Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

751G.00/9–1751

Minutes of the Second Meeting With General de Lattre de Tassigny, at the Department of State, September 17, 1951, 3:30 p.m.¹

Saigon, September 17, 1951, 3:30 p.m.

top secret
de Lattre Talks Min–2

Vietnam Army (Cont’d)

General de Lattre opened the afternoon meeting by continuing his description of the present status of the Vietnam army. He reported that Bao Dai agreed with him completely concerning the need to redouble the efforts to build a National Vietnam army. A figure of 60,000 men had been set, these to be called up in groups of 15,000, with the expectation that the first group would be deployed in Vietnam by October 15, 1951. But soldiers were not enough, the General said; equipment and officers were vitally needed. Armament was primarily an American problem. France had the courage, the men, and the will, but if she did not have the means, nothing could be accomplished. Vietnam needed 2,000 officers for 40,000 men, yet at present not even 500 “real” officers were available; 300 officers were now in school but 1,000 were required by the end of 1952.

His own relations with Bao Dai were excellent, the General asserted, and the Vietnam leader was making a stronger effort to mobilize his country behind the joint cause. On the contrary, he had found it impossible to work with Giao Governor of Central Vietnam who had been proposed as Chief of Staff of the Vietnam army. He had impressed upon Bao Dai the fact that the flower of French youth were on the Vietnam side, dying for their cause, protecting their national interests. This rapprochement with Bao Dai had been a gradual process since mutual trust between the two men had developed only after General had explained to Bao Dai that he understood his political problems and future aspirations. General de Lattre had told Bao Dai that he (Bao Dai) must assume the leadership of his own army since in a country as divided as Indochina, the army was the best means of unification. The army, therefore, must be placed under the control of the Chief of State, and Bao Dai was still the best political figure in Vietnam, despite his predilection for hunting and fishing. General de Lattre would continue to impress upon Bao Dai the importance of his becoming the true leader of the Army, and there appeared to be no difficulty on this point at the moment.

General de Lattre explained that efforts were being made to prepare and equip from four to eight divisions for the Vietnam National army by the end of 1952, such divisions to be composed entirely of Vietnamese. He noted that the “Yellow Paper” was incorrect in stating that there were Frenchmen in the National army’s infantry units, although it was true that French officers were being utilized in the National army’s staff corps since the Vietnamese did not object to non-nationals serving in a staff capacity. Upon his return to Vietnam, General de Lattre expected to have from three to four top-rate, extremely mobile National divisions fighting on the front in exactly the same status as the European army units. Bao Dai, upon the advice of the General, would be asked to promote outstanding Vietnamese leaders to the rank of General in the National army, even though they might be only 25 years of age. But the main problem was still the lack of equipment.

Mr. Merchant said that the Department of State would reemphasize to the Defense Department the political and strategic problems faced by Indochina and would make every effort to insure that the question of equipment would receive proper attention at the Pentagon. It was the will of the Department of State, he said, to speed the delivery of military equipment to Indochina, and the urgency of the situation was well understood by Mr. Young and Mr. Bingham, both of whom were most anxious to talk with the General’s staff about the specific items needed. Mr. Merchant inquired whether the General could estimate how long a period would elapse before the first new division of the National army would reach the front, thus permitting French units to be released for European duty. General de Lattre answered that three units of Vietnamese troops should reach the Tonkin front next month.

