790.5/5–2851: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
2044. I introduced Hoey1 to De Lattre on 21 May and during subsequent 90-minute conversation the General discussed the mil situation in great detail. With respect to the Singapore Conference, De Lattre felt that it had been most useful and that he had “made his position known”. He had originally felt that there might have been some question in the minds of the UK and the US dels as to the extreme importance of the mil campaign in Indochina. He felt, however, that there was no longer any question as to the acceptance of the Tonkin battleground as being the guarded gateway into SEA. He spoke highly of the cooperation and understanding evidenced by the other dels and particularly mentioned his high regard for Admiral Struble and his staff.
Gen De Lattre stated with the utmost conviction that he had been totally uninformed concerning the presence of Australian and New Zealand observers altho he welcomed them as representing important areas within the Commonwealth. He felt strongly that Vietnam having, as he said, a comparable position with the Fr Union should also have been represented. Had he known in advance of their presence he would have asked Bao Dai either to send a rep or that he, Gen De Lattre, be specifically designated as representing Vietnam. He explained that in the Fr view the Fr Union is comparable to the British Commonwealth.
With respect to Tonkin he stated categorically that the Viet Minh had been stopped and “that they knew it”. He acknowledged the presence in Tonkin of several thousand Chi individuals serving with the Viet Minh but reaffirmed that as yet there was no indication of Chi units. He stated that with his present forces he cld successfully handle the Viet Minh plus a small number of Chi volunteers. With his expected reinforcements he cld contain Chi volunteers up to approx 50,000. This latter ability wld be dependent upon an attack not coming [Page 421] before Oct when most of his concrete emplacements wld be finished. By the end of 1951 he was sure of his ability to withstand an attacking force consisting of Viet Minh and Chi volunteers.
The question of a massive Chinese invasion is on his mind day and night. In such an eventuality he hopes with assistance from unnamed allies to the extent of four infantry divisions plus air and an aircraft carrier to not only withstand a Chi attack but to throw it back. Such reinforcement wld, combined with his own command, be adequate to counter the Chi Commie attacking forces which wld be limited by terrain limitations to not much more than say 150,000 men. While in some quarters plans are being made for an evacuation of Tonkin fol a Chi attack it is his view that instead he shld be reinforced. Only in the event that such assistance is not forthcoming wld he plan to fall back on Cochin China. In the latter eventuality he assumes the loss of Thailand and eventually Burma and Malaya.
Throughout the conversation he repeatedly emphasized the aggressive nature of his war plan. He referred to the excellent combat capability of the Viet troops under his command. He referred to his son’s command of such combat in Tonkin and the excellent record the Viet troops had made. On the Viet Minh side he said that he considered them militarily superior to the Chi with exception of artillery and technical equipment.
He took this occasion to remark that he had made a study of mil manpower in many European and South American countries but that unfortunately he had never been invited to the US.
In explaining his tactics in small clean-up campaigns, he pointed out that he was handicapped in being unable to liberate more areas until the Vietnam state army had been built up to the point where it cld take over and occupy such areas. It is the task, he said, of the State Govt to assume the admin of areas his forces liberate and that he has been very careful to insure that there is no French participation in such take-overs. For example, he had forbidden his commissioner in central Vietnam to accompany the governor when the latter toured newly liberated areas.
Sent Dept 2044, rptd info Paris 838, London 32.
- Robert E. Hoey of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, was on a visit in Indochina.↩