senior military member. The mission recommended that the United States continue its efforts to supply the assistance requested by the French in March 1950, with certain additions. Equipment already delivered to Indochina, or enroute, includes various aircraft, naval vessels, equipment for twelve infantry battalions (less small arms), and miscellaneous equipment and ammunition, supplied both from the United States and the United States Far East Command. In addition to the military assistance initially requested, materiel has now been requested for the equipping of national armies in each of the three States. The cost and availability of this matériel is not unknown.
U.S. military aid already received in Indochina has increased the capability of the State forces and French Union forces considerably. [Page 398] If aid already furnished had not been supplied, those forces would not have been able to maintain their present positions. It is realized, however, that American assistance is supplemental to, and does not replace the primary responsibility of the three States and of the French Republic.
Indochina Foreign Relations
The United States has continued to extend political support to the States of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Agrément has been granted for the first Cambodian Minister to the United States. The United Kingdom has sent a diplomatic representative to the three States. Vietnam is planning to open a mission in Bangkok and has sent a minister to London. Cambodia has named a minister to Bangkok.
The three State Governments have been recognized by some 30 powers. They have been elected to membership in several UN organs such as FAO, WHO and ILO. The USSR and its satellites, including Communist China, have recognized the Ho Chi Minh movement as constituting the legal government of Vietnam, but not of Cambodia and Laos.
Although the Government of Thailand and the Republic of Korea have extended diplomatic recognition to the three Governments, the majority of the Asian states continue to be apathetic toward recognition. This attitude is based on an anti-colonial rather than a pro-Communist sentiment. The result, nevertheless, has been indirectly to encourage the Communist-directed Viet Minh forces through failure to support the legal governments. The French Government has done little in the past to publicize the progressive transfer of authority to the three States, which was completed by the end of 1950. In external affairs, the French Government has the right to be consulted on the selection of diplomatic posts, designation of Chiefs of Missions and negotiation of international agreements. The continuing presence in Indochina, however, of a French High Commissioner and some 70,000 French troops, as well as the fact that France continues to finance, to a large degree, the budget deficits of the three State Governments, may constitute in Asian eyes evidence of continued French control. A withdrawal of French financial and military support would result in rapid successes by the Viet Minh forces and the formation of Communist governments within the three States. Asian states are only slowly becoming aroused to this threat to their own independence as a result both of United States efforts to identify it and of Chinese activities in Korea and Tibet, in addition to Indochina.
Indochina Internal Situation
Internal administration was transferred by the French to the State Governments on December 30, 1949, except for certain powers reserved to the French High Commissioner and certain interstate matters to be settled by an interstate conference. This conference was concluded [Page 399] in November 1950 when it was agreed that all internal administration would be turned over by the French to the State Governments by December 31, 1950. However, the piastre would continue to be pegged to the franc (at a rate highly beneficial to the piastre); the French have military base rights similar to those of the United States in the Philippines as provided in the United States–Philippine Treaty; and French functionaries would continue to carry out certain educational, war damage, and French military security functions. Other French functionaries would be employed by the Associated States only as desired by the latter.
The three State Governments are now limited in their assumption of powers only by the availability of qualified indigenous officials, their dependence on continued French financial support and their lack of popular support. The planned formation during 1951 of national armies is expected to contribute toward the actual attainment of sovereignty in each State. This should have a beneficial political effect in winning additional popular support for the governments.
The most severe threat to the continued growth and even to the continued existence of the State governments is the increased capability of the Viet Minh forces, resulting from the extension of military and matériel aid from Communist China. There is also some evidence of Soviet support. Such aid from Communist China began in April 1950, and has increased steadily. Up to now, light artillery, mortars and automatic weapons have been shipped to Indochina for the Viet Minh. Training centers in South China have trained and equipped some 50 Viet Minh battalions which have returned to Vietnam. The capacity of the training centers has been estimated at 10 to 30 thousand men rotated about every three months with some 50,000 having already completed their training. It has been reported that there are 15 to 20 Chinese technicians with each China-trained Viet Minh battalion, usually directing the artillery. The capability of these troops is rated as equal to that of French Union Forces. Chinese Communist troops in South China, within easy striking distance of the border, are estimated at two to three hundred thousand. Airfields at the border posts evacuated by the French are available to the Viet Minh, and air training is reportedly being conducted in China. However, no Viet Minh air power has yet been used, and in this respect the French Union Forces hold a present advantage due almost entirely to United States Military Aid. French Naval power is also superior but is incapable of interdicting all small craft smuggling arms.
The Viet Minh forces have the present ability to continue to occupy the major area of Tonkin (North Vietnam), and to threaten the two large cities of Hanoi and Haiphong. Scattered elements throughout central and southern Indochina, continue to have a harassing ability, preventing peaceful conditions and the resumption of orderly life [Page 400] and trade. With continued assistance at the present level from Communist China, the Viet Minh forces will remain a serious threat to the ability of the States and the French Union Forces to defend and hold the major portion of Indochina. If massive Chinese Communist armies actually invade Indochina, such an attack could not be successfully resisted by the presently available forces and most of Indochina could be overrun within a matter of months.
The ability of the State and the French Union Forces to maintain their present positions in Indochina, therefore depends only upon the absence of an actual Chinese Communist invasion in force. Their ability to improve their present position, that is, defense against the Viet Minh as presently augmented by Chinese Communist aid, will depend upon continuing materiel and financial aid from France and the United States, and the skill with which such resources are utilized.
II—Policy Evaluation
The policy adopted in NSC 64 and the measures taken to implement it have made a valuable contribution toward the stability of Indochina and of Southeast Asia. American military aid furnished the States’ forces and the Army of the French Union may have been the decisive factor in the preservation of the area against Communist aggression.
Future policy with regard to Indochina will be the subject of new studies now under preparation for the NSC.
- Master File of National Security Council documentation, 1947–1961, retired by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.↩
- For the text of NSC 64, dated February 27, 1950, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 744. It was adopted by the National Security Council on April 18, 1950, and was approved by the President on April 24.↩