ECA Assistance

Mr. Merchant asked whether the General wished to comment on the US economic aid program in Indochina, adding that he should realize that the U.S. felt that it was to the common interest of both countries to give such aid directly to the governments of the three Associated States and to keep local French leaders informed of current economic arrangements. Mr. Merchant understood, however, that the General felt that economic aid could be used more directly for military purposes. General de Lattre replied that when he had first arrived in Indochina in December, 1950, he had felt that the aid program was not working out on a satisfactory basis. According to the General, the problem was caused by the fact that a number of young men with a “missionary zeal” were dispensing economic aid with the result that there was a feeling on the part of some that they were using this aid to extend American influence. The results could only be bad, the General, explained, if somebody was attempting to “put rocks” into the machinery of the Vietnam-Franco relationships and into the machinery of Franco-American friendship, particularly when the French Commonwealth was involved. He had taken up this question with Minister Heath who had informed him that since such projects were not under State Department jurisdiction, it would be advisable that the General explain his difficulties to Mr. Blum. Discussion had taken place with Mr. Blum early in August at which time the General explained that, while direct aid might rightly be sent directly to the Associated States, such economic assistance should remain within the framework of the concept of the French Union. He had also explained to Mr. Blum at that time that if economic aid were used to extend American influence, great harm would result. However, these discussions had proved most successful and a basis of agreement had been reached regarding the relationship between the economic aid program and the French Union. He had been informed that Mr. Blum was no longer in Indochina but hoped that his relationship with Mr. Blum’s successor would be equally harmonious. Minister Heath commented that he thought the past misunderstanding had been cleared up. Mr. Griffin concurred, saying that he did not feel that future misunderstandings would arise because liaison channels between ECA and the General’s staff had improved and a continued exchange of information through informal talks had been planned. By a more acute examination of the places in which economic aid would have the most advantageous military results it would be possible to build greater faith in the program. Mr. Griffen added that the major purpose of the U.S. program was to make the people of Indochina feel that the economic aid was contributing to the welfare of all. General de Lattre reiterated that the earlier disagreements were due largely to the overly zealous activity of the “young missionaries” and suggested that future programs should be directed more toward strengthening the infrastructure and toward building roads, railroads, port facilities and factories. He suggested that the allocation of aid funds might be handled through a committee composed of defense representatives of France, the U.S., and the Associated States.

Future Military Leadership

When Mr. Bingham asked what would happen when General de Lattre left Indochina, the General replied that several men were being groomed to take more important positions of military leadership. General de Linares was assuming increasing authority in the Tonkin area, while in the South, General de Lattre’s deputy, General Salan, a close friend of the Vietnamese, was in command. Both men were doing a magnificent job as witnessed by the successful military operations in Indochina during the recent period in which General de Lattre had been absent; and, furthermore, each had the confidence of the troops. General de Lattre thought that his greatest personal value lay in the fact that he held the confidence, both of the French Government and of Bao Dai. He emphasized that although he must remain in Indochina for at least a year, his future success rested entirely in U.S. hands. In the Orient, he said, things are not only as they are but must be as they appear to be. In other words, as Commanding General he must not only have the necessary authority to do the job, but he must also appear to have the authority.

Mr. Merchant promised that the State Department representatives would work actively to help the General wherever possible and suggested that the General’s staff discuss their individual problems with the military leaders. Specifically, he suggested that Mr. Young and Mr. Bingham might talk with General Allard in order to assess his immediate needs.

Recommended French Approach

General de Lattre requested Mr. Merchant to advise him of the best method to use in seeking further military aid from American authorities. Mr. Merchant suggested two approaches: (1) that the General see Mr. Lovett and General Collins,² and (2) that in his talks with military leaders, he emphasize the importance of specific items and request a definite date for their delivery. He felt certain that the General would have great difficulty in persuading the U.S. Government that Indochina should have a priority ahead of Korea and reminded him that he must recognize that the U.S. was faced with the same problems that are common to all governments, viz that it was impossible in many cases to find necessary funds for all desired projects. However, the best result could possibly be obtained if he discussed each item with the military on an individual basis—so many rifles, howitzers, trucks, etc.—and requested that each item be delivered by a specific date.

1. All participants in the morning meeting attended the afternoon session. In addition, the following officials were present: Pierre Millet, Counselor, French Embassy in the United States; R. Allen Griffin, Director of the Far East Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration; and David Williamson, Chief-designate of the ECA Mission at Saigon. Williamson had been assigned to replace Robert Blum on August 31 and actually assumed control on October 24. Blum returned to Washington to become Acting Director of the Far East Program Division.
2. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.