751G.00/9–1451
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William M. Gibson of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs
Subject: Interview with General de Lattre de Tassigny regarding Indochina
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister General de Lattre de Tassigny, French High Commissioner in Indochina, Commander of French Forces in the Far East | |
| Assistant Secretary Perkins | |
| Acting Assistant Secretary Merchant | |
| Mr. Gibson, PSA |
General de Lattre opened the conversation with the remark that he was particularly pleased to see the Secretary today for he had not expected to see him until after the Ottawa talks. That he should meet him on his first day in the United States and on the same day he had met the President was especially gratifying. He spoke of the cordial and “encouraging” interview he had had at noon with the President. He believed that the President had a thorough understanding of the Indochina problem and had been very reassured by his statement to the effect that “we would not let Indochina fall into enemy hands”.
After the formalities had been completed, Mr. Schuman made a particular point of stating to the Secretary that he was glad to be able to present General de Lattre himself and to state that General de Lattre would be speaking on behalf of the French Government during his visit to the United States. The Secretary acknowledged this fact and remarked that General Marshall, Mr. Lovett1 and our own officials in the Department were all looking forward to discussing the details of the Indochina problem with the General.
During the main body of the conversation General de Lattre reviewed the Indochina scene in a general sense. There was little stated that added to what Saigon and Paris had already reported.
The General spoke of the improvement in the overall French military potential since he had taken command and MDAP goods began to arrive. He spoke of the victories in Tonkin of last season as having marked the turning of the tide. He stated that if it were made possible [Page 503] to carry out his present military plans and there were no Chinese military intervention the Viet Minh could be eliminated as a righting force in a period of between one and two years. The General did not seek to minimize the danger of Chinese intervention, stating that there were 120,000 men or an estimated six to eight well-trained and armed Chinese divisions at the frontier who could intervene at any time. Their intervention would be disastrous. The General did not think that any Chinese invasion would be immediately fatal for the signs of a Chinese aggression would be evident in advance; the French could presumably fight a delaying action, if nothing else.
The General spoke in some detail on the subject of the national armies. In his estimation the young Vietnamese make excellent soldiers. He spoke of the two Vietnamese parachutist battalions now in service which have become able and effective units after only a few weeks of training. He observed that it was essential that the loyalist side train the youth for active service for if we did not Ho Chi Minh would (and does). The General termed the youth of Vietnam as being as numerous as the rice shoots—as ready for plucking and as useful. He described the Vietnamese as being very flexible politically. The same man who has been made into a Grade A parachutist in the governmental forces would make a fantatical communist guerrilla if Ho Chi Minh had reached him first. He spoke of the problem of filling the officer cadres in the national army and remarked that Bao Dai and President Huu had given him considerable support in this regard but the problem was very far from being solved. He hoped more progress would be made after his return from the United States with news that the Americans had promised to support the Franco-Vietnamese program on the basis that in Vietnam, as in the rest of the Orient, nothing succeeds like success.
The National Army of Vietnam, as contemplated, will have 120,000 men and 4,000 officers. The officers must all be Vietnamese; a single French officer would handicap the effectiveness of any unit.
The General referred to Bao Dai as the ablest statesman in Vietnam. At this comment Mr. Schuman interjected that he was perhaps the only one. De Lattre spoke with enthusiasm of the Emperor and his authority. He recounted several recent instances when Bao Dai showed the proper cooperative spirit and, in some cases, even initiative.
The Secretary stated that the nature of the war in Indochina was not entirely clear to him. Did, for instance, the General have to face a continuous front or was it a broken one. The General replied that although in the past there had been no front in the Western sense, the recent Viet Minh offensives in Tonkin had been done on a frontal [Page 504] basis with a set line of combat. The front is never stable, however, for the moment a line is established the enemy soldiers one has been facing slip through one’s feet and a few hours later on are at one’s back. The General stated that the only method to combat the Viet Minh was by using their own tactics of surprise enveloping movements, the success of which depended entirely on the ability of keeping the plan of attack secret in advance. Mr. Schuman interjected at this point that one of the functions the French hoped to improve with the formation of the national armies was intelligence. De Lattre agreed with the comment that intelligence was only effective by using natives to deal with natives.
At this point General de Lattre referred again to his hope that he would return to Vietnam with news of a successful American trip. The Secretary stated, referring to the Department’s responsibilities in the matter, “we shall support you very strongly”.
De Lattre ref erred to the prospect of peace in Korea and his hope that, if successful, it would result in the diversion of military matériel from Korea to Indochina. The Secretary answered that he didn’t think the prospects of a cease fire in Korea were particularly bright at this moment. The General expressed his theory that the Korean and Indochina wars were “one war” and that in order to be effective there must be “one peace”.
Toward the end, the General referred with considerable emphasis to the danger of allowing the Vietnamese to slip behind the Asiatic iron curtain. He stated that there was no country so potentially useful to the communists as the Associated States. Their youth, he said, was very clever and learned very quickly but were very unstable. The General felt that once a Vietnamese became a communist he was a communist forever and an exceedingly fanatical one. If the French were not in Vietnam, the communists would most certainly be.
Finally, Mr. Schuman spoke of the excellent impression the Associated States delegations had made at San Francisco. The Secretary agreed with this observation.
The interview closed with the General’s comment that “we must save these countries from the fate of communism”; the Secretary reaffirmed this conviction and the Department’s intention to cooperate fully with the General in the course of his presentation to the United States authorities.
- Robert A. Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Secretary of Defense from September 17.↩