751G.00/4–351: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
1759. Brit First Secy here asked Leg officer yesterday whether we had recd indication from Washington similar recent expression of renewed Fon Off concern re deteriorating IC polit situation. Fon Off holds opinion new representation shld be made De Lattre re necessity re-examination both Franco-Viet relations and domestic Viet politics. Chief proponent this point view seems be Malcolm MacDonald,1 who particularly desirous that Brit Leg here shld impress on De Lattre need for top rank polit advisor of Parodi caliber to replace coterie old colonials who now surround him.
Leg officer stated we had no such instructions and had recd no similar expression Dept’s view. He commented on hazards delicacy required approach. Brit officer agreed, stated they contemplating reply which wld point out: (a) De Lattre wld certainly not take kindly to such expression Brit advice, and (b) Brit Leg no specific suggestions to press at this particular time for amelioration local polit situation. They felt suggestion for high level polit advisor might more appropriately come on London–Paris level. They were also of opinion no ready alternative Huu existed and had some hopes that with departure Tri and restriction Dai Viet, IC Catholics might be brought to active cooperation in Govt. Further substantive parts this conversation reported my next tel. Appreciate care in not attributing foregoing.
I am, of course, also far from pleased with pendular swing IC politics away from optimistic prospects of last Jan. At that time Pau agreements and transfer central services and internal revenue to Viet Govt appeared provide stage for new four-point polit program, energetic implementation of which might have permitted real progress. This program called for: (1) Constitution of National Union Govt in which reps of all non-Commie polit families of Vietnam wld participate, [Page 414] (2) activation real National army under Viet flag and command, (3) Bao Dai’s social and econ program as launched in his tête-à-tête [Tet] address with his almost forgotten slogan of “terrefecondee”, and (4) early inauguration some form rep institutions. In succeeding months these various projects have dwindled although none except first has actually been foregone.
I believe, however, that question new approach to Fr in Saigon or in Saigon and Paris must be conceived primarily in terms timing and that present moment does not constitute happy or opportune juncture for such representation. There is a war on. De Lattre’s attention today almost exclusively and compulsorily directed to withstanding new Commie attacks in north. Present pattern these attacks seem make it not impossible that new offensive may last for several weeks of isolated but continuing small engagements. On other hand, Viet Govt concentrating very largely on assumption new services transferred to it under Pau accords. Its internal admin structure far from complete and until these posts filled and some measure admin experience acquired in discharging these new responsibilities it wld seem idle press for still further undependable transfers state powers.
If and when current mil crisis will have spent itself and when Viet Govt has filled area of its present sovereignty, I feel we shld review our own policies and programs to determine their adequacy to situation that will then exist. Prior that time, any new representations on our part wld, in my opinion, be not only unproductive but prejudicial to future exertions our influence in reactivating Jan four-point formula.2
In meantime, I believe exposure naked Commie control over former VM movements as exemplified by new Worker’s Party and Lien Viet Front provide us with important propaganda opportunities which shld be fully exploited in attempt split off non-Commie Natls within enemy camp. I shall submit further reviews this regard shortly.
Sent Dept 1759, rptd info Paris 750, London 24.
- British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia.↩
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Telegram 5946 from Paris, April 4, commenting on the present telegram, read in part as follows:
“Emb concurs with leg’s view that present moment is not appropriate one for representations as envisaged by British FonOff. Aside from reasons set forth in reftel, which are in Emb’s opinion sound, there is further and equally important consideration that this pre-electoral period in France when present govt faced with many complex and difficult problems is definitely not time for us to request French Govt make new approach to IC problems. Emb concurs with Saigon’s suggestion that, if and when current mil crisis has passed and when Vietnamese Govt has been able assume its new responsibilities, it would be appropriate to review our present course of action, at which time consideration cld be given to possibility and desirability of approaching French Govt in this regard.” (751G.00/4–451)
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